The B5 Airfield at Le Fresne-Camilly

The establishment, maintenance and exploitation of Allied air superiority over Normandy depended on persistent air presence in considerable strength. This could only be achieved via the rapid  construction of airfields on the continent following the D-Day landings. Through the simplest possible naming convention, American airfields were labelled with an A and British airfields with a B. Their contribution to the Allied victory in Normandy, although rarely acknowledged or appreciated, was of fundamental importance.

Reference: Overlord - The RAF Maintenance Plan

Reference: RAF Maintenance during the Early Stages of Overlord

Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) was created to provide tactical air support to British and Canadian forces in the campaign to liberate Northwest Europe. It comprised two flying groups numbered 83 Group and 84 Group, and a logistical organisation - 85 (Base) Group. The flying groups were largely equipped with Spitfire fighters and Typhoon fighter-bombers. Neither aircraft boasted particularly impressive endurance characteristics. Flying from Britain, a Spitfire could patrol over Normandy for only about 50 minutes when equipped with drop-tanks, which had to be jettisoned when they engaged in combat. The Typhoon’s endurance was even more limited, especially when it was carrying a full load of rockets.

To maximise their time over the battle area and reduce the potential impact of adverse weather between Britain and France, 2 TAF’s fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons had to be deployed as far forward as possible, and plans were duly devised to move 83 Group and 84 Group to Normandy immediately after the D-Day landings. It was originally expected that both flying groups would be based in Normandy by D+40. However, Allied planning was based on the supposition that Caen would be captured on D-Day: the open, flat country around the city - especially to the south - would then become available for airfield construction.

The original airfield construction plan, based on
Montgomery's infamous phase lines

Unfortunately, Montgomery was unable to take Caen on 6 June, and it remained under German control one month later. Consequently, while 83 Group moved to Normandy in accordance with the original timetable, the deployment of 84 Group and 85 Group was severely delayed. Throughout June, many 2 TAF squadrons had still to mount missions from Britain, accepting all of the inherent disadvantages. Inevitably, this reduced the availability of air support for ground operations in June. Against this background, relations between Montgomery and senior RAF officers - notably Tedder and Coningham - deteriorated steadily. It seemed there was little chance that the Allies would be able to exploit the air medium to the full in Normandy until Montgomery captured more territory.

Typhoons and Spitfires in Normandy

The shortage of available space for airfields was addressed in a number of ways. More airfields were constructed north of Caen than originally planned, although some were so near to the front line that they were frequently shelled by German artillery; existing airfields were extended to accommodate more aircraft, and aircraft based in Southern England used the Normandy airfields as forward arming and refuelling points during the day, before returning to their home bases in the evening. Additionally, in the immediate aftermath of D-Day, the Allies required fewer fighter squadrons than expected because the Luftwaffe had suffered such heavy attrition in the early months of 1944.

In the end, 2 TAF's entire organisation was finally established on the continent by early August 1944, but there was a long-term price to pay. Coningham’s forces were left too heavily concentrated near the Normandy coast, and this complicated their subsequent task of keeping pace with the Army during their rapid advance across Northern France in late August and early September.

Men assigned to the airfields accounted for a substantial proportion of the RAF personnel who came ashore on D-Day - around 1,800 in total with approximately 450 vehicles. More arrived on D+1, chiefly on Gold and Juno. RAF Beach Squadrons - under so-called Beach Masters - had the task of gathering units together after they had landed and passing them on to their assembly areas. The first RAF contingents proceeded to No. 1 RAF Assembly area at Buhot before moving on to two airfield sites - Brazenville and St Croix. During the first two weeks of the campaign, some 13,000 RAF personnel deployed to Normandy with 3,200 vehicles.

Airfield construction was undertaken by five Royal Engineer Airfield Construction Groups and one RAF Airfield Construction Wing. Three types of air strip were built, sometimes sequentially at the same location. Emergency Landing Strips (ELS) were rolled 1,800ft strips that were mainly located immediately behind the beaches. Refuelling and Rearming Strips (RRS) were 3,500ft long and incorporated marshalling areas at each end of the strip. Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) were fully prepared strips of between 3,600 and 5,000ft, the longer length being for fighter-bombers. Each site was designed to accommodate 54 aircraft and included a full set of taxiways.

RAF Servicing Commandos were responsible for establishing the main airfield services. Four Servicing Commandos landed on D+1 numbered 3205, 3207, 3209 and 3210, and totalling 700 men and 100 vehicles. They proceeded to B3 (St Croix), B2 (Brazenville) and B8 (Sommervieu). By 11 June, the RAF had established four operational strips in Normandy, and two more were under construction.

RAF Servicing Commando Memoir by Joe Grainger

An RAF convoy moving inland from the coast

A Spitfire and a Typhoon in Normandy

Typhoon pilots at a Normandy airfield

Needless to say, fuel was the most important single commodity supplied at each base. At first, aviation fuel was brought ashore by hand in Jerry cans, but a shuttle service using DUKWs was soon established to serve the airfields. The supply of fuel increased steadily after the Minor pipeline system came on-stream at Port en Bessin on 16 June. Allied planning in Normandy was based on a projected requirement of 398 tons of aviation fuel per day by D+14, building to 1,076 tons per day by D+41, and aviation fuel would ultimately account for around 45 per cent of all fuel consumed by Allied forces in Normandy.

Visiting Normandy with service personnel over the years, I would normally take them to the site of the B5 ALG. This was located by the Caen-Arromanches road at Le Fresne-Camilly. The B5 site was reconnoitred on 7 June and construction work was initiated by 88 Airfield Construction Company, Royal Engineers, on the 9th. The airfield was planned to host 121 Wing, which comprised three squadrons of Typhoons.

