RAF Maintenance during the Early Stages of Overlord



Brief Outline of the Operation[1]

Operation Overlord was launched on 6 June 1944.  The immediate command of the air forces participating was vested in the Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who was directly responsible for the overall control of the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces.

The original plan of operations was to put a force ashore over five main beach areas, three of which were British and two American.  It involved the consolidation, at the earliest opportunity, of a firm bridgehead running some five miles inland from the coast from Utah beach on the east coast of the Contentin Peninsula in the east to the town of Caen and the River Orne in the west.2

The plan for the use of air power in direct support of the assault called for the fulfilment of the following principal air tasks:

a) To protect the cross-channel movement of the assault forces against enemy attack, and to assist the Allied naval forces to protect the assault craft and shipping from enemy naval forces.

b) To prepare the way for the assault by neutralising the coast and beach defence.

c) To protect the landing beaches and the shipping concentrations from enemy air attack.

d) To dislocate enemy communications and control during the assault.

It was anticipated that the enemy would launch a counter-attack at the earliest opportunity to divide our forces by means of a thrust northwards towards Bayeux and thus isolate the British assault forces north of Caen and the American assault forces to the west of the river Vire.  This attack was made but was successfully held.3

Directly the enemy’s initial counter blow had lost its momentum, it was planned that the Americans would take the port of Cherbourg as soon as possible, expand their western flank of the bridgehead as far as Avranches, forming a secure base for any future advance into the Brest Peninsula or down the river Loire, while the emphasis of the build-up, particularly in armoured mobile formations, would be made in the Caen sector.  The final breakout from the bridgehead would occur once the forces ashore had been regrouped and the original assault brigades, which were not mobile owing to the light scales of equipment which their amphibious operations had forced them to carry, had been withdrawn.  It was found that the C-in-C’s plan, in spite of gallant attempts by the Army, supported by heavy concentrations of both Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, could not be accomplished.  The concentration of the enemy’s best divisions in the Caen sector, and their fighting strength, prevented a breakthrough and the air forces could not obtain the airfields which were so urgently required.  It therefore became necessary to increase the number of airfields above those that had been planned for the area Ouistreham-Caen-Bayeux-Arromanches.  The Americans likewise increased the density of their airfields beyond that planned on the Contentin Peninsula.

The Build-up of Air Forces in the Bridgehead

The main problem of the air forces at this stage was to ensure the maximum possible build-up of squadrons based in Normandy as the continued location of short-range aircraft in England involved much wasted flying.  Unless the short-range squadrons were moved to the Continent within seven weeks, the rate of effort which could be maintained would be insufficient to maintain air superiority, to harass enemy communications and delay the build-up of enemy ground forces which could otherwise concentrate in superior numbers against the bridgehead.

The high degree of air superiority that was achieved over the bridgehead soon after the commencement of operations plus the very high standard of rapid airfield construction enabled more aircraft to be concentrated on each airfield than was originally planned.

In accordance with the maintenance plan, the first RAF personnel to be landed on the Continent were the three Beach units that formed part of the Army beach groups which controlled the landings in the British sector.  By the evening of “D-Day” the advance party of Headquarters No 83 Group was also put ashore successfully.  Thereafter the build-up of units went ahead, controlled by an Inter-Service organisation located at Portsmouth.  On the arrival of elements of Headquarters No 83 Group in France, all RAF units in Normandy were placed under the local command of the group until such time as 2nd TAF Headquarters moved into Normandy.  This ensured that all units in the bridgehead had one controlling formation to whom they could state their problems, and who could represent the requirements of the Royal Air Force to the Army in the case of common user supplies, and to HQ 2nd TAF for supplies peculiar to the Royal Air Force.  Associated to this system command the AOC No 83 Group was made responsible for calling into the bridgehead all RAF units that were required to be moved over.  This ensured that the build-up of the RAF formations was controlled smoothly, and that no units not essential to the operations in hand were moved to the bridgehead to add to the congestion that was experienced.

