Brief Outline of the Operation[1]
Operation Overlord was launched on 6 June 1944. The immediate
command of the air forces participating was vested in the Air
Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who was
directly responsible for the overall control of the Allied Expeditionary Air
Forces.
The original plan of operations was to put a force ashore over five main
beach areas, three of which were British and two American. It
involved the consolidation, at the earliest opportunity, of a firm bridgehead
running some five miles inland from the coast from Utah beach on the east coast
of the Contentin Peninsula in the east to the town of Caen and the River Orne
in the west.2
The plan for the use of air power in direct support of the assault
called for the fulfilment of the following principal air tasks:
a) To protect the cross-channel movement
of the assault forces against enemy attack, and to assist the Allied naval
forces to protect the assault craft and shipping from enemy naval forces.
b) To prepare the
way for the assault by neutralising the coast and beach defence.
c) To protect the
landing beaches and the shipping concentrations from enemy air attack.
d) To dislocate
enemy communications and control during the assault.
It was anticipated that the enemy would launch a counter-attack at the
earliest opportunity to divide our forces by means of a thrust northwards
towards Bayeux and thus isolate the British assault forces north of Caen and
the American assault forces to the west of the river Vire. This
attack was made but was successfully held.3
Directly the enemy’s initial counter blow had lost its momentum, it was
planned that the Americans would take the port of Cherbourg as soon as
possible, expand their western flank of the bridgehead as far as Avranches,
forming a secure base for any future advance into the Brest Peninsula or down
the river Loire, while the emphasis of the build-up, particularly in armoured
mobile formations, would be made in the Caen sector. The final
breakout from the bridgehead would occur once the forces ashore had been
regrouped and the original assault brigades, which were not mobile owing to the
light scales of equipment which their amphibious operations had forced them to
carry, had been withdrawn. It was found that the C-in-C’s plan, in
spite of gallant attempts by the Army, supported by heavy concentrations of
both Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, could not be
accomplished. The concentration of the enemy’s best divisions in the
Caen sector, and their fighting strength, prevented a breakthrough and the air
forces could not obtain the airfields which were so urgently
required. It therefore became necessary to increase the number of
airfields above those that had been planned for the area
Ouistreham-Caen-Bayeux-Arromanches. The Americans likewise increased
the density of their airfields beyond that planned on the Contentin Peninsula.
The Build-up of Air Forces in the
Bridgehead
The main problem of the air forces at this stage was to ensure the
maximum possible build-up of squadrons based in Normandy as the continued
location of short-range aircraft in England involved much wasted
flying. Unless the short-range squadrons were moved to the Continent
within seven weeks, the rate of effort which could be maintained would be insufficient
to maintain air superiority, to harass enemy communications and delay the
build-up of enemy ground forces which could otherwise concentrate in superior
numbers against the bridgehead.
The high degree of air superiority that was achieved over the bridgehead
soon after the commencement of operations plus the very high standard of rapid
airfield construction enabled more aircraft to be concentrated on each airfield
than was originally planned.
In accordance with the maintenance plan, the first RAF personnel to be
landed on the Continent were the three Beach units that formed part of the Army
beach groups which controlled the landings in the British sector. By
the evening of “D-Day” the advance party of Headquarters No 83
Group was also put ashore successfully. Thereafter the build-up of
units went ahead, controlled by an Inter-Service organisation located at
Portsmouth. On the arrival of elements of Headquarters No 83 Group
in France, all RAF units in Normandy were placed under the local command of the
group until such time as 2nd TAF Headquarters moved into
Normandy. This ensured that all units in the bridgehead had one
controlling formation to whom they could state their problems, and who could
represent the requirements of the Royal Air Force to the Army in the case of
common user supplies, and to HQ 2nd TAF for supplies peculiar
to the Royal Air Force. Associated to this system command the AOC No
83 Group was made responsible for calling into the bridgehead all RAF units
that were required to be moved over. This ensured that the build-up
of the RAF formations was controlled smoothly, and that no units not essential
to the operations in hand were moved to the bridgehead to add to the congestion
that was experienced.
