Although Operation Goodwood was costly for the Allies and did not produce the breakout Eisenhower was hoping for, the Germans also suffered heavy casualties. A particularly graphic illustration of the Germans' vulnerability to Allied air power occurred in the Guillerville area early on the morning of 18 July 1944.
To a significant extent, the
Germans were defeated in Normandy because they attempted to deploy and maintain
armies in forward positions against an adversary that possessed complete
control of the air. Operating at the end of extended supply lines far from the
Reich, the Germans were doomed once the Allies started to exploit the air
medium to the full. This was fully recognised by Rommel, who recorded on 15
July 1944:
In these circumstances we must expect that in the foreseeable future the enemy
will succeed in breaking through our thin front ... Apart from the Panzer
Group's sector reserves, which are at present tied down by the fighting on
their own front and - due to the enemy's command of the air - can only move by
night, we dispose of no mobile reserve for defence against such a breakthrough.
Action by our air force will, as in the past, have little effect. The troops
everywhere are fighting heroically, but the unequal struggle is approaching its
end.
His warnings went unheeded.
The German disadvantage was of operational dimensions but inevitably had a
multiplicity of tactical implications. Most of all, perhaps, German units and
formations nearest the battlefront found themselves particularly vulnerable when
the Allies used strategic bombers in direct support of their ground forces.
On the eve of Operation Goodwood in July 1944, tanks belonging to the 22nd
Panzer Regiment of 21st Panzer Division and the Tigers of 3 Company, 503rd
Heavy Panzer Battalion, were positioned in woods and orchards around the
villages of Guillerville and Émiéville on the eastern
flank of the planned British axis of advance. Unknown to them, their location
was in Bombing Box H, a primary target for Bomber Command early on the 18th.
Between 0541 and 0615 that morning, 463 Bomber Command heavy bombers –
Lancasters and Halifaxes – attacked Box H using British and American 1,000lb
and 500lb bombs. The weather was clear and the target areas were marked
accurately. The aircraft bombed individually from altitudes of between 5,000
and 10,000ft. A large fighter escort accompanied the heavy
bombers, but there was no enemy air opposition. Two aircraft assigned to
Box H were brought down by anti-aircraft fire.
The majority of bombs fell
towards the southeast of the target area and slightly southeast of the target
area boundary, increasing the weight of munitions that impacted around
Guillerville and Émiéville beyond the provisions of the original plan.
Werner Kortenhaus recorded
his experience with the 22nd Panzer Regiment. 'The men got into the tanks and
closed the flaps, or crawled underneath for protection. We saw little dots
detach themselves from the planes, so many that the crazy thought occurred to
us: are those leaflets? We could hardly believe they could all be bombs.'
Kortenhaus subsequently recalled 'the most terrifying hours of our lives
... Among the thunder of the explosions, we could hear the wounded scream and
the insane howling of men who had been driven mad.'
Lieutnant Richard Freiherr
von Rosen, the commander of 3rd Company, 503rd Battalion, recalled that
he lost consciousness. Just 25 metres away, a Tiger took a direct hit and exploded;
no remains of the crew could be found. Another Tiger, numbered 313, was turned
upside down by the blast of a near miss. When at last the ordeal ended, the entire
first troop was out of action. The surviving tanks were covered in debris, and a
layer of earth clogged apertures, grilles, and air intakes. Fifteen men had
been killed by the bombs and others are said to have gone mad or committed
suicide; the company maintenance section had been obliterated. No radios were
functioning and there was no contact with higher command echelons. Somehow, von
Rosen’s men got eight tanks running, but two were lost soon afterwards when
their engines overheated.
After British forces moved
into the area, a Canadian Information Officer – essentially a Public Relations
officer – gained access to Guillerville and wrote:
Within a small area of shattered farmhouses and orchards lie the hulks of 13
tanks and 7 self-propelled guns. Unnoticed among this mass of armour lie the
remains of staff cars, signal trucks, MCs and soft skinned vehicles. But there
has been no distinction here between 'soft skins' and armour. Heavy tanks and
volkswagen alike have been flung in the air and torn apart. There is a Tiger
tank here in a position on the edge of the trees that gave it a magnificent
shoot against the British advance. A single bomb has thrown it upside down on
its turret as if it were a clod of earth. The crew were sheltering beneath it.
There is a Mark IV tank that is barely recognisable, its turret torn away, the
tank upside down and burned out. Bogey wheels and tracks litter the mud. A
Panther tank [actually a King Tiger] stands by itself burned out - its immense
gun wrenched off at the mantlet and lying beside it.
There are freaks to be seen too; some tanks are lightly damaged, with green
camouflage paint still fresh, buried beneath debris of trees and houses or
flung into bomb craters. One Tiger lies in a ditch astride a tree. It is
undamaged and full of the kit and familiar smell of its German crew. The
distant blast of some bomb must have thrust it into the ditch. Other tanks
appear quite whole until it is seen that the armour has been torn through by
shrapnel. In this small area there lie three Tigers and a Panther, seven Mark
IVs, and two Mark IIIs, and a host of SPs. The SPs have come off better. They
have been disdainfully tipped into craters or stuck face down in the mud. Here
and there a gun has been torn out of it seating - but many will work again for
us if we ever salvage them from this morass.