On 7 June, the first two servicing commando units arrived over the beaches.  A day later the first emergency landing strip was levelled at Asnelles to enable a Spitfire to make the first aircraft landing at 1300 hours.  On 9 June four more airstrips were available for aircraft at Bazenville, St Crois, Camilly and Coulombs respectively.  By 10 June, three more airstrips had been established by the Americans at St Laurent, Pouppeville and Beuzeville. By the afternoon of 9 June 3,537 men and 815 vehicles had been landed for the Royal Air Force in the beachhead. Landings of RAF personnel and vehicles from “D” Day up to D plus 3 were:

“D” Day           -        456 vehicles        -        1,818 men
7 June             -        594 vehicles        -        2,615 men
8 June             -        750 vehicles        -        3,232 men
9 June             -        815 vehicles        -        3,537 men

By 20 June, 13,000 men and 3,200 vehicles had been disembarked.

The move of the squadrons of 2nd TAF commenced on D plus 4 and the transfer of the fighter wings from their advanced landing grounds in southern England to Normandy worked smoothly and efficiently.  During the move the squadrons were able to operate throughout the daylight hours.  The wings were organised into three parties, ie main, airlift and rear parties.  The main party moved by sea prior to the move of the aircraft and was installed on the strip in Normandy before the wing moved; a small rear party followed by sea after the airlift party had flown over.

During the period that the main party were moving from the strip in southern England to the strip in Normandy, normally a period of 10 to 12 days, which included packing up, concentration, marshalling, ship borne time, landing, etc, the wings and squadrons with their airlift party moved to one of three main backer-up stations.  Squadrons operated continuously from the backer-up stations, serviced and fed by the station personnel, assisted by the specialised team from the wing and squadrons which formed the airlift party.  When the main parties of wings and squadrons signalled that they were ready to received the aircraft in Normandy, the squadrons flew over accompanied by their airlift parties in Dakota aircraft.  The aircraft were then able to operate the same day from Normandy.  The airlift party for the normal operational wing of four squadrons consisted of some 10 to 12 Dakota aircraft loads.

One of the disadvantages, unexpected in a western theatre of war, which the squadrons experienced on landing in Normandy, was the fact that the soil on which the airfields had to be constructed contained a very high proportion of abrasive silica dust which lessened the life of the engines, particularly those which were not fitted with air-cleaning devices.  After an intensive effort made by the Ministry of Aircraft Production with the adoption of various impromptu expediencies, such as pumping oil or sea water on to the landing and taxying surfaces, and the reduction for warming-up time to a minimum, the crisis was passed successfully.

Owing to the failure of our forces to break through immediately after the landing, the airstrips were under shell fire and were being bombed intermittently at night during the early days of the build-up4.  On 13 June, there were, however, sufficient stocks of petrol, ammunition and rocket projectiles to permit of 3 days’ maximum effort of 200 sorties per day, but so far the best day’s effort from France had been 140 sorties.  By 20 June, the 2nd TAF had six landing grounds in use, but owing to the rapid transfer of squadrons – one wing every five days, there was, as Air Marshall Coningham put it, “only standing room on the Continent for the moment”5.  At this period the force was somewhat short of bombs, as it was anticipated that no bombs would be required until D plus 18, but because there was little air fighting the AOC No 83 Group used every available fighter to carry bombs.  To make up the shortage five special ships each carrying 350 tons of bombs were sent to the beachhead and when the shortage was still felt, 30 Dakota aircraft loads, each carrying 2½ tons of 500 lb bombs were despatched from the United Kingdom.  Three thousand tons of petrol were now in dumps in Normandy, some of which was on the landing grounds.  In addition, 2,500 gallons of oil, ½ million rounds of ammunition and 1,000 cylinders of oxygen and hydrogen were available.  The daily emergency life by sea was working well.  Instead of the 20 tons per day which had been planned, 2nd TAF were getting 30 tons every second day which suited them better.  The one repair and salvage unit which had been transferred to Normandy was working well and two air stores parks were also in operation.

On 29 June, No 83 Group, complete with its nine wings and ancillary units was complete on the Continent.  Ten airfields were in use by the RAF and six by the USAAF.  Supplies of hessian strips to overcome the dust problem were arriving and it was arranged in future that every fourth airfield would be a hessian airfield.  All the Typhoon aircraft had been returned to England and fitted with dust deflectors, a measure which appeared to overcome 80 per cent of the troubles experienced but no less than 66 engines removed from aircraft as the result of damage caused by dust were found to be beyond the repair of RAF facilities.  A shortage of main planes was being experienced owing to unforeseen damage by “flak”.

The cross-channel low loader service commenced on 29 June with two LCTs crossing the water with low loaders every second day.  The vehicles were used to convey the needed main planes and heavy equipment for the air stores parks.

