Ukraine’s much publicised capture of a Russian Krasukha-4 EW command module in 2022 serves as a timely reminder of the fact that, sometimes, it is operationally essential to deploy sensitive ground systems into forward and vulnerable positions. How, then, can such equipment be protected?
On 16 December 1944, the Germans launched their final western counter-offensive of the Second World War in the Ardennes. Prepared over several months under the tightest possible operational security provisions, their attack targeted a northerly portion of the American front that was thinly held by formations being rested or given front-line experience. A less well-known presence in the Ardennes in December 1944 was the Royal Air Force. Specifically, in some of the highest terrain in the northwest European theatre, 85 Group had deployed 72 Wing’s top secret radar and communications units as well as the radar warning, visual observation and signals units of 25 Base Defence Sector (BDS). RAF Regiment elements were also deployed in the Ardennes to provide force protection - to defend the 72 Wing and 25 BDS units if they were attacked, evacuate them in the event of enemy threats, and take any measures necessary to prevent their equipment falling into German hands.
The various 85 Group units were spread over a substantial area, extending from Malmedy in the northeast to Bastogne in the south and Jemelle in the west. Based just north of Bastogne were the 25 BDS elements - 6088 Light Warning Set (which included both mobile radar and signals elements), and five observer units, so-called Wireless Observation Units (WOUs), which fulfilled the same warning role as the Royal Observer Corps in the UK but reported via coded signals rather than landlines. No. 1 WOU was in the Hollange area south of Bastogne, No. 2 was at Eschweiler, west of the town, while No. 3 was north of Clervaux. The two most exposed WOUs were much further to the northeast: No. 4 was near St Vith while No. 5 was near Poteau.
To the far northeast of the 72 Wing area, at Malmedy, was a detached radio countermeasures unit numbered RJ 5369. Otherwise, between Laroche and Vielsalm were the ground stations of RAF radar and radio systems used to guide bombers to their targets at night or in bad weather - systems such as Oboe, Gee and G-H. Although positioned at several sites (including three so-called technical sites near Odeigne, Pt. 5685, Regné, Pt. 6186, and at Chene-al-Pierre, Pt. 5395), their location was usually referred to generically as Laroche; their headquarters was at Vielsalm. Oboe had played a particularly important part in increasing the accuracy of Bomber Command raids since its introduction in 1943, but from the UK reached only into western Germany. After Overlord, the establishment of Oboe ground stations on the continent extended coverage further east, and the Laroche station played a particularly important role in this regard. The records also demonstrate that, in October, Laroche was the G-H releasing station for raids against Neuss, Essen, Leverkusen, Wesselling and Bottrop.
 |
| The compact interior of a mobile Oboe station's operations vehicle. |
The RAF had been deploying highly sensitive mobile radar and communications units into vulnerable areas for much of the war. Forward positioning - often very close to the front line and in some cases beyond it - invariably produced substantial tactical rewards. The RAF Regiment, although established to provide airfield defence, was first assigned to the protection of mobile radar units in the desert theatre, notably at Cap Serrat in Tunisia early in 1943, and had retained this vital role ever since.
Providing primary force protection for the 72 Wing elements east of Laroche was 2811 Rifle Squadron under Squadron Leader Goff. Apart from the squadron elements between Laroche and Vielsalm, one of their flights had a more forward role protecting RJ 5369 at Malmedy (as well as other radar units further to the north), and another was assigned to the protection of 72 Wing Air Formation Signals at Jemelle (to the south-east) after the German offensive began. For 6088 Light Warning set and the five WOUs, the protection role was allocated to a single troop of 2804 Armoured Squadron RAF Regiment commanded by Flight Lieutenant Walter Jay; his headquarters was at Bastogne. The scale of other RAF Regiment commitments in theatre precluded the deployment of a larger force.
.jpeg) |
| The approximate location of the 72 Wing technical sites and RJ 5369, under 2811 Squadron RAF Regiment for force protection. |
.jpeg) |
| No. 6088 Light Warning Set was sited between Bastogne and Foy, while four of the five WOUs were further east, near the front line. A troop of 2804 Squadron AFVs provided force protection. |
Central to RAF Regiment activity was liaison with the Americans to obtain the clearest and most up-to-date picture available of the general military situation, a timely warning of any threats, and advice on whether vulnerable posts should be evacuated. The liaison task was chiefly conducted at the US 8th Corps headquarters at Bastogne, and - particularly for the exposed and remote WOU units - through frequent patrolling and interaction with US forces across the Ardennes. Communications were not always reliable, and the RAF made extensive use of dispatch riders.
Commanding the RAF Regiment elements supporting 72 Wing and 25 BDS was Lieutenant Colonel Leith (Army officers who transferred to the RAF Regiment retained their Army ranks), but he was conducting a reconnaissance in Strasbourg on 16 December. Not until the early hours of the 18th was a temporary replacement appointed - Wing Commander Mase. Field Marshal Von Rundstedt subsequently disclosed that the Germans knew the locations of the RAF ground units in the Ardennes and other details, including their strength and degree of mobility. He detailed to one armoured formation the specific task of capturing them intact.