There must be many more tanks in the immediate neighbourhood; in fact one or
two carcasses can be picked up by binoculars. But there is No Mans Land and the
enemy holds the fringe of wood over there ... There can be no more impressive
tribute to air power than this small corner of the battlefield.
Four months later, the SHAEF Bombing Analysis Unit visited Guillerville and Émiéville.
Their report described the self-propelled guns as ‘small armoured recce cars’
with 40mm guns and wrongly concluded that all the tanks belonged to the same
unit, and that none of the tanks escaped, but it was accurate in every other respect and is reproduced below. It is
a salutary reflection on the German plight in Normandy that bodies were still
to be found in and around the vehicles so long afterwards. The recorded
equipment losses could have been replaced by the Allies in a matter of days. However,
for the Germans, the loss of Panzer IVs and Tigers on such a scale would have
represented a significant blow. In the British sector of the Normandy lodgement
area, the German lines held on 18 July because of their depth. However, the fate of these
armoured formations in Goodwood hinted at what was to come in Operation Cobra,
just one week later, when far thinner defence lines in the American sector were
targeted in the same way.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUND SURVEY OF THE RESULTS OF AN ATTACK BY HEAVY
BOMBERS ON A GERMAN TANK CONCENTRATION
OBJECT OF THE SURVEY.
1. The investigation was made in order to determine:-
(i) The density of bombing which destroyed and/or
neutralised the tank concentration.
(ii) The effect on the vehicles of the weapons used.
(iii) The extent to which any surviving vehicles would
have been immobilised by cratering.
THE TARGET.
2. A concentration of German tanks, comprising what was
probably a whole Panzer Company, together with some Battalion H.Q. vehicles,
was lying up overnight in the orchards and fields round GUILLERVILLE. The area
concerned is shown in Fig. 1. It seems probable (see para 9 below) that none of
the company’s vehicles escaped and, given that this view is correct, the total
number present at the time of the attack was:-
4 x Mark VI Tanks.
8 x Mark IV Tanks.
1 x Mark IV Tank with 75 mm Howitzer.
2 x Mark III Tanks.
-----
TOTAL 15 Tanks.
-----
7 x Small Armoured Recce. Cars – 40 mm. guns.
5 x Armoured Supply Vehicles – half track.
1 x Large Staff Car.
3 x Small Staff Cars
3 x Red Cross Vehicles.
1 x Unidentified Armoured Vehicle (completely destroyed).
Numerous horse-drawn supply vehicles.
3. Thirteen of the vehicles, including all but six of the
tanks, were dispersed in an orchard area (Area A of Fig. 1) covering about 11
acres, in an average concentration of 1.2 vehicles per acre. The remaining
tanks and vehicles were dispersed as shown in Fig. 1. At the edge of the
orchard was a cluster of farm buildings, which appear to have been used as the
headquarters of the Unit (Area A of Fig. 1). It is understood to be the normal
custom of tank crews in a forward area to sleep in or in the immediate vicinity
of their vehicles, and there is some evidence to show that this practice was
being followed here, as there are shallow pits under some of the tanks. The
buildings in the vicinity may have been used as alternative accommodation by
some members of the staff of the Unit.
THE ATTACK
4. The enemy was known to be occupying a line of strongly
held villages in an area to the East of CAEN. These were attacked by heavy
bombers of R.A.F. Bomber Command at about dawn on 13 July, 1944, in order to
cover the Eastern flank of an armoured advance.
5. The plan of attack of this combined operation (GOODWOOD)
was to destroy enemy strongpoints and cause heavy cratering along two parallel
lanes between which the army would proceed, after their axis of advance had
been “swept” by non-cratering bombs.
 |
The Goodwood plan; Area H - poorly marked - is the long green rectangle
slightly right of centre |
6. The Eastern flank area which was selected for attack by
cratering bombs included the villages of TOUFFREVILLE, SANNERVILLE, BANNEVILLE
and GUILLERVILLE. There were two aiming points in this area, and the centre of
the orchard in which the tanks were found was about 800 yd. South-East of the Southern
one. The following bombs were dropped on the whole of Area H, which covered
approximately 940 acres:-
464 x 1000 lb. U.S.A. S.A.F.)
900 x 1000 lb.
U.S.A. G.P.)
1296 x 1000 lb.
Br. M.C.)
186 x 1000 lb
Br. G.P.) Fused.025 sec. delay.
486 x 500 lb.
U.S.A. G.P.)
438 x 500lb.
Br. M.C.)
3295 x 500
lb. Br. GP.)
RESULTS.
Ground Density of Bomb Strikes.
7. Fig. 2 shows both a crater plot of all the bombs which
fell in the orchard area, and the location of the vehicles. The average density
of strikes in this area was 13.4 bombs per acre, compared with an average
density, assessed from photo cover, of 3.9 bombs per acre over the whole of
area H. In the main area of bomb fall, which was slightly displaced from the
intended target, the density was 6.3 bombs per acre.
Crater Sizes.
