RAF Airfield Anti-Aircraft Defence from Normandy to Bodenplatte

Twenty years have passed since the RAF last deployed its own Ground-Based Air Defences in the form of Rapier missile fire units, which were sent to Kuwait to defend the Ali Al Salem Deployed Operating Base during the second Gulf War (UK Operation Telic). Subsequently, the RAF Rapiers moved even further forward to protect 1 (UK) Armoured Division from Iraqi short-range surface-to-surface missiles, as no Army Rapier elements had been sent to the Gulf. Despite this impressive display of cross-component flexibility, the RAF’s Rapier capability was axed in the following year, leaving the Army solely responsible for UK Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD) for a brief period. Then, after the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK’s contingent SHORAD capability was eliminated too, leaving only enough Rapier systems for the Falkland Islands. It seemed that RAF air bases in the UK and overseas no longer needed GBAD. The west could take air superiority for granted and, in extremis, the Americans could always be expected to help. In this context, there could be no better time for Project Overlord to reconsider RAF airfield air defence during the liberation of Northwest Europe in 1944-45.

Throughout the inter-war years, UK Ground-Based Air Defences (GBAD) were desperately weak, despite the emergence of significant air threats in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Anti-aircraft defences proved easy to reduce after the First World War but difficult to enlarge in the 1930s. The diminutive scale of UK airfield anti-aircraft defence on the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 was part of this broader deficiency. Its true significance would only become clear when, on the very first day of the conflict, the Luftwaffe set out to destroy the Polish Air Force on the ground. With warfare now firmly established in three dimensions, airfields had become a primary target for air attack.

In the early wartime period, the UK had no realistic alternative but to assign a preponderant airfield Anti-Aircraft (AA) role to the Army, leaving RAF personnel to provide extremely limited Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA) defence with machine guns and cannon. Yet the Army had many other AA commitments, and it was inevitable that, in the heat of battle, cover for airfields should often have been inadequate. The most effective protection was achieved by integrating GBAD with other air defences on the UK mainland or by assigning Army AA brigades to deployed air formations such as the Western Desert Air Force. When Army AA elements were not integrated with the RAF in this way, airfields were often left without effective defences. Similarly, efforts to improve air defence rarely delivered satisfactory results if they were too narrowly focused. Genuine advances in one sphere, such as GBAD, were often linked to broader developments in areas such as radar, fighter protection and passive air defence. Significant progress was difficult to achieve without accepting that air defence was a multi-faceted entity.

The creation of the RAF Regiment in 1942 promised to eliminate many of the problems that had previously arisen in the field of airfield AA defence at the air-land interface, and the RAF’s dependence on the Army for AAA also declined for other reasons. With RAF and USAAF fighters increasingly dominating the skies at medium-to-higher altitudes, there was less need for the Army’s heavy AA guns by 1943.

By the time the build-up to Operation Overlord began in earnest, UK airfield LAA defence had been entirely taken over by the RAF Regiment. As a result, a considerable number of Bofors guns had been transferred to the Regiment, although they also retained lighter weapons. The composition of the RAF Regiment component of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham’s Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) was approved on 19 March 1944 and numbered 19 LAA squadrons at first; the total was subsequently raised to 25.(1) They were to form part of a layered and integrated air defence system to protect the Allied beachhead and the numerous advanced landing grounds. This system also involved radar warning and fighter control provided by mobile units, further warning provisions in the form of the ‘Y’ Service and visual observation, and extensive RAF and USAAF fighter cover.

Typhoons massed on a Normandy landing ground.

With aviation fuel...

And ammunition.

The last line of defence: the RAF Regiment's Bofors guns.

At an early stage, Coningham insisted that RAF Regiment LAA squadrons assigned to airfields in the Allied lodgement area should be equipped with Bofors guns and not Hispano cannons. During Operation Husky - the Allied assault on Sicily in 1943 - both the RAF Regiment’s Hispanos and the Army’s Oerlikons had revealed their limitations when operated from congested beachheads, bases or assembly zones crowded with Allied troops and equipment. As their 20mm ammunition was not self-destroying, their use could bring a downpour of lethal rounds on to nearby areas, and Hispano fire ironically caused casualties on airfields and damage to parked aircraft. Among those who witnessed this effect first-hand and only narrowly escaped death or injury was Coningham himself.

The chief difficulty with Coningham’s stipulation lay in the supply of Bofors guns, which could not keep pace with demand. The War Office agreed to support an RAF request to re-equip UK airfields with Bofors in the spring of 1944, but they balked at the prospect of supplying considerably more weapons to the Regiment squadrons bound for Normandy. Instead, they offered the 20mm Polsten gun as an alternative, stressing the tactical advantages of retaining a mix of 40mm and 20mm weapons for airfield AA defence.

