The distinctive feature of Operation Overlord, as far as administrative
planning was concerned, was that the main base for the operation was to be in
the United Kingdom. This fact was one of the chief formative
influences in the shaping of the administrative organisation. The
other very significant factor was the extreme mobility that it was expected
would characterise the early stages of the operation. It was,
moreover, inevitable that during these early stages the amount of shipping
space available for supplies, and for non-operational personnel, would be
severely limited. This circumstance precluded the possibility of
establishing the Base Group on the Continent during the assault phase, and made
it necessary to devise a system of supply and maintenance which would enable
units in the field to carry on satisfactorily until such time as the permanent
base administrative organisation arrived. Accordingly, to tide over
this vital period, special arrangements had to be made, and a number of units
were formed whose functions would cease when the base administrative units took
over. The way in which this temporary system worked will be outlined
in due course, but a characteristic example that may be noted in passing is
that of the beach squadrons and sections. The need for these units
was occasioned by the fact that the maintenance of the British forces in
Overlord would probably continue over the beaches until after D plus
30. The anticipated opening of the first major port by D plus 17
would make little difference to the position, as the bulk of its capacity was
to be allocated to the Americans. It was therefore important that
arrangements be made to ensure the proper handling, unloading, storage,
entraining, etc, of RAF equipment and supplies which arrived via the beaches,
and a beach organisation was accordingly formed to carry out this work until
the opening of the British “Mulberry” or artificial port, and
the capture of other existing ports, diverted the bulk of the traffic to more
normal channels. Other units with a purely temporary function were
formed to carry out “running repairs” to aircraft
operation. In fact the conditions prevailing during the period from
the launching of the assault until a firm foothold had been secured on the
Continent were such as to require quite different systems of supply and
maintenance from those that were to be employed in the later phases of the
operation.
The immediate and overriding task of the RAF administrative organisation
in the days following the initial assault on the beaches was, to put it simply,
to maintain in fighting condition as many aircraft as the operational plan
required, and to ensure that no hitch occurred through a breakdown in the chain
of supply and maintenance. The actual construction of airfields was
mainly an Army responsibility, since the Royal Engineers were better equipped
than anyone else to do the job, but the Royal Air Force had to undertake
practically all other services necessary to administer the finished product, in
addition to the assistance in construction rendered by the airfield
construction wings, of which more will be said later. The rate at
which advanced landing grounds, refuelling and rearming strips and complete
airfields could be completed naturally determined the rate at which supplies of
aviation POL, ammunition, aircraft spares, etc, would have to be phased
in. It was accordingly necessary to estimate as closely as possible
the rate of construction which could reasonably be assumed. In view
of the pre-eminent need for air superiority at an early date, it was, moreover,
desirable to plan administratively for a higher rate of construction than could
be foreseen before the assault took place, so that any unexpected advantages
would not be wasted. The RAF Administrative Plan envisaged a
development up to D plus 40 as indicated below:
Date British
Sector
D-Day 1
Emergency Landing Strip.
The Functions of the Base Group
In the initial stages of the assault all responsibility for RAF
administration was to be vested in AOC, 2nd TAF, until such
time as TAF units vacated the base area (ie by D plus 30-40) and units of No 85
(Base) Group moved in to take over the administration of the rear. 2nd TAF
was built up of two Composite Groups (Nos 83 and 84), No 2 Light Bomber Group
and No 34 Recce Wing. Attached to the composite groups were various
mobile aircraft and MT and signals maintenance units, which were to become a
part of the RAF forward maintenance organisation. These units, whose
functions and scope will be described later, carried the full weight of
maintenance and servicing during the difficult “emergency” period
before the long-term organisation could become operative. The
gradual build-up on the Continent of the base group units was the task of AOC,
2nd TAF, who was further responsible for controlling such of
these units as landed very early in the assault phase. The first
part of No 85 Group to go across was not the administrative element, but the
Static Fighter Defence organisation for the protection of the base
area. This group was gradually expanded as the administrative units
went over during the build-up phase until it was eventually administering the
whole base. No 85 Group thus had two roles, an operational one and
an administrative one, but its primary functions were of an administrative
nature. Its essential purpose was in fact to serve as the permanent
administrative base for the operations of the RAF Component of
AEAF. As, therefore, its importance in the administrative history of
the air forces in Overload is very great, a brief account of its main tasks is
apposite. In addition to his responsibility for the Command and
administration of all units assigned to the Group AOC, No 85 Group, had also to
carry out the local administration of other RAF units operating in or passing
through the base area, together with his responsibility for the administration and
care of all RAF detachments and personnel temporarily in the base of L of C
area which were not under the control of another HQ. Regarding
stocks of equipment, he was responsible for ensuring that these were kept at
the levels laid down by HQ, AEAF. And in conjunction with the
appropriate Army authorities, HQ, AEAF and HQ, 2nd TAF, he was
to work out the plans for the move of the base group to the
Continent. Finally, he had to represent the broad interests of the
Royal Air Force and to co-ordinate with the commanders in the base and L of C
the work of handling RAF personnel and material from beach or port and along
the L of C to delivery points.
The general control and development of the rear maintenance area was the
responsibility of HQ, 21st Army Group, in co-operation with
Second Army and 2nd TAF. Store and supply depots in
the base areas were to be controlled by the Army commanders and AOC, 2nd TAF
and RAF requirements of stores were to be included in Second Army Bids.
