Operation Charnwood: The Bombing of Caen, 7 July 1944

The fate of Caen was determined by the failure of Allied ground forces to capture the city on D-Day. Nevertheless, 75 years on, there is still good reason to examine the precise circumstances in which northern Caen was virtually levelled on 7 July 1944, when Montgomery launched Operation Charnwood. Although earlier raids at the beginning of the Normandy campaign caused more civilian casualties, the Charnwood bombing was the most damaging in material terms.

Reference: The Air Commander's Diary

In the summer of 1944 the Allies had to effect a radical strategic reorientation. Since 1940, operations against Germany in north-west Europe had primarily been conducted through the medium of strategic bombing. However, on D-Day, the Allies embarked on a joint campaign by deploying a massive land army on to the continent of Europe. Inevitably, perhaps, this transition left the Allied war machine looking somewhat over-committed to the earlier strategy; the Normandy campaign exposed a number of weaknesses within the Allied land armies, particularly where fire support was concerned.

Allied ground forces could of course call on RAF and USAAF fighter-bomber squadrons to support their operations, and they had their own artillery and armour, but they struggled to punch through well prepared German defences or to take out German armour in hull-down positions. It was against this background that proposals first emerged for using strategic bombers in direct support of ground forces trying to break out of Normandy. The first large-scale operation of this type occurred on 7 July 1944, when northern Caen was literally flattened by Bomber Command at Montgomery’s request.

Why was Caen such an important objective for the Allies in the Normandy campaign? It was by far the largest conurbation in the immediate area of the Allied landing beaches. Much has been written about its status as a communications centre and the fact that there was flat, open countryside around the city that was suitable for airfield construction. But the fundamental point was that Caen, fronted by a formidable ridge that dominated the approaches from the Sword and Juno beaches, had the potential to become an integral part of any German cordon around the Allied lodgement area. There could be no breakout in the British and Canadian sector until Caen was taken. Moreover, Montgomery knew full well that the city would be heavily damaged in the process. At a meeting with Leigh-Mallory on 29 May, he declared that ‘he wanted Caen destroyed as much as possible as early as possible on D-Day.’

Caen was a key objective for British forces on 6 June, but they narrowly failed to take it. The Germans then established defensive positions across the high ground to the north, sealing the city’s fate in the process. After that, unless the Germans withdrew, it was always likely that Caen would be heavily damaged by artillery or aerial bombardment, or both.

British ground operations then became hopelessly bogged down. Montgomery’s efforts to capture Caen ended in failure, and he soon found himself facing mounting criticism from Churchill, from the American high command, and from British airmen like Tedder (Eisenhower’s deputy) and Coningham, who headed the Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF). Tedder and Coningham had worked closely with Montgomery in North Africa, but the honeymoon ended in the later stages of the desert campaign. They both felt that Montgomery had failed to acknowledge the importance of the RAF’s role in the Allied victory in the desert and that he had been too cautious in pursuing Axis forces after Alamein. They saw the same caution in his approach to the problem of Caen, and were concerned that Montgomery and his staff appeared complacent and unwilling to admit that the Normandy campaign had run into difficulties. Additionally, 2 TAF’s deployment plans were completely upset by the failure to capture Caen and the countryside to the south. The airfields constructed in the lodgement area could only accommodate one of 2 TAF’s two fighter and fighter-bomber groups.

The heavy bombers of both the US Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command were assigned to operations in support of Overlord from March 1944, but their respective commanders were very reluctant to assume this role and argued that they should continue the strategic offensive against Germany. They were eventually overruled, but the strategic bombing forces were not subsequently subordinated to Leigh-Mallory or incorporated into the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Instead, they were placed under Tedder on the strict understanding that he was acting on Eisenhower’s behalf. Leigh-Mallory could do no more than advise Eisenhower and Tedder on how best the heavy bombers might be used.

A further limitation on Leigh-Mallory’s influence stemmed from the misalignment of the British command and control structure, which effectively left Montgomery representing both the army and army group levels, while the RAF subdivided their command responsibilities. Who, then, should function as Montgomery’s air opposite number – Tedder, Leigh-Mallory or Coningham? Ultimately, Montgomery was instructed to work through Coningham, although the two men detested one another. Leigh-Mallory was left to function as an advisor and a co-ordinator, but not as a commander. Not surprisingly, he resented these arrangements and actively sought opportunities to extend his influence.