The offensive started from a line some 30km in front of the main 72 Wing stations and the LWS but a much shorter distance from the WOUs and RJ 5369. In the action that developed, enemy columns thrust deep into the American lines; in some cases, they reached points 30km or so from their start line on the second day of the advance. In response, the Americans deployed armour and airborne troops, the former to Vielsalm, the latter to Bastogne.
The challenge facing the RAF Regiment forces protecting the radar and signals units was immeasurably complicated by the Ardennes terrain, with its high hills and dense woodland, which confined movement to roads and tracks vulnerable to ambush tactics. The roads used for the withdrawal were typically crowded with transport or entirely deserted, making movement either difficult or uncertain due to German penetration and frequent reports of parachute landings. These were mostly incorrect. The Germans only deployed a small parachute force to an area north of Malmedy, and their night-time landings were widely dispersed. Records stating that German parachute troops were encountered near Champlon, 50km southwest of Malmedy, may reflect a few misdrops but more probably resulted from confusion and disinformation among Allied forces in the area, or from the activities of SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny’s commandos.
No. 72 Wing headquarters learnt on 16 December that ‘enemy action east of Laroche had increased considerably’ and it was clear by the 17th that the Germans had launched a major offensive. The Wing’s commanding officer, Group Captain Phillips, then faced a dilemma. The importance of the 72 Wing ground facilities underlined the case for maintaining their operational status in situ for as long as possible, and this also promised to buy time for replacement stations to be established further to the west. However, on the other hand, there was (as he put it) ‘The need for preventing technical equipment of either a useful or a secret nature from falling into the hands of the enemy, thus affording valuable information as to the function and strength of these units, and the principles upon which they operate. Furthermore it was essential to prevent, or at least limit, casualties and the loss of skilled personnel.’ In his report, he wrote that ‘the two aspects were constantly balanced as the offensive gained momentum’ but we must also acknowledge that there was an inevitable degree of tension between them.
The initial RAF reaction to news of the German offensive was further complicated by the fact that the Area Commander of the Laroche units, Squadron Leader Wardropp, had left the Ardennes to attend a conference at 72 Wing headquarters. His appointed deputy, Flight Lieutenant Craig, was placed in charge at Vielsalm. The first intimations of trouble reached Craig at 1130 on the 17th. At this stage, 2811 Squadron RAF Regiment had not received any information about the offensive, but one of their flight commanders, Flight Lieutenant Hirons, left soon afterwards to contact 8th Corps headquarters at Bastogne. The Americans reported that the enemy were advancing on Vielsalm in considerable strength. Some 12 divisions had been identified, strong in armour, and paratroops had also been dropped. Captured orders had revealed that they were aiming to reach the Meuse, and the head of intelligence at 8th Corps urged the 72 Wing units to withdraw.
Hirons arrived back at the squadron at 1345 and briefed Squadron Leader Goff. Goff immediately ordered a state of readiness and set out to warn the other 72 Wing elements and the RAF Regiment units assigned to their defence. At the main Oboe site, No. 3 Flight stood-to and manned defences. No. 4 Flight at Regné ‘had vehicles ready with essential kit and rations’ to move to the Oboe technical site to defend it. ‘No 1 Flight at Chene-al-Pierre had been warned and all defence precautions taken.’ Goff eventually returned to squadron headquarters early in the evening.
Meanwhile, at 72 Wing headquarters, Wardropp had been ordered back to Vielsalm. He reported his arrival to Goff at 2215, and the two officers met there shortly afterwards to discuss the situation. Their greatest source of concern was the Malmedy unit, RJ 5369. Neither the unit nor it’s accompanying RAF Regiment force (part of 2 Flight, 2811 Squadron) could be contacted. Two RAF drivers had arrived from Malmedy early in the afternoon and had reported that ‘conditions appeared normal’ despite reports of German parachute drops, but when they were sent back to warn No. 2 Flight of the impending threat, they were denied access by the Americans.
Overnight, the position deteriorated. After reports that the Germans had captured Recht at around 0300, Goff and Wardropp instructed their units to prepare for withdrawal. The aim was to form a convoy of vehicles under the protection of the RAF Regiment. At 0800 on the 18th, Flight Lieutenant Hirons again left for 8th Corps headquarters at Bastogne. A conference there subsequently disclosed that Bastogne was directly threatened, that St Vith was still in Allied hands, and that Clervaux had fallen to the Germans. Remnants of two American divisions were holding out in the Schnee-Eifel area, while the US 7th Armoured Division had deployed tanks around Vielsalm.