On 7 June, the first two servicing commando units arrived over the
beaches. A day later the first emergency landing strip was levelled
at Asnelles to enable a Spitfire to make the first aircraft landing at 1300
hours. On 9 June four more airstrips were available for aircraft at
Bazenville, St Crois, Camilly and Coulombs respectively. By 10 June,
three more airstrips had been established by the Americans at St Laurent,
Pouppeville and Beuzeville. By the afternoon of 9 June 3,537 men and 815
vehicles had been landed for the Royal Air Force in the beachhead. Landings of
RAF personnel and vehicles from “D” Day up to D plus 3 were:
“D” Day -
456 vehicles -
1,818 men
7 June -
594 vehicles -
2,615 men
8 June
- 750
vehicles - 3,232
men
9 June -
815 vehicles -
3,537 men
By 20 June, 13,000 men and 3,200 vehicles had been disembarked.
The move of the squadrons of 2nd TAF commenced on D plus
4 and the transfer of the fighter wings from their advanced landing grounds in
southern England to Normandy worked smoothly and efficiently. During
the move the squadrons were able to operate throughout the daylight hours. The
wings were organised into three parties, ie main, airlift and rear
parties. The main party moved by sea prior to the move of the
aircraft and was installed on the strip in Normandy before the wing moved; a
small rear party followed by sea after the airlift party had flown over.
During the period that the main party were moving from the strip in
southern England to the strip in Normandy, normally a period of 10 to 12 days,
which included packing up, concentration, marshalling, ship borne time, landing,
etc, the wings and squadrons with their airlift party moved to one of three
main backer-up stations. Squadrons operated continuously from the
backer-up stations, serviced and fed by the station personnel, assisted by the
specialised team from the wing and squadrons which formed the airlift
party. When the main parties of wings and squadrons signalled that
they were ready to received the aircraft in Normandy, the squadrons flew over
accompanied by their airlift parties in Dakota aircraft. The aircraft
were then able to operate the same day from Normandy. The airlift
party for the normal operational wing of four squadrons consisted of some 10 to
12 Dakota aircraft loads.
One of the disadvantages, unexpected in a western theatre of war, which
the squadrons experienced on landing in Normandy, was the fact that the soil on
which the airfields had to be constructed contained a very high proportion of
abrasive silica dust which lessened the life of the engines, particularly those
which were not fitted with air-cleaning devices. After an intensive
effort made by the Ministry of Aircraft Production with the adoption of various
impromptu expediencies, such as pumping oil or sea water on to the landing and
taxying surfaces, and the reduction for warming-up time to a minimum, the
crisis was passed successfully.
Owing to the failure of our forces to break through immediately after
the landing, the airstrips were under shell fire and were being bombed
intermittently at night during the early days of the build-up4. On
13 June, there were, however, sufficient stocks of petrol, ammunition and
rocket projectiles to permit of 3 days’ maximum effort of 200 sorties per day,
but so far the best day’s effort from France had been 140
sorties. By 20 June, the 2nd TAF had six landing
grounds in use, but owing to the rapid transfer of squadrons – one wing every
five days, there was, as Air Marshall Coningham put it, “only standing
room on the Continent for the moment”5. At this period the force was
somewhat short of bombs, as it was anticipated that no bombs would be required
until D plus 18, but because there was little air fighting the AOC No 83 Group
used every available fighter to carry bombs. To make up the shortage
five special ships each carrying 350 tons of bombs were sent to the beachhead
and when the shortage was still felt, 30 Dakota aircraft loads, each carrying
2½ tons of 500 lb bombs were despatched from the United
Kingdom. Three thousand tons of petrol were now in dumps in
Normandy, some of which was on the landing grounds. In addition,
2,500 gallons of oil, ½ million rounds of ammunition and 1,000 cylinders of
oxygen and hydrogen were available. The daily emergency life by sea
was working well. Instead of the 20 tons per day which had been
planned, 2nd TAF were getting 30 tons every second day which
suited them better. The one repair and salvage unit which had been
transferred to Normandy was working well and two air stores parks were also in
operation.
On 29 June, No 83 Group, complete with its nine wings and ancillary
units was complete on the Continent. Ten airfields were in use by
the RAF and six by the USAAF. Supplies of hessian strips to overcome
the dust problem were arriving and it was arranged in future that every fourth
airfield would be a hessian airfield. All the Typhoon aircraft had
been returned to England and fitted with dust deflectors, a measure which
appeared to overcome 80 per cent of the troubles experienced but no less than
66 engines removed from aircraft as the result of damage caused by dust were
found to be beyond the repair of RAF facilities. A shortage of main
planes was being experienced owing to unforeseen damage by “flak”.
The cross-channel low loader service commenced on 29 June with two LCTs
crossing the water with low loaders every second day. The vehicles
were used to convey the needed main planes and heavy equipment for the air
stores parks.