There was to be only one RAF base maintenance organisation, and it was
to be capable of moving in echelons, in case the capture of further ports
should make possible the shortening of the L of C as a whole. Where
there was no RAF base organisation near to a port, RAF stores were to be
handled by RAF embarkation staff. Two RAF embarkation units were
authorised to form on 1 January 19442. These
were to be allotted to the first two British-operated ports to be
opened. A third embarkation unit was to be formed to deal with RAF
stores passing through the British “Mulberry”, and at one time it
was proposed to have a similar unit operating at the American “Mulberry”. It
was later decided, however, that owing to a reduction in capacity of the
American artificial port, there was no need for an RAF embarkation unit there:
this unit was accordingly cancelled on 29 June 1944.
Formation of No 85 Group
The formation of a base maintenance group had been under consideration
for many months before definite proposals for the creation of No 85 Group were
submitted to the Air Ministry. In December 1943, however, HQ, AEAF
put forward a scheme for the setting up of one base air defence wing, certain
signals units, and a nucleus of the Air Staff for the Group HQ3. On
8 January 1944 the HQ of No 85 Group was authorised to form in full, and from
that time on the various units which were to constitute the base group were
gradually transferred to the new headquarters. Many of the base
administrative units had already been formed, or were in process of formation,
by January, but a vast amount of training lay ahead, and further units were
still to be created. The principal types of administrative unit in
No 85 (Base) Group were the following[4]:
Forward Equipment Unit (FEU)
Administration and Maintenance in the
United Kingdom
Responsibility for the administration of all units of the RAF Component,
while based in the United Kingdom, rested with the respective
commanders. All units of No 85 Group, which were to operate under 2nd TAF
in the early stages on the Continent were, however, to be transferred to the
command of 2nd TAF before leaving their tactical dispositions
in the United Kingdom. The object of this decision was to facilitate
administration generally, and in particular to avoid any duplication of orders
relating to embarkation. It was hoped that all units of the air
forces would have arrived at their tactical locations by 1 February
1944. There were, however, the following exceptions: first, those
required to fulfil the Cover Plan, secondly, certain American units reaching the
United Kingdom after that date, and lastly, units which would be operating
towards “D” Day from ALGs, and would have to be accommodated
on permanent aerodromes while the winter lasted. It was accordingly
essential that the supply system from main depots to air stores parks and
repair and salvage units should remain as flexible as possible.
Result of the Concentration of Tactical
Air Forces in South England
The concentration of the British and American tactical air forces in
southern England was bound to have a marked effect on the existing organisation
of Maintenance Command and US Air Service Command in that area. One
urgent requirement was the immediate formation of the R and SUs and ASPs wanted
to complete Nos 83 and 84 Composite Groups. Another important task
was the selection of specific repair and equipment depots to serve each of the
two TAFs; this action involved the possibility of adjustments of stocks and
equipment at the depots concerned, as they would have to continue to serve the
units permanently in the United Kingdom which they had served hitherto, while
giving priority to the maintenance of the AEAF units. Such depots
would, moreover, have to be organised in a way that would permit them to throw
off an advanced element for use on the Continent at a fairly early stage in the
operation. Approval for the setting up of a nucleus of these
advanced depots for the Royal Air Force had already been given before the end
of 1943, but a great deal remained to be done. The problem of creating
a supply system which would be fully efficient, and yet not impair the mobility
of airfield HQs, ASPs and R and SUs, was one which required very special
attention. Accordingly, a constant review was made of all the items
consumed and held by units, in order that reasonably reliable establishment
figures could be laid down for each type of maintenance unit. The
information obtained in this way was used in determining the composition of the
maintenance “pack” for the ASPs and for the advanced equipment
depot.
Pre-Stocking of Airfields
Since many of the airfields to be used for Overlord were in what were to
be the Army concentration and assembly areas, where roads would inevitably be
congested from about D minus 15 until the end of the first stage of the
transition to the Continent, it was necessary to arrange for these airfields to
hold special stocks of equipment and supplies. This measure was
known as the pre-stocking of airfields. Its aim was to ensure the
efficient operation of units during the period of intensive air operations
based in the United Kingdom, and to make it possible at the conclusion of that
period for units to cross to the Continent with their correct establishment of
stores. By the method of pre-stocking these ends could be achieved without
unwelcome demands on road space at time when transport had to be cut to the
minimum if dislocation was to be avoided.
Maintenance Problems during Squadron
Moves[5]
A rather more formidable problem for the maintenance organisation in the
United Kingdom was that of providing service for squadrons after the airfield
HQs and supporting ancillary units had left for their Continental
locations. It was estimated that about seven days would elapse
between the packing up of the HQs and the date when their squadrons would have
arrived and be ready to operate from the new airfields overseas; and this at a
time when the squadrons concerned were required to operate from the United
Kingdom at a particularly intensive rate of effort. It was proposed
to meet this situation by the setting up of a duplicate airfield and
maintenance organisation, to function during the period of the move and while
the airfields on the Continent were being prepared for the reception of the
squadrons. The plan was to locate the squadrons temporarily at
static stations, which would receive an adequate stock of maintenance
requirements for the seven days or so that the transition
involved. A number of vital personnel from each Airfield HQ would be
retained, and the necessary balance drawn from the Static Station HQs and from
other sources. With regard to salvage, supplies, and repair and
replacement of equipment, the assistance of Maintenance Command would be
available.