It was now obvious to Goff that withdrawal was imminent, but he had not been able to issue any instructions to No. 2 Flight at Malmedy, where the situation remained unclear. At 0910 he set out to contact 2 Flight but could not get through. When he returned to the 72 Wing area headquarters at Vielsalm, Wardropp announced that Group Captain Phillips had been appraised of the latest reports on the developing German threat and had ordered an immediate evacuation. They were to withdraw to Florennes, west of the Meuse. A situation report timed at 0900 meanwhile recorded that radar and technical personnel were preparing to evacuate, that No. 4 Flight 2811 Squadron was standing by at Regné, and that No. 3 Flight was in defensive positions at the Oboe technical site and was also assisting 72 Wing to pack up. Subsequently, No. 4 Flight joined them at the technical site and took up positions on the Vielsalm road facing east. They also helped with the packing task. The first 72 Wing vehicles left at 1100.
By 1230, the majority of 72 Wing personnel had left their sites, and only Wardropp and two other officers remained behind. However, he reported to the RAF Regiment that a wireless mast, diesel engine, trailer and workshop had been abandoned together with three vehicles, which could not be moved because no American bulldozers were available. These vehicles had been stripped of their equipment.
It proved impossible to form a convoy. The roads were clogged with traffic and no vehicles were allowed to halt to allow others to catch up. Indeed, a local American commander threatened to bulldoze any stationary RAF vehicles off the road. Consequently, the 72 Wing trucks and trailers made their way independently to Florennes without close RAF Regiment protection. Instead, the Regiment elements formed a rearguard, moving off last to ensure that no one was left behind. Shortly before their departure, they were joined by the acting RAF Regiment commander responsible for the Ardennes area, Wing Commander Mase. All the RAF elements reached Florennes successfully except for one G-H unit, which was eventually located safe and sound at Philippeville.
The fate of the Malmedy unit and its accompanying RAF Regiment personnel initially gave more cause for concern. Again, the officer who commanded the evacuation - Flying Officer Yearwood - was not in the battle area on 16 December: he was at a G-H site at Ubachsberg, north-east of Aachen and across the Dutch border. He was sent to Malmedy the following day. This was the same day that Waffen-SS troops under the command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper infamously executed 84 US Army prisoners of war at the nearby Baugnez crossroads - the so-called Malmedy massacre.
Approaching Malmedy that evening in a Fordson truck, Yearwood learnt that the Germans were nearby and was forced to withdraw to a Military Police (MP) checkpoint, where he met two of the Regiment airmen from the town. They had been sent back in the optimistic hope of obtaining information from the Americans about the military situation. Together, they set out on foot for RJ 5369’s technical site, reaching it shortly after midnight, ‘a particularly eerie experience having to walk about 3/4 of a mile through the woods’. He found ‘all personnel as comfortable as possible and all at the ready.’
Subsequently, Yearwood returned to the MP position to find that American reinforcements had arrived, and made the checkpoint his base. The Americans sent out patrols to Malmedy and the neighbouring areas throughout the night. It proved difficult to obtain meaningful intelligence, but they captured several German paratroops. The following morning, one of the American officers took Yearwood to Malmedy by jeep. There, he found the RAF Regiment equipment and stores intact, but their billets had been taken over by the American troops defending the town. The Regiment personnel were contributing to their preparations. ‘They were living exceptionally hard, accommodation being tents, no blankets and no change of gear at all.’
Yearwood was out of radio or other signals contact with the remainder of 72 Wing and did not receive the order to withdraw on the 18th. On the 19th, his initial impression was that the position was improving. ‘Plenty of US armour and troops were proceeding down towards Malmedy. The situation seemed exceptionally good for the present.’ On this basis, and aware of RJ 5369’s operational importance, he devised plans to relocate the station slightly south of the town. As he put it, ‘This plan was to be put into action as the OC [Officer Commanding] of the [US] Battalion had told me that no movement by the enemy threatened the hill and he felt that as he was holding the [nearby road] junction, that it would be safe.’
Over the next three hours, this assessment changed completely. At 1300, the American battalion received orders to move and deployed to the Waimes area, south-east of Malmedy to take up defensive positions. ‘German pressure was increasing.’ At 1400, Yearwood decided to evacuate.
Throughout the remainder of the afternoon, he and his men worked frantically to recover RJ 5369’s technical vehicles and equipment, and the RAF Regiment equipment. A Chevrolet 30 CWT truck was filled and dispatched to an unrecorded but apparently safe location. The RJ 5369 technical site lay down a lane that was inaccessible to wheeled transport, but the Americans provided halftracks to tow vehicles to a nearby road. Meanwhile, the Fordson broke down and a motorcyclist was sent all the way back to Ubachsberg to obtain another truck; the bike broke down too, and he subsequently rejoined Yearwood. At one point, a V-1 flying bomb reportedly landed near the site without causing any damage or casualties: ‘Shrapnel also from HE AA dropped about as it was sent up at numerous flying bombs.’ By 1700, artillery shells were bursting nearby.
At 1745, the 30 CWT returned, and the Fordson was fixed soon afterwards. And so, at 1830, Yearwood, his RAF Regiment subordinates, and the RJ 5369 personnel set off in the Fordson, the 30 CWT and the RJ 5369 Austin. Conditions were challenging: ‘Weather misty, dark, and mud plentiful.’ But they found that the road to Aachen was still open and finally arrived safely at Ubachsberg at 0230 on the 20th. News of their successful evacuation reached headquarters 72 Wing the same day.