Throughout July the relatively static and inactive conditions on the
Caen front, resulting from the continued failure to break through the enemy
lines, retarded the progress of increasing the strength of the Royal Air Force
in Normandy6. At the beginning of the month a
small administrative staff of seven officers from No 85 (Maintenance) Group was
attached to Headquarters No 83 Group to deal with the detachments and base
details of No 85 Group as they were phased into the Continent. By 14
June, the Aviation and Ammunition Park was completed and fully stocked and some
sections of the Forward Repair Unit were established and working
well. The low loader shuttle service was organised to return to the
United Kingdom twelve crashed aircraft every other day. Owing to
lack of work the number of repair and salvage units was cut down to one per two
wings.
On 10 August 1944 No 85 (Maintenance) Group was transferred from AEAF to
the control of 2nd TAF and the servicing echelon system for the
maintenance of squadrons was introduced.
The Work of the Servicing Commandos[7]
The six servicing commando unit formed in April 1943 were all employed
in connection with the Normandy landings, either in direct support of advanced
squadrons or a bases in the south of England.
The four which operated from advanced landing grounds in France were
grouped in pairs, each pair operating from one airfield and having attached to
it a repair and salvage unit element with two salvage cranes and airfield
salvage equipment, a propeller fitting party complete with twelve fully
assembled propellers, and a wing flying control section with fire tender and
ambulance. The chief technical officer of the wing which was to take
over the advanced landing ground was attached to the servicing commando party
to act as chief technical officer of the airfield. Owing to the
nature of the operation none of the servicing commandos was employed as
extensively as had been planned, but it was demonstrated that one commando
could meet a peak load of 100 fighter sorties per day.
No 3210 SCU landed on 7 June 1944 near St Croix-sur-Mer, were it
serviced the aircraft of the first squadron to land in Normandy on 9
June. No 3205 SCU landed at Ver-sur-Mer also on 7 June and
co-operated with No 3210 SCU in the servicing of aircraft at the adjacent
landing strip. The Units were employed in this neighbourhood for the
remainder of the month, working as servicing units. On 30 June No
3205 SCU was attached to No 403 Repair and Salvage unit and engaged in the
collection of damaged aircraft; No 3210 SCU joined No 405 RSU at Martragny. At
the end of July both these units were withdrawn to England, No 3205 being
attached to No 83 Group Support Unit at Bognor Regis and No 3210 to No 84 Group
Support Unit at Thruxton. At these stations the servicing commando
units were employed principally on the modification and inspection of new
aircraft.
No’s 3206 and 3208 SCU landed in Normandy, near Coulombs, on 15 and 16
June, though part of No 3206 SCU remained at Thorney Island until the
withdrawal of No 3205 at the end of July when it took over the duties of the
latter unit. Following the collapse of the German front in Normandy
No 3208 SCU moved forward to Lille on 9 September and to Melsbroeck in Belguim
on 28 September. No 3206 reached Brussels area on 11 September,
Eindhoven on 16 October and Dieste on 29 October. The units remained
in these localities, employed on salvage and repair work and a certain amount
of servicing, until the end of March 1945 when they were disbanded.
As on all previous occasions when they had been used, the commando units
had to undertake up to 60 per cent of the pre-stocking of the landing grounds
owing to the inability of the army to meet its full commitments in this
respect.
No difficulties were experienced in refuelling and rearming aircraft,
all refuelling being done with jerricans and a filter funnel. The
hand refuelling gear was never used and it was the recommendation of the chief
technical officer, 2nd TAF, to dispense with it.
The technical qualifications of the Group I tradesman proved invaluable
and the high proportion included in the establishment was considered absolutely
essential during the early stages of an assault operation, when the Group I
tradesmen of wings and repair and salvage units would not be
available. A large number of aircraft were made serviceable at the
beachhead landing grounds by the exchange of propellers, carburettors, constant
speed units, flaps, rudders and many other such components, thus enabling
aircraft to fly back to base and assisting to maintain the high rate of
serviceability which existed during the assault period. Once the
Tactical Air Force was established in the bridgehead the Sicily experience was
repeated; there was little further need for the servicing commando unit, only
two of which remained on the Continent. These two were replaced, in
December 1944, by refuelling and rearming parties. The scales of
equipment provided formed a satisfactory basis for the requirements of the
operation but it was decided in the planning stage that the spares and equipment
carried must be entirely dependent on the detailed planning of the operation
for which the servicing commandos were used. The scales were
adjusted accordingly, prior to the operation. Spares carried covered
types of aircraft to be operated but not other types which might in emergency
use the advanced landing grounds. Fourteen day packs of spares for
each type were provided at the base so that the servicing commandos could be
restocked by fast sea craft or by air, also to cover the possibility of alternations
to the basic plan necessitating the servicing of types of aircraft other than
those originally intended.