Emergency Replacement Pools
Another problem of administration in the United Kingdom prior to and
during the early phases of the assault, was to arrange for the provision of
swift replacements for personnel, vehicle and equipment wastage occurring
before the normal procedure for replacement could be fully operative, i.e.
during the move to the marshalling areas, the actual embarkation and crossing,
and the preliminary period of establishment on the Continent. To
cope with this demand HQ AEAF was to arrange for the setting up of special
reserve pools in southern England. One pool, containing personnel
and vehicles, was to be established near the concentration area, and was to
provide replacements for casualties arising during the move of units from their
tactical locations to the marshalling areas. In addition, an
emergency pool of vital personnel vehicles and equipment was to be set up in
the vicinity of the RAF marshalling areas to afford swift replacement of
wastage occurring during embarkation, crossing, and the early build-up period.
The responsibility for carrying out the salvage and repair of aircraft
and MT in the area to be vacated by 2nd TAF and No 85 Group was
to be assigned to No 43 Group, which would gradually take over control as the R
and SUs (Repair and Salvage Units) and MTLRUs (MT Light Repair Units) belonging
to 2nd TAF began to move to their Continental locations.
The Organisation and Control of
Movement[6]
One of the most complex aspects of the administration of the air forces
in Overlord prior to the actual assault was the organisation and control of
movement. As has been mentioned already, the effect of amassing in
southern England the enormous forces required for the assault was likely to
mean serious confusion on the roads leading to the embarkation points, unless a
very rigid and detailed control of the movement of units was
exercised. During the mounting of the operation the supreme
authority for RAF movement lay with the Director of Movement, Air Ministry,
working with the DQMG, War Office, and the Chief of Transportation,
ETOUSA. This central control was to be effective until units had
embarked. During the development of the operation the procedure for
movement was based on the provisions of a pamphlet prepared under the direction
of the QMG and AMSO for issue to all units. The title of the paper
was “Overseas Movement – Instructions for Commanding Officers (Combined
Operations – Short Sea Voyage)”. In most cases the movement of
RAF units was arranged by RAF Movement Control, but where no representatives of
the latter were available, unit commanders took their orders from the Army
movement authority.
The overall control of movement to the Continent during the initial
build-up of the expeditionary forces, when a day-to-day supervision of the
phasing in of units was essential, was vested in the Build-Up Control
Organisation (BUCO). This body was composed of representatives of
the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, 21st Army
Group, and AEAF, and was located at Combined HQ Portsmouth. Its
function was to control the build-up and to make bulk allocations of ships and
craft to the various users, basing its decisions on the information supplied by
Turn-Round Control Organisation (TURCO), the Naval body concerned with the
turn-round of ships and craft. Once the build-up priorities had been
decided by the representatives of the Force Commanders in BUCO, the task of
preparing the actual movement programme embodying these policy decisions fell
to Movement Control Organisation (MOVCO), a subordinate branch of the Build-Up
Control Organisation, which then forwarded the programme to Movement Control,
Southern Command. The latter were responsible for issuing the
appropriate Movement Instructions to units regarding transfer to concentration
areas and then to marshalling areas. Such instructions carried the
authority of Force Commanders an could not be amended by COs of units.
As BUCO was in control of the ground movement of all RAF and USAAF units
its machinery had considerable ramifications and utilised a large number of
bodies, including a concentration area camp staffed by ADGB, a replacement pool
administered by HQ, AEAF, and a static movements staff responsible to the Air
Ministry. One of the main tasks of the AEAF representative on BUCO
was, of course, to secure adequate sea lift for the air forces. And
from the Air Force point of view the BUCO procedure worked very well; as
compared with the normal methods of controlling movement overseas – ie through
the Admiralty and War Office – the BUCO organisation was capable of a much
swifter response to the unpredictable requirements which air warfare is liable
to involve.
Accordingly, when it was suggested in July and August 1944 that BUCO
might be closed down, a protest came from Main HQ, 2nd TAF,
asking that no such action be taken until No 2 Group and the outstanding units
of No 85 Group had been phased in, which it was expected would have happened by
the middle of October. The views of 21st Army Group
on this matter concurred with those of TAF, and in a memo dated 9 October the
former stated that BUCO would continue to function for an indefinite period.
Movement Prior to Embarkation[7]
It is now apposite to consider briefly the actual stages of movement in
the United Kingdom up to the time of embarkation, in so far as administrative
problems are involved. In chronological sequence, the three big unit
movements were:
a. From tactical
locations to the concentration area;
b. From the
concentration area to the marshalling area; and
c. From the
marshalling area to the embarkation area.
In the normal sense of the word, units were concentrated on reaching
their tactical dispositions, but in order to carry out efficiently the first
stage of waterproofing, in readiness for the sea crossing, it was desirable
that the RAF units should pass through one point on their journey to the
embarkation areas. The point selected for this purpose was the RAF
station at Old Sarum, which was therefore the concentration area as far as the
Royal Air Force were concerned. The job of waterproof was an
enormous and complicated one, for until ports became available, and vehicles
could be unloaded directly on to dry land, all had to be waterproofed for
wading to a depth of 3ft 9in. It was anticipated that this would
apply to all vehicles disembarked up to D plus 42. Responsibility
for carrying out or supervising waterproofing was vested in the Air Ministry,
which provided special personnel for the task. Arrangements for
waterproofing the contents of vehicles were to be made by HQ, 2nd TAF
and HQ, 85 Group. There was three stages in the process; Stage “A” was
to be performed in the concentration area, Stage “B” in the
marshalling areas, and Stage “C” in the embarkation
areas. Completion of each stage was to be indicated on the vehicle
by a colour paint mark, and no vehicle was allowed to embark unless it bore all
three marks.