Owing to the very high concentration of strikes it was not
possible, from fragments found in the vicinity, to identify in all cases the
calibre of bomb responsible for a given crater. As Table 1 shows, the craters
varied greatly in size.
TABLE 1.
SIZE OF CRATERS IN ORCHARD AREA.
Up to 25 feet in
diameter…….……………41
26 to 30 “ “
“ ………………35
31 to 35 “ “
“ ………………35
36 to 40 “ “
“ ………………18
Over 41 feet in diameter
………………....16
Total 145
It should be born in mind that 4 months had elapsed between
the attack and the ground survey, so that the craters have become somewhat
wider and shallower through erosion.
Damage.
Descriptions and illustrations of the damage sustained by
each of the vehicles are given in Appendix I. It will be seen that while only
one tank and one vehicle were totally destroyed by direct hits, all the other
tanks were effectively neutralised as fighting units, and that at best, only
one or two were not seriously damaged directly by the bombing. If these two had
in fact been able to move under their own power, they would not have been able
to leave the orchard area, owing to the density of the craters. The establishment
of the company concerned was presumably 15 tanks, and 15 were found in the
vicinity.
10. The building used as the Headquarters was very severely
damaged, and the staff cars which were parked in the out-buildings were all
destroyed.
11. Remains of Germans are still to be seen in the area, but
it is not possible to say what numbers of tank crews or other personnel were
killed. The severity of the damage would suggest that a high proportion of
those present during the attack became casualties.
Damage by Fire.
12. Of the 15 tanks immobilised by this attack, it will be
seen from Appendix I that 6, when found, had been seriously affected by fire. With
the exception of the tank in Incident No. 21, which did not in fact catch fire,
no tank had been hit either by shell or
by piat mortars.
13. It is known that the Germans sometimes set fire to their
tanks in order to prevent them falling into our hands intact, but in the case
of the attack under discussion the charred remains of crews are still to be
found inside some of the tanks. It seems unlikely, therefore, that they were
deliberately set on fire.
14. In the case of the 6 tanks set on fire, which were
representative of all three types of tank found in the area, the distances of
the nearest bombs were 13 ft., 20 ft, 25 ft., 25 ft., 25 ft., from 500 lb.
bombs, and 35 ft from a 1000 lb. bomb. Appendix I shows that in many cases
bombs falling much closer than these distances did not cause fires.
Vulnerable Area of Tanks.
15. It is commonly assumed that tanks are in general immune
to anything except direct hits or very near misses by bombs. On the basis of
this view, the damage suffered by the 15 tanks in the formation could be
theoretically regarded as excessive. If, for example, one were to assume that
500 lb. and 1000 lb. bombs could “knock out” tanks if they were to strike
anywhere up to three yards from the edge of a tank measuring 6 yards x 3 yards,
the average probability of destroying or severely damaging such a target would
be only about 25% for a mean ground concentration of 13 bomb strikes per acre. On
this basis one would not have expected that more than about 3 to 4 of the tanks
present in the area would have been put out of action. If we assume a band of
vulnerability around the tank of up to 6 yards, the number of tanks which, on
an average, would have been affected directly would have been about 7. For a
band of 9 yards, the average figure would have been 10, and for one of 12
yards, about 11.
16. At first glance, therefore, the result of this attack
would suggest that a heavy tank is vulnerable to any 500 or 1000 lb. bomb which
falls up to about 12 yards from it. This figure seems excessive, and should be
accepted with reserve until experimental evidence is obtained for single bomb
hits up to this distance. If such evidence substantiates the general conclusion
which emerges from the present analysis, then it becomes simple enough to
understand the fate of the 15 tanks which are the subject of the present
report. If, on the other hand, experiment suggests that the band of
vulnerability is significantly less than 11 yards, then an explanation would
have to be sought in the fact that the tanks were subjected not to a number of
hits well separated in time, but to a very large number occurring within a very
short interval. When one remembers that the tank formation was blanketed by
about 145 bombs averaging in weight about 700 lb., and with an average
charge/weight ratio of 40%, one can obtain some impression of the physical
conditions which existed at the time of the attack. For example, approximately
one ton of earth is thrown up per lb. of charge. This means that some 40,000
tons of debris were set in motion in the area of the tanks during the period of
the attack. The violent impulses to which the vehicles were subjected by
debris, by multiple ground shocks and blast waves would perhaps be sufficient
to account for their destruction without assuming that a heavy German tank is
vulnerable to a single 500 lb. or 1000 lb. bomb falling up to 11 yards from it.
 |
Even at high magnification, the tanks are quite difficult to see; everything
was covered by a thick layer of dust and debris |
Immobilisation of Vehicles through Cratering.
It was the opinion of an officer who was in command of a
Squadron of British tanks during the fighting in this district that the density
of bombs achieved in the orchard was sufficient to make it completely
impassable to tanks.
CONCLUSION.
In wooded country an average density of about 10
strikes per acre from a mixture of 500 lb. and 1000 lb. Br. G.P. bombs per acre
fused 0.25 sec. delay is likely to immobilise tank concentrations, either
through direct damage or by making it impossible for any undamaged vehicles to
get away.
