The Destruction of HQ Panzer Group West

Over the course of the Normandy campaign, a significant number of German headquarters and command posts were attacked from the air. Many of these facilities were, by their very nature, communications hubs, and, when sited in forward positions their only available means of communication was radio. The volume of radio transmissions, their geographical point of origin and their actual contents were all targets for Allied intelligence. When headquarters were successfully located, air strikes against them could produce a disproportionately high return.

If we think of air power in Normandy at all, we tend to think of the more popular and enduring images, such as rocket-firing Typhoons over the Falaise Pocket, or the immense carpet-bombing operations that preceded the Allied ground offensives. And yet, in the early stages of the landings, the priorities for Allied air commanders were defensive: their primary goals were to isolate Normandy as much as possible and prevent German counter-attacks into the lodgement area. Conversely, the German priority was to launch an armoured counter-attack as soon as possible. Under Rommel, responsibility for this action was assigned to Headquarters Panzer Group West under General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg. However, on 10 June, von Schweppenburg’s HQ at the village of La Caine was destroyed by the Royal Air Force.

HQ Panzer Group West had formerly been based in Paris, but it was moved to Normandy after the Allied landings and arrived at La Caine on the 8th. Von Schweppenburg took over the local chateau and located his tactical HQ in the grounds. Planning for the counter-attack began immediately, scant regard being paid to signals security.

The subsequent order of events is hard to document, but it seems likely that the increase in radio traffic was spotted by British wireless interception stations, which were linked by teleprinter and telephone to Direction Finding (DF) stations. However, even if HQ Panzer Group West was not located via DF, an ULTRA decrypt in the early hours of 10 June confirmed that it had been established at La Caine. An air reconnaissance sortie was also flown over the village.

The ULTRA decrypt that confirmed HQ Panzer Group West's
location at La Caine.

An air reconnaissance photograph taken before the raid; the
chateau is in the centre of the image, left of the road.

Post-strike imagery; while the bomb craters show up clearly, it
is more difficult to gauge the impact of the Typhoon rockets.

A more revealing shot taken on 24 June 1944 that clearly
shows bomb craters behind the chateau.

Planning for the RAF attack began early that day, originally for the afternoon, but the operation was delayed by the weather until the evening. It was designed very much as a ‘knock-out blow’ and was executed by a substantial force - four Typhoon squadrons and four Mitchell squadrons. Another four Spitfire squadrons provided fighter escort, but there was no opposition from the Luftwaffe.

By the standards of the time, the raid on La Caine was extremely accurate. Von Schweppenburg was only slightly wounded, but his chief of staff was killed along with most of his operations staff, and much of the tactical HQ, including its signals equipment, was destroyed. Presumably, many more Germans would have been wounded and evacuated. Headquarters Panzer Group West ceased to exist, and its functions were temporarily transferred to 1st SS Panzer Corps. No RAF aircraft were lost or damaged, and the records contain no mention of anti-aircraft fire in the immediate target area.

Destroyed staff cars near the chateau.

Perhaps the bus in which Rommel met
von Schweppenburg before the raid.

Had the operation been launched earlier, in accordance with initial Allied planning, Rommel might also have been among the casualties, for he visited La Caine on the afternoon of 10 June. There, in a bus belonging to the operations staff, he held lengthy discussions with von Schweppenburg and his subordinates before leaving less than an hour before the air attack. Ironically, von Schweppenburg ‘warned him to watch out for enemy low-flying aircraft’. A supremely ironic Prisoner of War debrief was also undertaken by the Allied Bombing Analysis Unit some months later. The subject was a sergeant major in a unit responsible for communications intercepts. He described how, by listening to Allied air-to-air communication, it had often been possible to identify the targets of attacking planes and pass on a warning. ‘This would be quite enough to give the occupants time to move away if they were mobile, or at least to get into shelters.’ Unfortunately for the Germans, this individual was posted to La Caine on the day after the raid.

Visiting La Caine with an RAF group some years ago, I was approached by a local farmer – a child in 1944. He described meeting the members of the Bombing Analysis Unit and helping them to count the craters in and around the village. Their subsequent report is reproduced below.

SURVEY OF THE RESULTS OF AN AIR ATTACK ON HQ FIFTH PANZER ARMY: LA CAINE – JUNE 1944.

SUMMARY

(i) On 10 June, 1944, Mitchells and Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force successfully attacked the Headquarters of the German Fifth Panzer Army at LA CAINE.

(ii) Bombs were very well distributed round the target, a density of 1 bomb per acre being achieved.

(iii) Several M.T. vehicles were destroyed by fragments. The available evidence confirmed the view that 500 lb. M.C. bombs functioning Nose Instantaneous are more effective for this purpose than are the same bombs functioning delay.

(iv) The attack was a great success and completely disorganised the headquarters.

OBJECT OF SURVEY.

1.  At the request of H.Q. 2nd Tactical Air Force, a survey was made by the B.A.U. of the results achieved in a series of air attacks on localities believed to contain the Headquarters of German military formations, (B.A.U. Report No. 12). The attack on LA CAINE (Map Ref. T.9152 GSGS 4250 Sheet 7/F3) proved to be the most successful of all those investigated, and it was therefore decided to carry out a more detailed investigation to obtain some evidence as to :-

(i)                The general accuracy of attack

(ii)               The material damage inflicted on the Germans.

THE TARGET.