Units to be landed on “D” Day and D plus 1 might not
pass through Old Sarum but through a military concentration
area. Their target date for arrival there was about eight days prior
to the assault. Units to be landed after D plus 1 were to move into
the concentration area about five days before they were due to land on the
other side.
Control of movement in the concentration area was to be held by RAF
Movement Control, Southern Command, working closely with the representatives of
Director of Movements, Air Ministry, at Combined HQ.
Units would not normally spend more than 48 hours in the concentration
area, and during this time administration would be carried out under
arrangements made by the Air Ministry, all domestic services being provided.
In the marshalling areas, the principal activity was the breaking down
of units into unit parties, and the formation of these into craft or shiploads
in readiness for embarkation. Road movement into the marshalling
areas was normally by day, and vehicle parties were grouped in convoys of a
convenient size. The commander of each convoy sent ahead an officer,
accompanied by unit representatives, to report full details of the convoy at
the marshalling area regulating post, one hour before the convoy was due to
arrive. Once in the marshalling areas, the composition of the
parties commenced, and an officer or NCO put in charge of each. In
addition, an OC Troops was appointed in the marshalling areas for each craft or
ship, and he remained in command until arriving on the Continent. Units
were normally in the marshalling areas from 18–36 hours. During this
time their administration was carried out under War Office arrangements, with
RAF Movement Control Officers to assist in last-minute
preparations. A permanent Admin Staff provided all domestic
services.
Embarkation was to take place at hards or ports, and craftloads, whether
of vehicles or personnel, were to be called forward from the marshalling area
to the embarkation points by movement control. In order to minimise
the losses which might occur during the crossing as a result of enemy action,
the principle of “balanced loads” for ships and craft was
adopted. This meant that each shipload was composed in such a way
that on arrival on the other side all its equipment and personnel could go into
action without being dependent for their efficiency on the safe arrival of any
other shipload. For instance, guns would not be shipped in one
craft, and their ammunition in another, thus eliminating the possibility of
having large quantities of the one item arriving and none of the
other. The value of this system was enormous, for as the tonnage of
equipment which could be shipped in the early days of the assault was severely
restricted, it was vital that no items should be “frozen” while
awaiting the arrival of other items necessary to their use.
The Assault, Beach Organisation[8]
It was anticipated that the first major port to be captured on the
Continent would not be working to full capacity until D plus 17 at the
earliest, and it was therefore necessary to arrange for the entire maintenance
of the assault and follow-up forces to be carried out over the
beaches. Moreover, as it had been decided that the American forces
should have chief claim on the first major port, supplies for the British
forces would continue to be unloaded on the beaches as late, probably, as D
plus 30. This circumstance involved the setting up of an elaborate
organisation to administer the beach areas concerned and special units were
formed in AEAF to deal with the requirements of the Royal Air
force. The functions of this beach organisation would, of course,
cease whenever sufficient ports were available, and the permanent base
organisation could be established in their vicinity.
Responsibility for the development of the British beach maintenance
areas, or the L of C terminal, was vested in Second Army. Attached
to the Army beach groups and beach sub-areas were RAF beach squadrons and beach
flights. Each RAF beach squadron had the control of up to three RAF
beach flights. The commander of a beach squadron (normally a wing
commander) was responsible for liaison with the Army sub-area commanders, and
for the implementation of orders issued by RAF HQ ashore concerning the
disembarking of personnel and supplies. In addition he was
responsible for the administration of beach balloon flights, about which a word
or two is relevant here.
The beach balloon barrage was required to operate as soon as possible
after the beach organisation had landed. There were, however,
difficulties; first, if, in order to save shipping space, the balloons were
brought over inflated on LCTs there was a danger of interference with radar,
even if the balloons were on short haul. On the other hand, the
amount of space which would be used in shipping hydrogen cylinders, etc, would
possibly make it preferable to phase back the establishment of the beach
barrage for a while. Responsibility for maintaining the barrage in
full strength once it had been set up was to be shared by HQ, Balloon Command
and HQ, 2nd TAF. When shipping lift became less
restricted it was intended to bring over some packed balloons, with the
requisite hydrogen cylinders.
As far as possible, RAF beach squadron commanders were briefed before
leaving the United Kingdom with the daily landing programme of RAF units and
stores. This information was supplemented at later stages by RAF HQ
ashore. The RAF beach flights were divided into sections, each
dealing with the RAF aspect of the work that the beach organisation was designed
to perform. The following diagram illustrates the composition of a
beach flight:
As was stated earlier, the beach maintenance areas were organised on a
purely ad hoc basis, and as soon as the rear maintenance area was opened, and
brought under the control of HQ, 21st Army Group, the beach
areas were to shut down, except in so far as they continued to be used as
stores transit areas. Similarly, once the RAF base group was
established, all RAF units in the base sub-area would be transferred from the
control of 2nd TAF to that of AOC, No 85 (Base)
Group. The date at which this would take place would depend, of
course, on the tactical situation, but when the boundary of Second Army was
forward of the rear maintenance area, HQ, 21st Army Group was
to take over the rear, and the four beach sub-areas and the one base sub-area
would come under its command.