Throughout July the relatively static and inactive conditions on the Caen front, resulting from the continued failure to break through the enemy lines, retarded the progress of increasing the strength of the Royal Air Force in Normandy6.  At the beginning of the month a small administrative staff of seven officers from No 85 (Maintenance) Group was attached to Headquarters No 83 Group to deal with the detachments and base details of No 85 Group as they were phased into the Continent.  By 14 June, the Aviation and Ammunition Park was completed and fully stocked and some sections of the Forward Repair Unit were established and working well.  The low loader shuttle service was organised to return to the United Kingdom twelve crashed aircraft every other day.  Owing to lack of work the number of repair and salvage units was cut down to one per two wings.

On 10 August 1944 No 85 (Maintenance) Group was transferred from AEAF to the control of 2nd TAF and the servicing echelon system for the maintenance of squadrons was introduced.

The Work of the Servicing Commandos[7]

The six servicing commando unit formed in April 1943 were all employed in connection with the Normandy landings, either in direct support of advanced squadrons or a bases in the south of England.

The four which operated from advanced landing grounds in France were grouped in pairs, each pair operating from one airfield and having attached to it a repair and salvage unit element with two salvage cranes and airfield salvage equipment, a propeller fitting party complete with twelve fully assembled propellers, and a wing flying control section with fire tender and ambulance.  The chief technical officer of the wing which was to take over the advanced landing ground was attached to the servicing commando party to act as chief technical officer of the airfield.  Owing to the nature of the operation none of the servicing commandos was employed as extensively as had been planned, but it was demonstrated that one commando could meet a peak load of 100 fighter sorties per day.

No 3210 SCU landed on 7 June 1944 near St Croix-sur-Mer, were it serviced the aircraft of the first squadron to land in Normandy on 9 June.  No 3205 SCU landed at Ver-sur-Mer also on 7 June and co-operated with No 3210 SCU in the servicing of aircraft at the adjacent landing strip.  The Units were employed in this neighbourhood for the remainder of the month, working as servicing units.  On 30 June No 3205 SCU was attached to No 403 Repair and Salvage unit and engaged in the collection of damaged aircraft; No 3210 SCU joined No 405 RSU at Martragny.  At the end of July both these units were withdrawn to England, No 3205 being attached to No 83 Group Support Unit at Bognor Regis and No 3210 to No 84 Group Support Unit at Thruxton.  At these stations the servicing commando units were employed principally on the modification and inspection of new aircraft.

No’s 3206 and 3208 SCU landed in Normandy, near Coulombs, on 15 and 16 June, though part of No 3206 SCU remained at Thorney Island until the withdrawal of No 3205 at the end of July when it took over the duties of the latter unit.  Following the collapse of the German front in Normandy No 3208 SCU moved forward to Lille on 9 September and to Melsbroeck in Belguim on 28 September.  No 3206 reached Brussels area on 11 September, Eindhoven on 16 October and Dieste on 29 October.  The units remained in these localities, employed on salvage and repair work and a certain amount of servicing, until the end of March 1945 when they were disbanded.

As on all previous occasions when they had been used, the commando units had to undertake up to 60 per cent of the pre-stocking of the landing grounds owing to the inability of the army to meet its full commitments in this respect.

No difficulties were experienced in refuelling and rearming aircraft, all refuelling being done with jerricans and a filter funnel.  The hand refuelling gear was never used and it was the recommendation of the chief technical officer, 2nd TAF, to dispense with it.

The technical qualifications of the Group I tradesman proved invaluable and the high proportion included in the establishment was considered absolutely essential during the early stages of an assault operation, when the Group I tradesmen of wings and repair and salvage units would not be available.  A large number of aircraft were made serviceable at the beachhead landing grounds by the exchange of propellers, carburettors, constant speed units, flaps, rudders and many other such components, thus enabling aircraft to fly back to base and assisting to maintain the high rate of serviceability which existed during the assault period.  Once the Tactical Air Force was established in the bridgehead the Sicily experience was repeated; there was little further need for the servicing commando unit, only two of which remained on the Continent.  These two were replaced, in December 1944, by refuelling and rearming parties.  The scales of equipment provided formed a satisfactory basis for the requirements of the operation but it was decided in the planning stage that the spares and equipment carried must be entirely dependent on the detailed planning of the operation for which the servicing commandos were used.  The scales were adjusted accordingly, prior to the operation.  Spares carried covered types of aircraft to be operated but not other types which might in emergency use the advanced landing grounds.  Fourteen day packs of spares for each type were provided at the base so that the servicing commandos could be restocked by fast sea craft or by air, also to cover the possibility of alternations to the basic plan necessitating the servicing of types of aircraft other than those originally intended.