2.  The Chateau at La CAINE (Fig. 2) stands back from the main road at the centre of a small village. It has the usual outbuildings and is surrounded by trees. An orchard lies to the West of it.

3.  Two days before the attack, a large formation of German troops arrived in the area, and the Chateau was taken over for the Headquarters. Two, and possibly three, generals were seen in the vicinity, and other officers were billeted in the village. The vehicles were parked in the orchards and under cover nearby.

4. It has been established from Prisoner of War information, from the names of German officers killed, and from other sources, that this was the Headquarters of the Panzer Group West, which later became known as the Fifth Panzer Army.

THE ATTACK.

5.  The attack was carried out by Mitchells and Typhoons of the 2nd Tactical Air Force on 10 June, 1944. 61 Mitchells were over the target from 2119-2121 hrs. and they dropped 426 x 500 lb. M.C. bombs attacking from 11-13,000 ft. The bombs dropped were fused Nose Instantaneous (details of the particular pistol used are not at present available) but some of them functioned with a slight delay. The crews reported that the target was blanketed by bombs and that there were many hits in and around the village.

6. Between 2102 and 2155 hours, 40 Typhoons attacked in three waves. One wave of 10 aircraft attacked with 80 R.P: another, of 20 Typhoons, attacked with 128 R.P. or guns.

RESULTS.

7.  Fig. 1 shows a detailed plot of all the bomb craters within a quarter of a mile of the Chateau. Craters at greater distances were not plotted owing to the fact that it was not possible to distinguish between bombs dropped during this attack and those dropped during subsequent attacks on other objectives in the vicinity.

8.  The bombs dropped were fused Nose Instantaneous. Some, however, functioned with a delay. While only 130 craters were counted in the immediate vicinity of the Chateau, it seems some bombs detonated in the trees, since there were broken branches and fragment damage in the orchards in places fairly remote from craters. Owing, however, to the fact that 6 months had elapsed between the attack and the survey, it is not possible to be sure of this point. No rocket motors or other direct evidence of the R.P. attacks could be found.

9.  Very little structural damage was found in the village, only three buildings being totally destroyed. There was, however, a large amount of blast damage to windows and roofs, and there were signs of considerable fragmentation in many areas. This type of damage is typical of 500 l.b. bombs fused Nose Inst. (B.A.U. Report No. 4). The Chateau itself had suffered little structurally. Although its windows and roofs were damaged and its walls heavily pitted by fragments (and possibly also by gunfire), it was certainly not rendered uninhabitable by the attack (Fig. 2).

Casualties.

10.  It is not known how many Germans were wounded, but it is certain that 18 of them including the Chief of Staff of the Panzer Group West, were killed. They were buried in a bomb crater in the orchard (Fig. 3). The inscription on the grave indicates that the following officers were killed:-

    General Major Ritter und Edler von Dawans
    Major i G Burgsthaler
    Major i G von Waldow
    Rittmeister Kuhl
    SS Hstuf. Beck
    Oblt. Fulig
    Uffz. Ziedler

It has been established from Intelligence sources that the staff positions held in the Panzer Group West by some of the officers killed were as follows:-

Gen. Maj von Dawans                        Chief of Staff
Maj. i G Burgsthaler                           Operations Officer
Maj. i G von Waldow                         I.D. (Operations Training)
Rittm. Kuhl                                         Assistant Intelligence Officer

Damage to Vehicles.

11.  The following vehicles were damaged beyond repair and were abandoned by the Germans:-
            
            1 large mobile office
            1 large mobile mess
            1 large omnibus
            1 Signals lorry
            1 large staff car
            2 small staff cars

All these vehicles had been either burnt out or looted. Photographs and details of the damage, as far as they are now obtainable, are given in Figs. 2 – 10. Nearly all the damage to the vehicles was caused by fragments from bombs fused Nose Inst. It is noteworthy that the small staff car illustrated in Fig. 8 had been knocked out by a bomb fused Nose Inst. and had suffered no damage from a bomb which had fallen much nearer to it but whose fuse had functioned after a delay. 

Effect of the attack on the Germans.

12. The enemy left the Chateau immediately after the attack, and the command of the Panzer Group West seems to have been completely disorganised. This is indicated by the following extract from the telephone log of the German 7th Army Headquarters:-

“0920 hrs. 11 June 1944. G-3 (presumably of 7th Army informs G-3 Army Group ‘B’ that … the Panzer Group West has been knocked out by a direct hit on its Headquarters. Command has been given to the First Panzer Corps.”

It was learnt from a Prisoner of War who had been ordered to report to the headquarters of the Panzer Group West that when he arrived at La Caine for duty on 11 June, 1944, the Headquarters had departed. He also stated that shortly after this attack orders were received from the German High Command that in future no Headquarters were to be set up in Chateaux, and that they had to be established away from villages, and to have good cover from aerial observation. It seems probable that the La Caine attack was at least partly responsible for this order.

CONCLUSIONS:

14.  Bombs were well distributed round the target, and a density of at least 1 bomb per acre was achieved.

15.  500 lb. M.C. bombs fused Nose Instantaneous are more effective in destroying soft skinned vehicles than are the same bombs when the fuse functions after a delay.

16. The attack was a great success and completely disorganised the Headquarters of the Panzer Group West.

The cross marking the mass grave; the bodies were later moved
to the German military cemetery at La Cambe