The 72 Wing after-action report subsequently recorded that the withdrawal was conducted in an orderly fashion, no casualties to Wing personnel were sustained, nothing of a secret or documentary nature was left for the enemy, and only a few vehicles were lost. These losses were remarkably low, since more than one hundred 72 Wing vehicles were involved. They included a few W/T signals vehicles, which remained operational until the very last moment and were fired by American demolition units. The only other items of technical gear left on site were two 105 foot towers, which could not be dismantled and packed in the time available.
 |
| Map depicting the main 72 Wing and 25 BDS withdrawals from the Ardennes. |
While this appears largely correct, a degree of confusion did in fact colour events on the ground afterwards, leading to one documentary claim that does not entirely accord with 72 Wing’s assessment. To elaborate, it is necessary to return to the other RAF Regiment Squadron, 2804 Squadron, one troop of which was responsible for protecting 6088 LWS and the five attached WOUs.
At approximately 1600 on 16 December, No. 4 WOU at St Vith radioed the LWS, warned of the German offensive and reported that they were under fire. One of the 2804 Squadron armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) under Flight Lieutenant Jay set out to evacuate the WOU, found it unscathed, and deployed anti-tank and Bren guns to provide covering fire during the withdrawal. Artillery shells had fallen within 20 yards of the WOU site, and there was considerable small-arms fire in the immediate area. Jay at first attempted to move the WOU to a new location to resume operations, but this site was also found to be under threat. Evacuation was the only safe option, and No. 4 WOU therefore joined 6088 LWS at 2300 without incurring casualties or any loss of equipment.
At 0215 the following morning, US 8th Corps headquarters in Bastogne warned that they were expecting an airborne attack. Consequently, the LWS defence plan was initiated, and all RAF Regiment personnel not already on watch or other imperative duty were deployed together with 30 US Army augmentees. Evacuation planning began immediately, all vehicles being prepared to move. An AFV patrol that had been dispatched to gain intelligence returned at 0345 with the news that paratroops had been dropped at Mabompré -northeast of Bastogne. The same patrol was then sent on a further reconnaissance along the main road north of Bastogne and returned to report that small-arms fire had been heard in the direction of Mabompré.
At daybreak on the 17th, after an entirely sleepless night, the defences of the LWS headquarters were reduced to allow personnel to rest. Flight Lieutenant Jay paid a visit to 8th Corps headquarters at 0900 in the hope of clarifying the situation but without success. However, personnel from No. 3 WOU arrived at the LWS site soon afterwards and reported that they had been under enemy fire and had evacuated. Unfortunately, one of their vehicles had then collided with a US mobile gun and had been left behind. Two AFVs left promptly for the evacuated position, taking with them a 3-ton truck, while another was sent to evacuate No. 5 WOU.
On arrival at the No. 3 WOU site, a reconnaissance by the RAF Regiment corporal in charge established that German troops were only 1,000 yards away, exchanging fire with nearby American forces. The two AFVs were deployed to give covering fire while the 3-tonner was packed with equipment and the WOU vehicle recovered. Luckily, there was no enemy interference, and the little convoy arrived back at the LWS base at about midday.
By that time, intelligence was reporting that the Germans had occupied Clervaux, that St Vith was holding out but had been bypassed, and that the road to Vielsalm had been cut. On this basis, and on the advice of 8th Corps, evacuation of the LWS and the other units to Champlon (about 20km northwest) began, the intention being that they should resume operations from this new location. By 2330, the bulk of their equipment and the majority of personnel had been moved successfully, although Jay and a few of his subordinates remained at the original LWS site to pack what was left of their stores and direct the remaining WOUs to Champlon.
Meanwhile, the AFV sent out to evacuate No. 5 WOU faced a hazardous journey to Poteau. The roads were now blocked by American tanks, and the AFV came under German shellfire after passing through Petit Their. It encountered the WOU vehicle as it was pulling out of its original site but was then forced off the road by the Americans. The WOU was ordered southwest to Vielsalm and instructed to wait there until the AFV had been recovered and could provide an escort south. Once this had been achieved, the RAF Regiment personnel returned with the WOU to the LWS site, only to discover that it had been evacuated. They subsequently escorted the WOU to Champlon.
Further afield, in the relative safety of western Belgium, the standard of reporting on these events seems to have varied. The acting RAF Regiment area commander, Wing Commander Mase, apparently concluded at an early stage that reinforcements were needed and sent elements of 2742 Armoured Squadron to support Jay’s 2804 Squadron troop. However, at 85 Group headquarters, there were evidently doubts as to whether the situation was being competently handled, and the OC 85 Group decided to wield the ‘long screwdriver’. On the 18th, he sent his senior RAF Regiment staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Gray-Horton, to investigate the situation in the 72 Wing area, advise units to withdraw if necessary, or make sure that they had done so.