However, since the appearance of the Bofors quick traverse mounting, these advantages were less pronounced, and the gun was also effective up to medium altitude whereas 20mm weapons were not. Furthermore, the Polsten was an unknown quantity, and the supply of self-destroying ammunition for it was uncertain. The RAF therefore turned down the offer and declared that, if no further Bofors guns were forthcoming from the War Office, they would be allocated to the 2 TAF squadrons from those originally deployed for airfield defence in the UK.(2) 

GBAD planning before Normandy was based on the same assumptions that guided other aspects of the air defence plan. The Allies overestimated the Luftwaffe’s response to the landings on 6 June. In the words of the official War Office history, ‘The result was perhaps an over-insurance in the matter of AA protection. On “D” day, 23 per cent of the artillery to be landed was AA, and by “D” + 1 the proportion had risen to 42 per cent, at which level it remained for the next month or more.’(3)

A further assumption was that, by day, the Luftwaffe could be dealt with by the fighters alone above 3,000ft. Below that altitude, the AA guns were responsible for air defence. By night, when only a small number of Allied night-fighters could be controlled at any one time, Heavy Anti-Aircraft (HAA) barrages would be necessary to protect vulnerable areas. As in earlier operations, an Army brigade made up of three HAA and three LAA regiments was tasked to assist with protecting the airfields of 83 Group - the first 2 TAF group to come ashore. This was 106 Brigade. The AOC 83 Group also controlled searchlights, barrage balloons and smoke screens in his area of responsibility.(4)

The Normandy landings required Allied aircraft to operate at great strength over anti-aircraft gunners who were in no sense ‘air-minded’ and who had not previously fought under RAF or USAAF air cover. While fighter control during the landings was exercised afloat by ships known as Fighter Direction Tenders (FDTs), which were specially equipped and staffed for the task, wider warning responsibility was over-centralised in headquarters ships, and preparations for them to fulfil this function were inadequate. It would probably have been better exercised from the FDTs.

On the night of 5/6 June itself, naval vessels fired on the RAF troop carriers bringing 6 Airborne Division to Normandy although ‘The aircraft were so well illuminated by the tracer from the flak that the special markings [i.e. their black and white wing stripes] were easily distinguishable.’ On board the responsible headquarters ship, ‘The Admiral was so incensed that he finally threatened to engage the next offending craft with the guns of HMS Largs. At least two Dakotas were shot down by naval gunfire. A Naval Staff Officer was dispatched by boat to pass by word of mouth the order for AA guns to cease fire.’(5)

On several occasions over the following days, after a yellow warning was issued in the British sector, German raiders bombed before a red warning was given. As a result, any confidence that might have existed in the system quickly broke down, with predictable consequences.

AA gunfire control, both naval and military, from the anchorage and beaches, left much to be desired. Serious cases of firing at friendly fighter aircraft occurred in the British area. Usually it was started by the gun-crews of smaller vessels, coasters, LSTs and LCTs, but once it had started, even visual recognition was completely ignored and the firing was taken up strongly by shore AA and naval guns of all classes of warships, including cruisers – even the well disciplined gun-crews were quickly out of hand. The accuracy of gunfire from naval guns in the Eastern Task Force area was very poor, otherwise there would have been heavy casualties to Allied fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft.(6)

A later inquest revealed, among other things, a lack of R/T communications between headquarters ships and subordinate AA elements. ‘A broadcast R/T channel from the Controlling Ship, received by all ships carrying AA and operating in the assault area, was obviously necessary if full advantage were to be taken of the available radar information, and also so that on occasions when fire was opened on friendly aircraft, it could be immediately stopped.’(7)

Meanwhile, the RAF Regiment’s LAA squadrons came ashore. First to become operational was 2834 LAA Squadron, which was allocated to Brazenville airfield (numbered B.2) and reached operational status with the six guns of ‘A’ Flight before midnight on 7 June; the guns of ‘B’ Flight became operational the following day. By 18 June, ten LAA squadrons had deployed to airfields in the British sector under Mobile Wing Headquarters control.

The Regiment squadrons were responsible for the close AA defence of airfields under construction until the arrival of the first 106 Brigade units, normally just before airfields commenced operations. Responsibility for close AA defence and operational control of the RAF Regiment LAA Squadrons then passed to the local Anti-Aircraft Defence Commander, who was appointed by the commander of 106 Brigade.(8) 

RAF Regiment Bofors guns in Normandy.