There had been discussions about the possible use of heavy bombers in support of ground forces in Normandy for some months before D-Day, but the first concrete proposals after the landings were submitted by Dr Solly Zuckerman, scientific advisor to the AEAF’s Bombing Committee. In the months before D-Day, Bomber Command had demonstrated an ability to bomb transportation targets in northern France with remarkable accuracy and concentration, and this apparently persuaded Zuckerman that they might be employed to equally potent effect in a tactical support role. His idea was that the bombers would concentrate their attack on a small and clearly defined section of the German defences. This might open the door to a decisive advance by Montgomery’s troops. On 10 June, Tedder’s diarist recorded that ‘Zuckerman attempts to sell the Chief idea of using Heavies to plaster a given tactical area: object, to destroy all enemy life within area. Chief sceptical.’

On 14 June, Leigh-Mallory made his first visit to Normandy. As he described it in his diary, Montgomery ‘was not in a good temper for I had sent him a signal shooting down an airborne operation which he wanted mounted. However, he brisked up a bit when I offered him, in exchange for the operation I was not prepared to carry out, a much more attractive proposal.’ Again, this involved the use of heavy bombers in direct support of ground forces. According to Leigh-Mallory’s account, he subsequently tried to contact Coningham to discuss the plan, but he was unobtainable. Leigh-Mallory therefore explained his ideas to Coningham’s deputy, and his views were, he believed, communicated to Coningham later and passed on to Tedder. Leigh-Mallory ‘at once sent over planners’ to Montgomery ‘to fix up the details of the immediate operations he wished laid on’ but he told his diarist that Tedder and Coningham also made plans to go to Normandy the following day.

Montgomery and Leigh-Mallory in Normandy, 14 June 1944

Tedder (right) with Broadhurst of 83 Group, 2 TAF

Coningham, with Montgomery and Dempsey

The next day, at the regular AEAF meeting, Leigh-Mallory revealed his plans for using heavy bombers to support the Army. As Tedder was en route to Normandy – with Eisenhower – his deputy was in attendance. Also present were two very senior Americans – the USAAF Chief of Staff, General ‘Hap’ Arnold, and the commander of US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz. Tedder’s diarist recorded ‘a very distressing meeting. Leigh-Mallory uncertain of himself.’ He had, it emerged, appointed a committee to choose aiming points for his operation but had failed to ask Spaatz for a representative. ‘This committee had already proceeded to Montgomery’s headquarters before Spaatz knew it was constructed.’ Spaatz, in front of Arnold, complained vociferously.

Meanwhile, Tedder and Eisenhower arrived in Normandy and found a joint Army/Air conference in session at Second (British) Army’s headquarters to consider the tactical use of heavy bombers in support of ground operations. The committee included Zuckerman but there was no representation from either Spaatz or Coningham. Tedder then left to find Coningham and Broadhurst, of 2 TAF’s 83 Group. Both were apparently incensed at their exclusion from the planning process. Tedder subsequently agreed with the commander of Second Army, Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey, that the bombing plan should be considered by Coningham, who duly rejected the entire concept.

Leigh-Mallory afterwards accused other senior RAF officers, such as Tedder and Coningham, of abandoning the Army in its hour of need. It is certainly true that Tedder disliked the entire concept of using heavy bombers in a ground support role. After all, the strategic bombing forces were the only Allied formations capable of striking more distant targets, including urban and industrial targets in Germany, and they had been created to fulfil that specific task. The Army had its own organic fires and could also count on the support of 2 TAF. Tedder feared that a single concession on this point would open the door to similar demands for heavy bombing support from ground commanders in future, with virtually any advance on the ground becoming conditional on preliminary strikes by Bomber Command or the Eighth Air Force.

By contrast, Leigh-Mallory argued that all available air power should be employed in support of ground forces in Normandy if necessary. As he put it, ‘We must use air power to get the Army forward if they can’t do it on their own, and I repeat, it looks to me, unfortunately, as though they can’t.’ His case might sound convincing, but the reality was more complex. This is illustrated by the fact that Leigh-Mallory’s original concept for using heavy bombers in direct support of the Army did not merely involve blasting a hole through the German front lines. Rather, he believed that specific tactical targets should be attacked, such as gun batteries or strongpoints. Yet this was very different from the approach ultimately employed over Caen in Operation Charnwood.