Broadly speaking, the main responsibility for the development and
control of the beach area and base and L of C facilities was an Army one, and
the part of the Royal Air Force was to provide essential elements in the Army
organisation. In the base and L of C the Royal Air Force, of course,
controlled their own units, and where there was economic justification provided
their own facilities.
Clearance of the beaches was the task of the beach
groups. The Royal Air Force were not normally required to provide
transport for their requirements between the beaches and the forward areas,
except where special RAF vehicles were involved. During the
period “D” Day to D plus 41, Second Army were to be
responsible for phasing in daily maintenance requirements and initial stocks
required for reserves, and RAF requirements were to be covered by the Second
Army programme. After D plus 15, HQ, 21st Army Group
was to phase in all stores requirements, and the RAF were to submit demands
direct to this HQ. The scale of RAF reserves to be landed was laid
down by HQ, AEAF, and conformed generally with the Army scale. In
the initial stages of the operation it was considered unlikely that air lift
would be available for the transportation of stores, except in cases of
emergency, but every effort was to be made to provide this additional form of
transport later on.
With regard to aviation POL, explosives and oxygen, requirements were
calculated by HQ, 2nd TAF, and the supply arranged by the Air
Ministry through Maintenance Command channels. The movement of
initial stocks from the beaches to the RRSs and ALGs was an Army responsibility
although at a later stage it was considered possible that the Royal Air Force
would be able to assist in providing transport for pre-stocking purposes. During
the early days all aviation POL was to be supplied in containers, and a minimum
of 14 days’ reserve at sustained rates was to be established by D plus
41. Bulk supply was to be introduced as soon as possible in order to
reduce the tonnage coming over the beaches. This could not be done,
however, until adequate storage capacity was available. Bulk storage
was to be established at Port-en-Bassin, and the petrol transported to
airfields in special lorries. RAF explosives and ammunition were to
be held in RAF air ammunition parks within base ammunition depots, and all
labour and transport needed at these parks were to be provided by the Army.
In the period before RAF repair units could be brought to the Continent
the provision of adequate repair and recovery services was a major problem of
the administration of the beaches.
The Army was responsible in these early days for the salvaging and
repair of RAF MT, spares being provided by the Royal Air Force. The
Royal Air Force, however, had to deal with RAF mechanical equipment other than
MT, and had to supply experienced personnel for the purpose. A
certain amount of cannibalisation was unavoidable at first, but such drastic
action was not to be permitted except as an emergency measure.
The procedure concerning captured enemy air equipment, including radar
equipment, was that it should be reported to the air intelligence sections of
TAF, who would dispose of it. Enemy aircraft in serviceable
condition would be guarded until taken over by these sections, and airborne and
paratroop equipment would be dealt with by the Army.
The RAF Forward Maintenance
Organisation before the Establishment of the Base Group[9]
The operational plan for the initial stages of Overlord aimed at the
establishment of a firm bridgehead on the Continent, and the capture of a port
or ports, followed by a rapid advance towards the German
frontier. It was an integral part of the plan that air formations
should be as mobile as possible, and a highly flexible maintenance organisation
was accordingly necessary. The whole success of the great venture
was dependent on our ability to sustain a regular flow of supplies and
equipment for the forces which went over during the assault and follow-up
phase, but this had to be accomplished with strictly limited shipping
capacity. It was therefore impossible to consider the establishment
overseas of a permanent and complete base maintenance organisation until some
months after ”D” Day, and it was accordingly
necessary to evolve a system of supply and replacement to tide over the period
before No 85 (Base) Group left the United Kingdom.
During this time the main burden of RAF maintenance fell on 2nd TAF. The
two composite groups, comprising day fighters and Army support and reconnaissance
squadrons, were the first to operate on the Continent: the night fighters and
the light bomber group were due to arrive later, and in the meantime continued
to operate from the United Kingdom. As early as possible the base
defence units of No 85 Group were to be transferred to the Continent, but not
the administrative units, and until these could be phased in 2nd TAF
was entirely responsible for all RAF administration on the far side.
The first aircraft servicing units to be put ashore were the servicing
commandos. These units were attached to the composite groups, and
their function was to cater for squadrons operating from ALGs. They
were small and very mobile units, trained in amphibious operations, and
composed chiefly of technical personnel. Their duties comprised the
servicing of a variety of aircraft up to daily inspection standard, and for
this purpose they carried a stock of 14 days’ requirements of essential
spares. They were also capable of executing light repair
work. After the arrival of the airfield HQ the primary task of the
servicing commandos was finished, and they could then be moved on to a new ALG
in the forward area or used to strengthen repair and salvage units or airfield
HQs. Replenishment of the stocks held by servicing commandos was to
be obtained in the form of packs direct from the United Kingdom, without
demand, for even when the air stores parks had been landed the stocks held by
them were not considered adequate to meet such a comprehensive requirement.
Airfield HQs
An airfield HQ was a large unit established on an airfield for the
servicing and maintenance of squadrons. Units of this type were
attached to 2nd TAF and to No 85 (Base) Group. They
held 7 days’ stock of spares and were equipped to carry out servicing up to,
but excluding, major inspection standard. They were not intended to
carry out aircraft repairs requiring more than 48 hours to complete, or MT
repairs requiring more than 24 hours to complete. The first airfield
HQs to go across were to be fully mobile, but those phased in later required
the assistance of a supply and transport column if they had to move en
bloc. Replenishments of spares and equipment were demanded from air
stores parks.