Gray-Horton was an interesting character. Of Franco-American extraction, son of the American impressionist painter William Samuel Horton, he was educated at Harrow and Sandhurst and obtained British citizenship in 1917 before joining the First Battalion of the Scots Guards on the western front. Still a subaltern in November, he demonstrated, in the words of the London Gazette, conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty by organising the defence of a position against a German counter-attack, getting a Lewis gun into action and breaking up the advancing enemy units. ‘Though severely wounded, he continued to encourage his men, setting a splendid example of gallantry and endurance.’ He was subsequently awarded the Military Cross.
A keen sportsman, Gray-Horton became a member of the British bobsleigh team in the 1920s, and participated in the 1924 Winter Olympics at Chamonix. After his marriage to Gwen Le Bas at the Guards Chapel in London in 1930, he left the Army in 1932 but rejoined the Guards shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. Then, along with many other older Army officers, he transferred to the RAF Regiment after it was established in 1942. In 1943, he set up and commanded the Fighter Command Battle School. In February 1944, he moved to 85 Group, and he was at the Group headquarters at RAF Uxbridge on Sunday 18 June when Gwen tragically attended the morning service at the chapel where they had married. Infamously, it was destroyed by a V1 and 121 worshipers were killed, Gwen included.
On 13 March 1945, after the events described here, Gray-Horton became the first British officer to lead a unit across the River Rhine proper, crossing with a small RAF Regiment reconnaissance party via a pontoon bridge erected by the Ludendorff Railway Bridge at Remagen some two weeks before Second (British) Army crossed further to the north at Wesel.
 |
| Gray-Horton, pilot of the British bobsleigh team at the Winter Olympics in 1924. |
 |
| Members of 2742 Squadron pose next to a destroyed Panzer IV in the Ardennes. |
 |
| No. 9442 AMES, the Laroche Oboe unit, on the move during the campaign to liberate northwest Europe. |
 |
| A Wireless Observation Unit in Normandy. |
Jay, still at the original LWS position, was warned of these impending arrivals early on the 18th. An advance party from 2742 Squadron under Flying Officer Roberts reached Bastogne at midday and learnt of Jay’s presence at the site. They were advised against travelling north on the Houffalize road as shelling was expected at any time, but the LWS site lay near the road so there was no alternative. They duly found Jay and recorded that he was preparing to move back to Bastogne. At 1330, Gray-Horton arrived and received a full brief on the situation in relation to the LWS and the five WOUs.
Hirons had called on Jay that morning and the latter therefore presumably had some idea of the situation further north around Vielsalm. Nevertheless, the 72 Wing units had not yet evacuated at that point, and there was no one at the LWS site who could confirm to Gray-Horton that the withdrawal had taken place. He therefore continued north through Houffalize to what had been the headquarters of 2811 Squadron at Odeigne. Of course, he found the headquarters deserted. He therefore explored the Laroche-Vielsalm road to make sure that 72 Wing had indeed been evacuated and spotted the vehicles and equipment that had been left behind at their technical sites. Of the vehicles, Gray-Horton recorded:
These had been left by the commander of the 72 Wing stations as he had not been able to move them, owing to a reliance on an American tracked vehicle, and he did not feel the military situation at the time justified their destruction. There appeared to him a very good chance that the site might be reoccupied in the course of the next few days.
This statement does not entirely accord with the 72 Wing record, which implies that nothing of significance had been left behind. As we shall see, this was not the only point on which the records diverged.
Gray-Horton’s position was simply that he had ‘5 vehicles on his hands, of unknown contents and importance’. Consequently, he decided to warn the Regiment detachment at Champlon that objects of potential significance remained at the technical site. Before this, he proceeded to Vielsalm, which he found threatened by German armour to the north and east. Progress towards Malmedy and RJ 5369 was impossible.
In the meantime, at Champlon, the RAF Regiment force was divided. Three AFVs were detailed to protect the evacuated LWS and WOU units while all remaining vehicles returned to the Bastogne-Foy area to collect any remaining stores and equipment. At about 1530, the original LWS site came under shell fire and the majority of RAF personnel finally withdrew. Some loading nevertheless continued until about 2000, and the last vehicles were just leaving the site when small arms fire erupted in an adjacent wood. They reached Champlon three hours later without incident.
Jay got to Champlon that evening to find that C Flight of 2742 Squadron, commanded by Flight Lieutenant Hargreaves, had arrived several hours earlier. The situation was deteriorating, and US vehicles of all types were pulling out of the village. Shortly before Hargreaves reached Champlon, Gray-Horton had also arrived via the Vielsalm-Laroche road. Up to this point, RAF Regiment responsibilities in the Ardennes had been rigidly divided: 2811 Squadron had been responsible for the protection of 72 Wing elements, while 2804 and 2742 Squadrons had been allocated to 25 BDS. It required the appearance of a senior officer from Group headquarters to override this demarcation and assign all RAF Regiment resources available to investigate the remaining 72 Wing vehicles and equipment at the abandoned technical sites and ensure that they were withdrawn or destroyed. Gray-Horton left orders to this effect at Champlon.