In truth, before heavy bombers could be used in the battle area, a number of detailed issues required investigation and clarification. These included the targets for bombardment, the aiming points, weapon-to-target matching and bomb fuse settings. Furthermore, if the targets were too close to the front line, there was a serious risk that friendly ground troops might fall victim to the tendency of heavy bombing patterns to ‘creep’ backwards from their aiming point. Finally, in the words of the official RAF narrative, ‘the problem of forward movement by our own troops over terrain that had been subjected to heavy bombing had still not been solved.’ Hardly any Army officers had directly observed the effects of strategic bombing, and few RAF officers had any knowledge of how these effects might be brought to bear in support of a ground offensive. Viewed from this perspective, Tedder’s caution appears amply justified.

Thereafter, the plan lay dormant until the last week of June, when Montgomery launched Operation Epsom to the east of Caen. A Bomber Command strike in support of Epsom on the night of 25-26 June was considered but did not take place. However, on 30 June, Leigh-Mallory advised his diarist that ‘The Army has called for the assistance of heavy bombers, which I am going to give them, and they are going to attack what is thought to be the main Panzer concentration at Villers-Bocage.’

Bomber Command's attack on Villers-Bocage on 30 June 1944

Bomber Command struck Villers-Bocage before nightfall that evening and the operation was afterwards judged to have been a great success. However, Leigh-Mallory expressed dismay that the Army did not exploit the attack. As he put it,

I should have thought that this was the moment to fling in all the armour. How well I remember the way it was done on August 8th 1918, beyond Amiens. Then the Army put in 450 tanks, all they had, and scored what was the beginning of a decisive victory. Now, with three times that amount, they seem to be marking time waiting about, and of course the Hun can take the opportunity of reorganising in this vile weather, for we cannot do much to stop him from the air.

By the first week of July, Caen had still not fallen, and Montgomery was finalising a further operation to drive German forces from the area, Operation Charnwood. He was coming under mounting pressure and criticism from across the Allied high command, but the impasse around Caen now strengthened the arguments for using heavy bombing in the absence of any other obvious means of achieving a breakthrough, and Villers-Bocage provided something of a precedent. From his diary, it is also clear that Leigh-Mallory was still promoting the idea. However, Montgomery only sought support from Bomber Command for Charnwood less than 24 hours before it was due to start. Specifically, he requested that they should destroy German defences in northern Caen and deny reinforcements to forward enemy positions. It is very likely that this late approach to the Supreme Commander resulted from preliminary discussions between Leigh-Mallory and Montgomery (or his senior staff) that are not on record. Clearly, too, Coningham had been approached. In the absence of Eighth Air Force participation, Spaatz was not in a position to renew the objections he had raised in June.

On 7 July, the daily Allied Air Commanders’ Conference was attended not only by Leigh-Mallory and Tedder, but by Eisenhower in person. At the conference, Coningham’s deputy reported that a new Second Army offensive was to be launched the following day against northern Caen, and the Army ‘had requested an attack on 4 aiming points consisting of concrete ‘hedge-hog’ defences. They wished these to be bombarded before dusk tonight, and Air Marshal Coningham suggested that the heavies should be employed.’

The main target area - northern Caen

The plan was apparently sanctioned without argument. Nevertheless, Tedder believed that it ‘had not been adequately worked out in detail’. Later on, outside the meeting, he told Leigh-Mallory that he was in danger of ‘leading the Army up the garden path’ and he maintained that the limitations of air support on the battlefield were not fully understood.

The targets and aiming points for Charnwood were selected by Second Army. Bomber Command were asked to strike two areas. The main effort was to be directed against the north of Caen, extending from the city’s northern boundary to the central Medieval chateau, while a second attack was to be mounted over countryside to the north-west. Both areas were around 1,000 x 1,000 yards. However, the precise location of the main target area was to prove controversial. To reduce to the minimum any risk of friendly casualties, it was deliberately located to the rear of the German defences and at least 3½ miles from the nearest Allied troop formations.