Air Stores Parks (ASPs)[10]
Responsibility for the administration, both technical and operational,
of ASPs lay with 2nd TAF, although Maintenance Command acted in
an advisory capacity in dealing with certain special tasks. The ASPs
were to be landed at the same time as airfield HQs and were designed to meet
the requirements of two airfield HQs and one repair and salvage
unit. They were mobile units and held a month’s stock of spares,
equipment and technical and domestic stores. In addition they held
the bulk of the spares required by MT light repair units, and mobile signals
servicing units, except for cer5tain special radio items needed by the latter,
which were obtained from the base signals unit. Replenishment for
ASPs was demanded direct from the forward equipment unit, and despatch of
stores was to be arranged by sea or air, according to the degree of priority
and the air lift available.
Repair and Salvage Unit (R and SUs)
During the period when there were only the servicing commandos on the
Continent, very little repair and salvage could be undertaken, but it was
planned to put ashore advance salvage sections of R and SUs as early as
possible so that landing strips could be kept free of damaged
aircraft. The complete R and SUs were to come over with, or immediately
after, the airfield HQs and from then on more comprehensive repairs were
practicable. Control of R and SUs was exercised by 2nd TAF. They
had two principal functions:
a. Close technical support of the airfields for which they were responsible.
b. Collection and disposal of salvage within specified areas.
They were established on a scale of one per six squadrons and were
located as near as possible to the airfields which they
served. Repairs requiring longer than 7 days to complete were not
within the scope of the R and SUs, and aircraft in this category were, if
possible, to be returned to the United Kingdom until such time as the forward
repair unit was brought over and could deal with them on the
Continent. During this interim period cannibalisation might be
necessary, but was not to be allowed except as an emergency measure, since the
stripping of usable parts from a damaged aircraft meant that its eventual
repair, if practicable at all, would be a far longer job than if it had been left
untouched.
MT Light Repair Units (MTLRUs)
Two MTLRUs were attached to each of the composite groups in
TAF. They performed services for MT similar to those performed by
the R and SUs for aircraft. Their function was to hold a small pool
of replacement vehicles, and to carry out repair and salvage and major
inspection of all MT. They held a stock of 7 days’ requirements
of “quick turnover” items, and obtained replenishments from
ASPs. Complete overhauls, and repairs taking longer than three days,
were outside their province and were to be undertaken by the forward repair
unit.
Mobile Signals Servicing Units (MSSUs)
These units were established on the basis of one for each composite
group and one for No 85 Group. Their functions were to repair ground
wireless and radar equipment “on site”, and to hold an operational
reserve of complete signals units to replace casualties. They were
to hold in addition 7 days’ stock of “quick turnover” items,
replacements for which were to be demanded on ASPs (specialist radio items
excepted). Repairs beyond the capacity of an MSSU were to be
returned to the base signals unit.
Supply and Transport Columns (S and T
Columns)
Each composite group had an S and T column, divided into six sections,
each consisting of 48 vehicles. The function of the column was to
provide a central pool of load-carrying vehicles for the purpose of
transporting aviation POL, SAA, and bombs from the air ammunition parks to
airfields, and for assisting in the movement of non-mobile units. The
delivery of all RAF requirements of packed POL, ammunition, stores and supplies
to agreed points within a distance of 40 miles from RAF units was an Army
responsibility. Bulk POL was to be delivered direct to airfields by
the Army. The RAF, however, were responsible for distribution from
the agreed points to units. Further, RAF representation was provided
at all levels in the Army supply organisation.
RAF Base Maintenance Organisation
In planning the maintenance organisation for the RAF for the build-up
phase and subsequent stages of Overlord it was decided that only one base would
be necessary. It was, however, desirable that the units of the RAF
base group should be organised in a way that enabled them to move in echelons,
thus facilitating any change in the location of the base area resulting from
the capture of further ports. In the early days of the assault the
base area had to be accessible, by road or rail, from the beaches and from the
first captured port, but if and when further ports became available, it was
conceivable that the L of C as a whole might be shortened if the base area were
transferred to the vicinity of these ports. Accordingly, the initial
base maintenance organisation was to be set up on a purely temporary footing,
and in matters such as accommodation only a minimum protection was to be
provided.
The policy control of the RAF base maintenance units was exercised by
HQ, AEAF, but the base group HQ was responsible for the local administration of
the maintenance units in the base area, and also for the control, both
operational and administrative, of the static fighter defence organisations.
The staff of AEAF were to take an active part in planning the layout of
the base area, and were responsible for representing RAF requirements to the
Army who dealt with the requisitioning and hiring of land and buildings11. The negotiations were to be carried out by
Group Captain (Quartering) under the supervision of Air Commodore (Admin
Plans). Among the units to be established in the base area were the
Forward Equipment Unit12 the Forward Repair Unit,
the Base Hospital, Base Signals Centre, Personnel Transit Centres, Mobile
Signals Servicing Units, Supply and Transport Column, Aircraft Reception Unit,
and Embarkation Units.