Shortly after 2200, orders from 25 BDS directed all LWS and WOU elements to withdraw from the village and return to base at Louvain, east of Brussels. At 2315, four reconnaissance cars of 2742 Squadron, 15 3-ton vehicles and the wireless vans of 6088 LWS, together with 59 of their RAF and Army personnel moved off; Hargreaves went with them. The 2742 Squadron diary records ‘hundreds of flares on both sides of road towards Marche.’ Paratroops were thought to be responsible but their true source is impossible to establish. At Champlon, to execute Gray-Horton’s orders, this left B Troop 2742 Armoured Squadron and B Troop 2804 Armoured Squadron under the command of Flight Lieutenant Jay. With this force remained a single radar expert, Flight Sergeant West.
The documentary sources afterwards diverge, recording different timelines. Gray-Horton’s report states that Jay reached the former 72 Wing sites on the 19th. The abandoned RAF trucks could not be recovered without towage by American tracked vehicles, and the only one available had a burned-out clutch, but the RAF personnel were assured of assistance the following day. However, when they returned in the 20th, the Germans had overrun the area and they were forced to abandon their mission and withdraw to Marche.
Yet the squadron diaries indicate that Jay only set out to find the abandoned items on the 20th, raising the obvious question as to what he was doing on the 19th. It is recorded that AFVs were sent that day from Champlon to a bridge on the Bastogne road (Pt. 4366), which must have been at Ortheville. They were in R/T contact with Jay’s headquarters at Champlon and he had issued instructions to stop all vehicles and establish how far the Germans had advanced. They came under small arms fire during their move to the bridge, but its origin is unclear. They subsequently returned to Champlon.
This suggests that Jay lacked information about German dispositions and was understandably reluctant to lead his very small force to the 72 Wing sites until the extent of the enemy penetration had been established. Also, he may not have been very familiar with the area between Laroche and Vielsalm, which had previously been the responsibility of 2811 Squadron. Furthermore, his normal source of intelligence, US 8th Corps headquarters, had withdrawn from Bastogne and its whereabouts were unknown. Another factor was disinformation. The Operations Record Book of 2742 Squadron records the receipt of a report that German forces were advancing towards Marche. ‘This proved to be false, as it was given out by a German officer in American uniform, who was later captured.’
By the morning of the 20th, Jay had learnt that 8th Corps headquarters had moved to Neufchateau, southwest of Bastogne, and he set out to find the Americans at 0900. They could not provide much clarification but were confident that Jay would be able to reach the three 72 Wing sites. Therefore, at 1300, a troop under Jay’s command left Champlon and drove via Laroche and Semrée to inspect them. Flight Sergeant West went with him, while another Flight Sergeant named Bunney was left in command at Champlon. According to 2804 Squadron’s account, they found a trailer at the first site - Regné - which was burned on West’s advice; while it was being destroyed, US MPs arrived and reported that enemy tanks were operating in the next valley. However, 2742 Squadron’s record goes further, referring to ‘site complete with equipment ready for use’. It is clear that at least some equipment had been left behind, and 2742 Squadron described how ‘two small hutted sites’ were ‘destroyed by grenades and fire’.
At the second 72 Wing site - Odeigne - Jay found that five VHF vehicles had been left intact, although their interior communications equipment had been removed. Four were soon running but were stuck in rough ground; the fifth proved unserviceable and was destroyed. It was at this point that the Americans offered Jay the tracked vehicle, but it could not be used as the clutch had failed. Jay was duly promised the use of another tow vehicle the following day, and this plan appeared viable as ‘there was a certain amount of US armour’ holding the Germans back, although the 2742 Squadron account refers to the enemy being only 400 yards away. ‘Small arms fire was encountered the whole time.’ Finally, the RAF Regiment detachment moved on to the third site at Chene-al-Pierre, which had been ‘efficiently destroyed and evacuated’. At about 1830, they headed back to Champlon.
.jpeg) |
| Flight Lieutenant Jay led elements of 2804 and 2742 Squadrons from Champlon to the 72 Wing technical sites on 20 December. |
.jpg) |
| Detail enlargement of the 72 Wing area. |
 |
| Odeigne in January 1945; Jay reached the technical site near the village on 20 December but heavy fighting in the area prevented his return the following day to recover four 72 Wing vehicles. |
Early the next morning, Flight Sergeant Bunney led another patrol down the Bastogne road to the bridge at Ortheville. Again, the aim was to establish the extent of the German advance. He found the village held by an American tank destroyer unit, which reported that 101st Airborne Division was defending Bastogne. Bunney was still talking to the unit commanding officer when nearby German forces opened fire, causing several American casualties.
The Americans reported that enemy paratroops were operating close by at Baconfoy. Again, it is more likely that these were regular German ground troops. Nevertheless, Champlon was immediately evacuated, the remaining RAF vehicles withdrawing to Marche along a road crowded with refugees. The Germans were expected to mount flanking manoeuvres, cutting the roads, and German troops were reported to be wearing American uniforms and using captured American equipment.