The criticism made in Sicily, concerning the over-accentuation of the assault aspect in the training of the commando personnel, was repeated by the AOC-in-C, 2nd TAF.  He submitted that, before the servicing commando unit could take over, it was essential that the site should have been firmly secured by the Army and the airfield constructed or repaired by the airfield construction parties.  Accordingly, though subject to sniping and shell fire, the commando personnel had little need for skill in boat work, cliff-scaling and the use of arms.

Several proposals were made for increases in establishment but it was realised that in the majority of instances these arose out of needs peculiar to the nature of the operation and could be covered by the attachment to the unit of such specialist personnel as might be required.  Certain recommendations were, however, made, which affected the basic establishment of the servicing commando unit.  The most important was that the rank of the commanding officer should be raised to squadron leader to enable him more effectively to conduct the necessary Inter-Service discussions and arrangements arising in the initial stages of a combined Services assault.  His position as a junior officer seriously restricted his disciplinary powers and was detrimental to the efficiency of the unit.  It was felt that an additional engineer officer should be carried on the establishment.  It had been necessary on previous operations frequently to split up the unit into two, or more, detached groups operating on different airfields.  An additional flying officer, engineer, had been attached to each commando unit for the Overlord operation and as this move had, in the event, proved its value it was recommended that the post be permanently established.  Provision for MT maintenance had been provided by the inclusion in the establishment of two fitters (MT) – one a corporal – and an MT mechanic.  The importance of transport serviceability was considered such as to warrant a sergeant in charge in lieu of the corporal.

The chief technical officer, summing up in his report, concluded that servicing commandos were essential for the assault phase of a waterborne invasion but that it was unnecessary to retain them once the wing personnel had landed and taken over the maintenance of their own aircraft.  The AOC-in-C 2nd TAF in his covering letter suggested that three such units would have met the needs of the Tactical Air Force and that the provision of six was extravagant.  He considered that such tactical groups as No’s 83 and 84 Groups should be provided with a refuelling and rearming party.  Such a party would support the commandos in the assault phase.  He pointed out, further, that the majority of the ground personnel of four complete wings was immobilised in marshalling or concentration areas during the first ten days of the operation, while their squadrons were being operated by “backer-up” stations in the United Kingdom or by servicing commandos in the bridgehead.  He felt that it would have been possible and preferable to have made up advance parties from these wings, who in addition to three servicing commandos could have carried out all necessary servicing in the bridgehead area during the first fortnight of the operation.  He did not underrate the value of the commandos which, by providing small, well-trained units with a high proportion of skilled personnel, had enabled the entry of complete wing ground parties to be postponed, thereby allowing the armies to have a greater proportion of their personnel and vehicles in the assault phase convoys.

On 28 July 1944, Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, passed to the Air Ministry the information received from the Air Marshal Commanding 2nd TAF that the servicing commando units under this command had served their purpose.  Authority was requested to disband No’s 3205 and 3207 Commandos in No 83 Group and No’s 3209 and 3210 in No 84 Group.  It was desired to retain one commando unit in each group until future commitments were known.  No’s 3207 and 3209 SCUs had not moved to France as units, though detachments had been across and personnel had been posted to other servicing commando units to replace wastage.  Their chief work had been the servicing of aircraft operating from airfields in England.  They performed a variety of tasks at various stations that were temporarily in need of assistance during the stress of the early period of the landings.  Although only No’s 3206 and 3208 SCUs were retained in France, the remaining four units were not disbanded but were re-equipped and embarked for the Far East at the end of 1944.




1 A full account of the operation is given in AHB Narrative The Liberation of North West Europe, Volume II.
2 Despatch by ACM Leigh-Mallory.
3 Report by AM Coningham.  AM File C.28691/45.
4 LM/7977/DGO, 14 June 1944.
5 LM/8116/DGO, 21 June 1944.
6 LM/8298/DGO, 14 July 1944.
7 ORBs of Servicing Commando Units and AM File S.83764.

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