B5 - note the ample evidence of artillery bombardment

The site had to be cleared of all obstacles and flattened, using mechanical plant. The runway area was then covered using 200kg rolls of Square Mesh Trackway (SMT), which had to be unrolled and pinned in place. Each 15m of strip was held down by 96 clips and 120 pickets. In all, some 10,000 tons of SMT and 2,000 tons of Pierced Steel Planking (PSP) were consumed in the construction of 41 airfields in Normandy in 75 days. Bitumised Hessian runway underlay was also widely employed.

As soon as the runway and elementary facilities had been established at the site, the Servicing Commandos arrived. Their task was to undertake aircraft servicing to a daily standard, and light repairs, and they held small quantities of essential spares. They deployed forward while other groundcrew remained in Britain to operate aircraft from their home bases until ALGs were up and running.

One pilot based at B5 was John Golley, who supplied the following description in his book, The Day of the Typhoon.

The strip, coded B5, was the fifth airfield to be established in the British and Canadian sector of the Normandy landings. Only about four miles inland from the invasion beaches of Courseulles, St Aubin, Luc and Lion-sur-Mer, it had only recently been freed from shell-fire which had come from German units dug into surrounding woods. These had now been ‘flushed out’ from their positions but the front line was still less than a mile away to the south, where the country road from Le Fresne-Camilly bisected the major road from Bayeux to Caen.

The wire mesh strip which served as a runway was over 1,000 yards long and ran from north to south along the plateau. Surrounding orchards were used to give cover for maintenance hangars and as dispersal points for aircraft requiring servicing. The main HQ was situated at the southern end of the runway and the three squadrons were dispersed to the east and west of it. Anti-aircraft defences were dug in around the perimeters, and slit trenches were adjacent to all working areas.

Strips had first to be cleared of obstacles

SMT being pinned in place.

SMT can still be found used as fencing in Normandy

Wounded being loaded into a Dakota in Normandy

The first aircraft to land at B5 on 15 June were the Dakotas bringing the Servicing Commandos. They were immediately reloaded with wounded for evacuation. The Germans shelled the airfield during this operation, destroying one Dakota. The Typhoons’ arrival on 17 June was again described by John Golley.

Landing in France for the first time was going to be quite an event, and most pilots wondered what it was going to be like as they flew north-east towards the landing beaches. They hadn’t long to ponder before they were back in line astern formation and making a gentle dive to join the circuit prior to landing. The strip looked very short and rough after the runways of Holmsley South and was surrounded by woods and orchards with dark green tents blending into the natural landscape. Sandbagged ack-ack positions covered all approaches and they were surprised to see a solitary Typhoon standing disconsolately outside a canvas maintenance hangar which poked its roof through an orchard. Gun flashes were winking away all around the Caen area as, with undercarriages down, they crossed out over the coast before turning back to make a curved approach towards the mouth of the strip.

Coming in over the barrage balloons, they dropped off the last few hundred feet with full flap down and gave engines a final burst before thumping onto the uneven wire mesh. Sturdy wide undercarriages took the strain as squadron Typhoons rocked and rolled down the strip sending up clouds of dust. With brakes squealing they came to a standstill and were waved into dispersal points by their old chums who had gone over shortly after D-Day.

Greetings were short-lived as shells came whining over and pilots dived smartly into adjacent slit trenches having got the message loud and clear. Despite the bravado and jokes it was a fairly terrifying experience being under shellfire especially for the first time. Those whose initial reaction was to disregard the funk holes soon changed their attitude and were glad to get their bums underground with the rest.

Although German artillery would remain a problem until mid-July, the main enemy here was dust; the sleeve valve Sabre engines of the Typhoons proved especially vulnerable to it. The German gunners would also aim at the dust clouds thrown up by aircraft landing or taking off. Attempts were made to hose down the airfield with water, but it simply evaporated, so it was drenched in old engine oil.

Labour-intensive refuelling from Jerry cans

Open-air propeller servicing

Stocking up on munitions

Flying control officer

There is no doubt that ALGs such as B5 played a crucial part in the maintenance of air superiority and offensive air support in the invasion area. The Typhoons flew 1,365 sorties from B5 in July 1944 destroying over 100 enemy tanks and vehicles. The squadrons based here also participated in the famous action at Mortain in August, when the Typhoons played a crucial role in halting the German counter-offensive.

More broadly, the airfields illustrated their own success in terms of the maintenance of air superiority. They made superb targets, but the extent of Allied air superiority was such that they were rarely attacked by the Luftwaffe. Descriptions of Normandy from the air in the summer of 1944 bring out how completely the Allies had established air superiority. The invasion area was crammed full of every type of military vehicle, along with personnel, supplies, and munitions; and then there were sites like the ALGs and the Mulberry harbour.

But south of the invasion area the German military presence was all but impossible to detect. Everything was dispersed, concealed or camouflaged. The Germans were completely unable to assemble or manoeuvre during the day in any significant strength. This naturally imposed enormous constraints on their operational potential, particularly when it came to mounting offensive or counter-offensive action.

RAF Regiment anti-aircraft gunners digging in

B5: aircraft and supplies in the open, reflecting the
absence of any significant threat from the Luftwaffe

This enlargement shows the aircraft more clearly

B5 also illustrates the scope of the expeditionary capability established by the British armed forces during World War II. That capability was not maintained in the post-war period, but expeditionary warfare has become the focus of renewed interest in recent years. The RAF’s current Expeditionary Logistics Wing took the number 85 because of 85 Group’s central role in providing forward support to deployed RAF units in the Normandy campaign.