If air power is integrated into operational plans from the outset, it will probably be employed far more effectively than if it is bolted on belatedly as an afterthought. This might appear obvious, and yet the lesson has apparently to be re-learnt over and over again. Market Garden provides a great example.
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| An RAF Typhoon at Eindhoven, shortly after deploying to the airfield during Market Garden |
On 16 September, the day before Market Garden was launched, First Allied Airborne Army woke up to the fact that they had little or no offensive air support planned for the operation. Lieutenant Colonel Laroque, of their operations staff, then flew to Brussels and spent the day meeting Coningham's senior staff officer, Air Vice-Marshal Groom, the commander of 83 Group, Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst, and a number of their executives. His record of their deliberations that day is reproduced below. His concluding comments merit particular emphasis: 'I feel very strongly that in any future operation someone must be sent at an early date to tie up all details with the air forces in support ... The air end of all these operations must be determined well in advance of D-Day, and all air formations operating must be personally briefed well beforehand.'
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