On arrival at Marche, five AFVs under Jay set out to reach the vehicles near Odeigne located the previous day. He decided to route via Laroche. They left Marche at 1300 hours but found Laroche under mortar fire and detoured via Hotton and Erezée. At Lamormenil, one AFV broke down and was left in the village.
They continued to Dochamps, where an American tank attack was being launched to destroy an enemy road block; 2742 Squadron’s account states that they got as far as Odeigne village, which lay about one mile from the actual technical site. However, the road east was blocked by a firefight between American and German forces. There was ‘considerable small arms and mortar fire’, leaving no alternative but to withdraw to Lamormenil. From there, Jay and his men made one further attempt by proceeding about two miles along another lane. This time, they closed to within half a mile of their objective but then came under fire again from both sides of the road. As further progress was impossible, they gave up and returned to Marche for the night.
The following day, they set off back to 25 BDS, but it is an interesting reflection on the Ardennes battle that, about 10km from Sinsin (presumably at or near Hogne) they received yet another warning of ‘paratroops’ nearby. The RAF Regiment detachment then checked the documents of two civilians and discovered that they had false identity cards stamped with Swastikas. While handing them over to the Americans, they once again came under fire, which they returned before capturing one of the Germans.
Also in this period, the last of the 72 Wing units - Air Formation Signals (AFS) - was evacuated from Jemelle. Late on the 18th, the Mortar Flight of 2811 Squadron (by this time quartered at Morville) had been sent to the AFS site, and they spent the following day helping the signallers to pack up their equipment before returning to base. Subsequently, in the absence of an immediate threat, 72 Wing decided that AFS should continue operating from Jemelle for the time being.
On the 19th, the OC 2811 Squadron, Squadron Leader Goff, sent out four reconnaissance parties to establish the exact position of the Germans and to determine whether any of the evacuated 72 Wing units could resume operations in the La Roche area. The answer was emphatically that they could not; furthermore, there was a clear threat to the AFS site, which was entirely staffed by communications and radar personnel and had no permanently assigned force protection. Consequently, Goff decided to send his No. 1 Flight to Jemelle the following morning.
Once at Jemelle, the key problem facing No. 1 Flight was, yet again, the fog of war. Hard information was ‘very difficult to obtain’. The Germans were reported to have advanced past St Hubert. By the 21st, Lieutenant Colonel Leith had returned from Strasbourg and resumed his post as area RAF Regiment commander. That day, he decided to carry out his own reconnaissance, which yielded little information about the Germans but established that virtually the only Allied troops left between Bastogne and Marche were Canadian Forestry Corps personnel equipped with rifles.
 |
| Air Formation Signals (AFS) was located at Jemelle. |
 |
| The road fork south of Jemelle: 2804 Squadron AFVs took up position here on 22 December, covering the roads from Forrieres and (through Ambly) Nassogne. |
Leith then sent out dispatch riders to patrol the approach roads to Jemelle, and it was via this channel that he was warned at 1305 that the Germans had overrun the Champlon area and were heading west. The Canadians had been ordered to evacuate. Shortly afterwards, all signals personnel were ordered to withdraw from Jemelle under the protection of No. 1 Flight, although the AFS commander, Major Davis (Royal Corps of Signals) and Hirons, who commanded No. 1 Flight, remained there for the time being. AFS was evacuated with all its equipment at 1930, but Jemelle continued to serve as a base for dispatch rider reconnaissance activity, which was maintained throughout the night under extremely hazardous conditions by three Leading Aircraftsmen, Bridgewater, Stokes and Coutts.
Early the following morning, an armoured patrol of 2804 Squadron accompanied by Flying Officer Thomas of 2811 Squadron visited Jemelle, and the RAF Regiment units between them assembled the following picture: the Germans were probably in St Hubert and Laroche and were advancing northwest; Marche was still in American hands; the Germans had captured Hotton but the Americans were holding St Vith and Malmedy. The armoured vehicles then took up positions at a nearby junction that covered the roads from the south-east. There, they learnt from a civilian that American troops had been fired on by Germans operating captured US tanks at Forrieres and that four Tiger tanks had moved into Nassogne - two villages only a few kilometres away. Clearly, in such circumstances, there was no prospect of resuming AFS operations from Jemelle in the near future, and all British personnel promptly abandoned the site.
Meanwhile, 72 Wing was working flat out to restore Oboe, Gee and G-H operations from the new Florennes base, and this was achieved in a matter of days. Yet there was a price to pay: from this more westerly position, there was some loss of coverage over Germany, which is illustrated by the following map:
The successful evacuation of 85 Group (72 Wing and 25 BDS) elements in December 1944 is a small but interesting detail in the history of the Ardennes battle - a colossal military undertaking in which entire armies confronted one another - but it is more than that. It is a story that contains lessons still relevant to military practitioners to this day, particularly with regard to the protection of highly secret capabilities positioned in forward areas.