The Forward Equipment Unit (FEU)
Since it was essential that the air stores parks attached to the
composite groups should be fully mobile, the amount of stock that they could
carry was strictly limited, and although they were to start with a month’s
reserve of requirements it was very probable that this stock level would be
depleted more quickly than it could be replenished. If it had been
practicable to provide a regular air supply service from the United Kingdom
during the early days, the ASPs would have been able to fulfil their functions
without recourse to any intermediary supplier, but as this was impossible, and
as transport by sea was altogether too slow for the purpose, the problem had to
be solved in another way. Accordingly it was decided that a large
unit should be set up as part of the permanent base organisation with a stock
of one month’s requirements for all RAF units in the theatre. Its
range was to include all RAF stores equipment and spares, including items
common to both the Army and Royal Air Force, but not POL, ammunition and
bombs. All demands from ASPs were to be submitted to the FEU, and
the latter was to obtain its replenishments from a specially allocated
maintenance wing in the United Kingdom. At a later stage, “common
user” items were to be demanded from Army depots in the base area, and
not direct from the United Kingdom. The FEU was also to be responsible
for the collection and delivery of RAF stores from/to port or railhead13. It was to be a transportable, but not a
mobile, unit and to consist of an Admin HQ and six stores groups, a case-making
section and provision office. Responsibility for the formation and
build-up of the FEU rested with Fighter Command, the technical control being
exercised by Maintenance Command, who also gave advice on specific
matters. The nucleus for the FEU was approved as early as 16
September 1943.
The Forward Repair Unit (FRU)
The FRU was the technical link between the repair and salvage units and
MT light repair units, and the aircraft repair organisation in the United
Kingdom. It was not intended to undertake work which could without
difficulty be returned to the United Kingdom, and it was to be provided with
full depot facilities. The FRU was to be a transportable unit, and
so organised as to be capable of movement by stages. In addition to
its services to the air forces established on the Continent, the FRU was to be
responsible for the salvage and repair on site of Transport Command aircraft,
and of aircraft of No 38 Group. It was further intended to carry out
a certain amount of salvage and repair work on Bomber Command aircraft.
The Base Signals Unit (BSU)
The Base Signals Unit was the main ground wireless and radar equipment
repair organisation in the theatre. Its functions included the
execution of repairs beyond the capacity of the mobile signals servicing units,
the holding of a reserve of complete signals units and vehicles, and the
installation of fixed wireless and radar stations in the base area and along
the lines of communication.
An illustration of the way in which the chain of RAF technical
maintenance units operated in Overload may be given in connection with the
demand for the No 40 Group range of equipment in stock for TAF. In
the period before the Forward Equipment Unit moved to the Continent the
procedure was that units in the field demanded on the ASPs, the ASPs then demanded
on the FEU located in the United Kingdom and the FEU drew supplies from the
various units of the United Kingdom Maintenance Organisation. Once
the FEU was located on the Continent the chain of demand was as before, except
that the FEU itself obtained its replenishments from No 3 Maintenance Unit,
which acted as a collection point for demands in the way that the FEU had
served hitherto.
MT Replacement
A reserve of MT vehicles was held in the MTLRUs attached to 2nd TAF,
and this reserve was maintained at the agreed level by demands on the
FEU. Before, however, the MTLRUs could be established on the
Continent units made direct demands, by the most expeditious method, on the RAF
station at Old Sarum. The MT reserve for No 85 (Base) Group was held
at the Forward Repair Unit.
Aircraft Replacement
A rather bigger problem was that of arranging for swift replacement for
aircraft casualties. Each wing held a small pool of replacement
aircraft at the aircraft reception flight in the repair and salvage
unit. New and repaired replacement aircraft from the United Kingdom
were flown to the aircraft reception flight where they were brought up to
operational standard. The rate at which aircraft wastage on the
Continent could be made good was dependent not only on output of new machines,
but on the efficiency of the United Kingdom repair organisation 14. As it was highly probable that in the
normal course of transfer from the Continent to the United Kingdom a damaged
aircraft would sustain additional injury – for instance, in the loading on to
and removal from a savage vehicle – a special LCT shuttle service was
instituted which enabled salvage trailers, “Queen Marys”, to be
transported complete with their freight from the collection point on the
Continent to the repair depot in the United Kingdom. Salvage
trailers withdrawn in this way from the Continent were replaced by incoming
trailers bearing loads of equipment. A unit known as the Base
Salvage Centre was set up to control this traffic movement. Responsibility
for the loading of vehicles on to LCTs lay with the appropriate beach unit, and
the beach squadron commander had the task of calling forward the vehicles from
the beach salvage centre.
Division of Responsibility between the
Army and the Royal Air Force
It has always been an accepted principle that services of common usage
in the Army and the Royal Air Force should be provided by one Service for the
benefit of both. The factor determining which Service was to have
responsibility in a particular case was economy, and the Service which was more
able, by reason of resources of man-power, equipment, organisation and
experience to perform a service efficiently, was assigned responsibility for
it.
This principle was adhered to in the main in the planning for Overlord,
but it was inevitable that certain modifications should be necessary to meet
the conditions of specific theatres and types of operation. In the
detailed application of the principle it was found that two important
requirements would have to be met:
a. The provision of RAF elements in certain Army units which were to provide services for common usage.
b. The provision by the Army, in certain circumstances, of services for the Royal Air Force in areas where these services are not required by the Army.