The attack took place before dusk and in fine weather on the evening of the 7th. Although a large fighter-escort was provided, there was no Luftwaffe opposition. Three aircraft were lost to anti-aircraft fire, one of which was a Pathfinder Mosquito. This aircraft broke up in mid-air over the headquarters of 83 Group, 2 TAF, part of it falling into their rear headquarters area, part of it falling near to Second Army's headquarters on the other side of the road. As it fell, the Mosquito shed a large quantity of red target indicators, causing no little consternation on the ground. Fortunately, the other Pathfinders marked the target accurately.

In all, some 467 heavy bombers dropped 2,300 tons of bombs into the target boxes. Both were devastated, but the spill from the main attack ironically went forward (south) rather than backwards (north), i.e., towards the centre of Caen. Mercifully, many civilians had left the area by that time. The attack was then followed up by further strikes by medium bombers and fighter bombers, and by a heavy artillery barrage.

The ground offensive began early the following morning, but it took Montgomery’s forces another two days to advance into Caen itself. They succeeded in taking the northern half of the city but were halted on the river Orne, so that southern Caen remained in enemy hands. The Germans also maintained their hold on the country to the south of the city, where the RAF were hoping to construct airfields.

The basic Operation Charnwood plan

Caen during the bombing attack on the evening of 7 July 1944

Northern Caen after Operation Charnwood

Huge bomb craters and mountains of rubble obstructed the British advance

Contemporary military assessments suggest the air bombardment produced few pronounced military gains. At the top of the command chain, perceptions of the operation were extremely positive; further down, serious doubts were raised concerning the purpose and usefulness of the bombing. Thus the Brigadier General Staff at 21st Army Group HQ stated that ‘the heavy bombing of Caen was decisive’, citing the destruction of a regimental HQ and two divisions’ subsequent shortage of rations and ammunition.

The Second Army Staff agreed with 21st Army Group and added:

The bombardment had completely wiped out enemy battery positions, presumably killing enemy holding positions in the area and thus achieving its purpose of breaking the hard crust of resistance in front of Caen.

The senior staff of the 3^rd British Infantry Division emphasised the considerable morale effect of the bombardment on their own men but:

They did not consider either that the bombs had destroyed any enemy positions or that the enemy had intended to fight either in front of the town or in its streets. Further, no enemy dead and no destroyed equipment had been found during the advance into the town, and no indication of road blocks being erected or of strong points being built had been seen. Their direct route into the town, however, had been blocked by craters and this had definitely slowed up the advance.

The front-line brigades agreed with the divisional comments, adding that, apart from the morale effect, ‘the bombing had made no material difference to the whole operation.’

In summary, while there was probably a valid case for attempting to use heavy bombers in a tactical support role by July 1944 – at least on a one-off experimental basis – the employment of this technique in the specific circumstances of Charnwood was extremely problematic. There was no doctrine to support this application of heavy bombing, and little grasp of appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures. At the very least, far more careful and detailed preliminary planning should have taken place. To an extent, perhaps, the Charnwood bombing operation was shaped as much by tensions in the Allied command chain, personality clashes and inter-service rivalry as it was by operational or tactical considerations.

Charnwood also raises important questions about resource utilisation. It is often argued that the greatest strength of air power is its flexibility. But this very flexibility can lead to misuse – to a high demand for air power from different quarters that can result in its dissipation over a wide variety of targets, some of which may be far from profitable. More than 40 per cent of Bomber Command was used to bomb Caen on 7 July 1944.

Nevertheless, there are limited grounds for viewing the Charnwood bombing in a slightly more positive light. Bombing provided some assistance to the capture of northern Caen by destroying German command and control in the area and preventing the deployment of any reinforcements from the south once the British ground offensive began.

Charnwood might also be seen as part of a process by which air power capabilities develop incrementally. On 18 July, the heavy the bombers returned to support Operation Goodwood, south-east of Caen. Again, the operation was a failure, this time because of the depth of German defences in the area, but a similar approach succeeded when it was employed in the American sector a week later at the start of Operation Cobra. In Cobra, the Eighth Air Force helped punch a hole through very much thinner German lines to initiate the Allied breakout from Normandy.