The RAF’s dedicated force protection corps, the RAF Regiment, played a crucial role in ensuring the safe evacuation of all 85 Group personnel and virtually all their equipment. Nothing of any value fell into German hands. But it is perhaps worth reordering this fundamental point: it would have been extremely risky to deploy such secret and high-value systems as Oboe, Gee and G-H into forward areas without dedicated force protection. The 85 Group personnel positioned in the Ardennes were largely technical specialists (‘techies’) with minimal knowledge or experience of the realities of combat. Their capacity to evacuate successfully under direct pressure from the Germans without RAF Regiment support appears very doubtful. US forces in the Laroche area periodically supplied invaluable assistance but had priorities that extended far beyond the protection of British radar or signals units.
Throughout, RAF Regiment personnel frequently came under fire from small arms, mortars and artillery. They sometimes returned fire, regularly drove miles towards rather than away from the advancing German divisions, operated perilously close to forward enemy spearheads, and often conducted reconnaissance into contested areas or deployed defensively along key arteries while the 85 Group units prepared for withdrawal. Additionally, at all the sites, they helped the 85 Group units to pack for the move. The Regiment’s absence would, at the very least, have greatly increased the risk of top secret equipment falling into hostile hands.
Several problems complicated their task. Command and control was divided between three chains, one American, one 85 Group and one RAF Regiment - each with their different priorities. This was unavoidable, and the complications generated by divided command could only be addressed through close liaison or the permanent allocation of particular Regiment units to 85 Group elements. Even then, the high importance of the 85 Group mission was such that evacuation was delayed, making the Regiment’s task more difficult when the final order was given. In one instance, this apparently resulted in the abandonment of equipment that might have been useful to the Germans, although this is impossible to establish with certainty. There were also several proposals for resuming 85 Group operations from locations that were barely less vulnerable than those from which their units had been withdrawn.
Furthermore, given the highly fluid situation on the ground, rigid demarcation of RAF Regiment tactical responsibilities between 85 Group units was not always advantageous. While modern doctrine might frown on the ‘long screwdriver’ and promote mission command, Gray-Horton’s appearance near the battlefront at a key moment allowed responsibilities to be reallocated so that the limited Regiment forces available could be sent into the 72 Wing area, where they destroyed what one source described as ‘site complete with equipment ready for use’.
The other fundamental problem was situational awareness. The first few days of the German offensive were characterised by great uncertainty, the RAF being critically dependent on the US Army for accurate and timely intelligence. The fog of war combined with the fog of the Ardennes to produce a situation that was shrouded in uncertainty. Disinformation fed by German commandos in American uniforms complicated matters still further, as did the numerous inaccurate reports of airborne landings. Communications were critical in these circumstances. In the words of one report, ‘In the early days of the battle, when it was necessary to move units with great rapidity, W/T signals personnel were in many cases the last to leave the threatened area, maintaining vital communications until the very last moment possible.’
When neither the American information link nor the communications network were available, the RAF Regiment were thrown back on their own resources. These included reconnaissance patrols, the establishment of roadblocks, checkpoints and observation points, and the constant use of dispatch riders. High-priority and high-responsibility tasking was frequently passed down to the lowest levels - to junior officers, NCOs and airmen, who fulfilled their duties creditably in very difficult circumstances.
Not much more is known of the main actors in this little-known drama, but Squadron Leader Goff accompanied Gray-Horton on his reconnaissance across the Rhine at Remagen in March, together with elements of 2742 Squadron, braving mines, craters, shelling and air attack, and somehow emerging unscathed. And then there was Flight Lieutenant Jay. We may reasonably leave it to the London Gazette to describe how the gamekeeper ultimately turned poacher to earn a Military Cross:
Flight Lieutenant Jay has commanded an armoured flight for eleven months and has been actively engaged in conflict with the enemy since August, 1944. From 3rd-12th April, 1945, his flight was acting as an armoured reconnaissance unit to a special force whose speedy advance was only made possible by his determined and efficient handling of the flight. On 8th April, 1945, Flight Lieutenant Jay was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance with a troop of armoured cars which necessitated proceeding between two strongly held pockets of resistance. He was frequently under fire and once had to join battle with the enemy, giving covering fire to an American detachment in difficulties. His determination, courage and complete disregard of personal danger, enabled the force to gain its objective without casualties. The operation resulted in the capture of the entire designing staff of the Focke Wulf Aircraft Company, together with many valuable secret documents.
Notes
This blog is substantially based on the following UK National Archives sources:
AIR 37/1218, RAF Regiment in Battle of the Ardennes, 1945.
AIR 29/101/4, 2804 (Armoured) Squadron RAF Regiment Operations Record Book, 1944-1946.
AIR 29/83/2, 2742 Squadron RAF Regiment Operations Record Book, 1943-1946.
AIR 16/921, History of 72 Wing.
AIR 26/103, 72 (Signals) Wing Operations Record Book, 1940-1946.
Other sources include:
The Second World War, 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Signals, Vol III, Aircraft Radio (Air Ministry, AHB, 1956).
The Second World War, 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Signals, Vol IV, Radar in Raid Reporting (Air Ministry, AHB, 1950).
The Second World War, 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Signals, Vol VII, Radio Counter-Measures (Air Ministry, AHB, 1950).
London Gazette