The criticism made in Sicily, concerning the over-accentuation of the
assault aspect in the training of the commando personnel, was repeated by the
AOC-in-C, 2nd TAF. He submitted that, before the
servicing commando unit could take over, it was essential that the site should
have been firmly secured by the Army and the airfield constructed or repaired
by the airfield construction parties. Accordingly, though subject to
sniping and shell fire, the commando personnel had little need for skill in
boat work, cliff-scaling and the use of arms.
Several proposals were made for increases in establishment but it was
realised that in the majority of instances these arose out of needs peculiar to
the nature of the operation and could be covered by the attachment to the unit
of such specialist personnel as might be required. Certain
recommendations were, however, made, which affected the basic establishment of
the servicing commando unit. The most important was that the rank of
the commanding officer should be raised to squadron leader to enable him more
effectively to conduct the necessary Inter-Service discussions and arrangements
arising in the initial stages of a combined Services assault. His
position as a junior officer seriously restricted his disciplinary powers and
was detrimental to the efficiency of the unit. It was felt that an
additional engineer officer should be carried on the establishment. It
had been necessary on previous operations frequently to split up the unit into
two, or more, detached groups operating on different airfields. An
additional flying officer, engineer, had been attached to each commando unit
for the Overlord operation and as this move had, in the event, proved its value
it was recommended that the post be permanently
established. Provision for MT maintenance had been provided by the
inclusion in the establishment of two fitters (MT) – one a corporal – and an MT
mechanic. The importance of transport serviceability was considered
such as to warrant a sergeant in charge in lieu of the corporal.
The chief technical officer, summing up in his report, concluded that
servicing commandos were essential for the assault phase of a waterborne
invasion but that it was unnecessary to retain them once the wing personnel had
landed and taken over the maintenance of their own aircraft. The
AOC-in-C 2nd TAF in his covering letter suggested that three
such units would have met the needs of the Tactical Air Force and that the
provision of six was extravagant. He considered that such tactical
groups as No’s 83 and 84 Groups should be provided with a refuelling and
rearming party. Such a party would support the commandos in the assault
phase. He pointed out, further, that the majority of the ground
personnel of four complete wings was immobilised in marshalling or
concentration areas during the first ten days of the operation, while their
squadrons were being operated by “backer-up” stations in the
United Kingdom or by servicing commandos in the bridgehead. He felt
that it would have been possible and preferable to have made up advance parties
from these wings, who in addition to three servicing commandos could have
carried out all necessary servicing in the bridgehead area during the first
fortnight of the operation. He did not underrate the value of the
commandos which, by providing small, well-trained units with a high proportion
of skilled personnel, had enabled the entry of complete wing ground parties to
be postponed, thereby allowing the armies to have a greater proportion of their
personnel and vehicles in the assault phase convoys.
On 28 July 1944, Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, passed to
the Air Ministry the information received from the Air Marshal Commanding 2nd TAF
that the servicing commando units under this command had served their
purpose. Authority was requested to disband No’s 3205 and 3207
Commandos in No 83 Group and No’s 3209 and 3210 in No 84 Group. It
was desired to retain one commando unit in each group until future commitments
were known. No’s 3207 and 3209 SCUs had not moved to France as
units, though detachments had been across and personnel had been posted to
other servicing commando units to replace wastage. Their chief work
had been the servicing of aircraft operating from airfields in
England. They performed a variety of tasks at various stations that
were temporarily in need of assistance during the stress of the early period of
the landings. Although only No’s 3206 and 3208 SCUs were retained in
France, the remaining four units were not disbanded but were re-equipped and
embarked for the Far East at the end of 1944.
1 A full account of the operation is given in AHB Narrative The
Liberation of North West Europe, Volume II.
2 Despatch by ACM Leigh-Mallory.
3 Report by AM Coningham. AM File C.28691/45.
4 LM/7977/DGO, 14 June 1944.
5 LM/8116/DGO, 21 June 1944.
6 LM/8298/DGO, 14 July 1944.
7 ORBs of Servicing Commando Units and AM File S.83764.
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