In the majority of cases it is more economical for the Army to provide
services of common usage, partly because Army requirements were on a far bigger
scale than those of the RAF, and partly because the Army is often better
equipped for the purpose.
The prime consideration in administrative planning for Overlord was,
however, to cut the transport commitment in the early stages to the bare
minimum and it was therefore necessary to aim at the utmost pooling of
resources by the Royal Air Force and the Army, even at the cost of
administrative convenience.
It was on this basis that the detailed policy for the division of
administrative responsibility between the two Services was worked
out. One of the most important matters covered by this policy was
responsibility for movement control. In principle, movement control
is a joint service, but the Army, as main user, had the main
responsibility. The general policy and organisation was formulated
by the Army in conjunction with the RAF Movements Service, and RAF Movements
officers were established wherever necessary. Group Captain
(Movements) was responsible both to the Deputy Quartermaster General, who
controlled movement and transport in the whole of the British theatre, and to
the AOC regarding the movement of RAF personnel and material. At
ports handling RAF requirements, RAF embarkation units were provided, who
received their instructions from the port commandant. Apart from
this provision of specialist personnel, the RAF had no responsibility for the
transport organisation at ports and docks, the only exception being the
provision of MT for conveying certain large aircraft parts.
With regard to road transport, the Army had the task of delivering all
RAF stores, supplies, ammunition and bombs to agreed points within 40 miles of
RAF units. The RAF was responsible for collection of goods from
these points and for subsequent distribution to units. The carriage
of loads necessitating special RAF vehicles, such as ‘Queen Marys’,
was an additional RAF responsibility. It was at all times essential
for the RAF to give adequate notice to the Army authorities of their road
transport requirements, for otherwise the greater speed at which the air forces
could concentrate might have involved a time lag in the provision of the
requisite supplies.
In the matter of providing labour, the Royal Air Force was responsible
for meeting the requirements of all RAF units, except for the supply of
unskilled military labour and the enrolment of labour in occupied territory. All
engineer works services were, however, provided by the Army, the only Royal Air
Force responsibility being the notification of requirements and the provision
of portable hangars, and items made to special RAF specifications, such as
fittings for airfield lighting.
The acquisition and allotment of accommodation for both Services was an
Army task, and the Army was further responsible for all the administrative
arrangements connected with the hiring and purchase of land and
buildings. Payment of billets for RAF personnel was, however, the
responsibility of the Royal Air Force.
The reception and disposal of salvage was also arranged by the Army, RAF
advice being sought with regard to aircraft and other air technical
matters. The Royal Air Force was in charge of the delivery of
salvage to the appropriate Army depots or dumps, except in the case of aircraft
damaged beyond repair, which were collected by the Army after all serviceable
spares had been removed by RAF personnel.
The division of duties with regard to aviation POL was rather more
complex. In the case of bulk POL the Royal Air Force was responsible
for provision at the source of origin, and for allocation between the various
theatres of war. They also controlled the quality of bulk POL and
provided all facilities for handling it at airfields, apart from airfield
tankage, which was erected and maintained by the Army. The Army was
also responsible for control of storage in the base and L of C, and for bulk
delivery to airfields. RAF personnel, acting in an advisory
capacity, made recommendations to the Army as to RAF reserves, and supervised
the inward and outward movement of stocks. The arrangements for
packed aviation POL were broadly the same as for bulk, except that the Army did
not deliver it from ‘door to door,’ but only to agreed points
within 40 miles of the RAF consumer unit, where it was collected by the Royal
Air Force. Empty containers were returned by the Royal Air Force to
dumps, where they were picked up by the Army.
The provision of MT POL from the source of origin was an Army
responsibility, and the latter was also responsible for delivery to agreed
points within the usual 40-mile radius, and for control of qualities and
grades. The Royal Air Force provided transport for subsequent
collections, and were under the obligation of notifying the appropriate
military HQ as to impending changes in RAF dispositions which might affect RAF
requirements.
The Royal Air Force was the agreed provider of all stores and equipment
peculiar to the RAF (excluding MT), and of the appropriate types and quantities
of RAF explosives, bombs, SAA and pyrotechnics. The Army took charge
of storage for the latter in the base and L of C, provided the necessary labour
for handling, and transport up to agreed points. Provision of
supplies such as hospital comforts, fuel and disinfectants was entirely an Army
job, the one exception being emergency flying rations.
All repairs to RAF MT, and the provision of spares for this purpose,
were tasks generally undertaken by the Royal Air Force. During,
however, the interim period between the establishment of an airfield and the
arrival of the MTLRU, 1st and 2nd echelon repairs
to RAF MT were undertaken by the Army, spares being obtained from the Royal Air
Force.
Under the arrangements made for the care of casualties, the Army had
full responsibility back from, and the Royal Air Force for areas forward of,
Army casualty clearing stations. The Royal Air Force was also
responsible for the supply of medical stores peculiar to the RAF, and for the
provision, where necessary, of RAF hospitals in established
theatres. The procedure for the evacuation of casualties by air was
that the Army undertook transport to the special RAF mobile field hospitals
which were located near airfields used for air evacuation, whereas the RAF was
concerned with the treatment of casualties from the time at which they were
admitted to the RAF hospital until their despatch from the airfield on arrival
in the United Kingdom. The Army was responsible also for the
transport of casualties after disemplaning from airfields to Army medical
units.
[1] Review of Admin. Problems, Pt III
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