The Luftwaffe’s reaction to the landings fell far short of Allied expectations, and the Allies immediately secured air superiority. Intermittent raids on the airfields called the anti-aircraft gunners into action, and the RAF Regiment LAA squadrons claimed 14 aircraft destroyed and 13 damaged between 7 June and 15-16 July.(9) Yet the Germans reorganised their western air forces, and discussions between Jagdkorps II and Seventh Army produced a plan to protect supplies and reinforcements en route to Normandy, to provide tactical support to front-line troops, and to target Allied airfields.(10)

The RAF Regiment reported ten attacks by enemy aircraft on beachhead landing grounds between 1320 hours on 4 July and 0135 hours on the morning following. A total of about 50 enemy aircraft were involved of which four Messerschmidt 109s were destroyed. There were few repetitions of these tactics during the next two days but during the afternoon, night and early morning of 7/8 July there were 11 attacks. The most active day was 14 July when 34 attacks were made on landing grounds, 19 of them by single aircraft. A total of 17 enemy aircraft were reportedly shot down. On 16 July, some 15 to 20 enemy aircraft carried out an elaborate attack on Carpiquet airfield just before midnight but except for 3 daylight attacks on 4 July, the other operations were carried out by very small numbers of aircraft and the damage done was negligible.(11) 

The raids mounted on 14 July took advantage of bad weather, which substantially reduced the Allied air effort. One of the largest involved a formation of more than 50 aircraft, which attacked Martragny airfield (B.7). The guns of 2703 LAA Squadron and units of 106 AA Brigade responded vigorously and afterwards claimed between them 14 destroyed – a figure that was officially confirmed. However, during this action, the LAA defences also fired on Allied aircraft. A subsequent enquiry exonerated the RAF Regiment squadron, but the airfield commander placed one detachment of Army gunners under arrest and charged them with ‘firing at friendly aircraft’.(12)

This was but one episode in a running inter-Service argument over the deconfliction of combat air power and AA activity. The Army naturally wanted the freedom to defend itself from air attack – a freedom that could not be exercised if there was a risk of firing on friendly aircraft. To address this situation, a system of Inner Artillery Zones (IAZs) and Gun Defended Areas (GDAs) was devised, one excluding aircraft entirely from a given area, the other excluding all aircraft except fighters and permitting AA fire subject to a raid warning, a lack of IFF from the target aircraft, and direct communication with a Gun Operations Room. Yet in the restricted airspace above the Normandy lodgement area, the employment of IAZs and GDAs imposed significant tactical constraints on the RAF and the USAAF, reducing their capacity to provide effective air cover and offensive support to ground forces.

The problem of aircraft recognition was subsequently addressed following a request from 21st Army Group by Observer Captain VO Robinson OBE, MC, of the Royal Observer Corps and six experienced Royal Observer Corps officers who deployed from the UK. In August, they toured the Army’s AAA sites in France to assess the standard of aircraft recognition and suggest improvements. After visiting 65 different units – Brigade Headquarters, batteries and individual gun crews – they concluded that there was ‘a considerable variation of efficiency’ extending across the Royal Artillery HAA and LAA elements. There were three main reasons for this: 

1) No standard was laid down.

2) No establishment of qualified aircraft identifiers existed.

3) Efficiency consequently varied with the attitude of the Commander of each individual unit to the subject. The opinion of the troops and battery commanders was the most important under the existing circumstances and organisation, and then that of the Regimental and Brigade commanders. 

Robinson and his team found that a very considerable knowledge of aircraft recognition existed but, ‘owing to lack of standard establishment and qualifications and lack of status of the subject, also owing to inadequate organisation of regimental instructors and instructional material, that knowledge was quite haphazard in its distribution.’ Some fire units were reportedly ‘very poor’, others ‘very bad and certainly likely to make mistakes.’ He recommended that there should be a minimum establishment of qualified instructors and that qualified aircraft identifiers should be provided down to the lowest tactical levels; of necessity, these identifiers should undertake recognised tests at regular intervals.(13)

Eventually, in keeping with the experience of earlier campaigns, the Luftwaffe attacks declined as Allied forces enlarged their presence in the lodgement area and strengthened their air defences. Against this background, 83 Group requested the withdrawal of some 106 Brigade Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) cover, and both the IAZs and GDAs were substantially reduced in size. For 106 Brigade, daylight engagement beyond the revised GDA was made subject to authorisation by the 83 Group Control Centre. By night, all LAA guns were permitted to engage aircraft that were clearly hostile and were also allowed to employ barrage fire (14) against unseen targets with authorisation from the Anti-Aircraft Operations Room. If an airfield was directly attacked, this authorisation was automatically delegated. However, all barrage fire was subject to the approval of the airfield commander. The RAF Regiment LAA squadrons raised their claim to 19 aircraft destroyed and 13 damaged by the end of July, but the airfield AA guns were rarely called into action in Normandy thereafter.(15)

The Allied advance through France and Belgium and into The Netherlands involved the movement of AAA elements from one airfield to the next. Ramp space was at a premium, and the bases were often packed with aircraft, but the deterrent effect of the Allied air defences, in the context of the Luftwaffe’s weakness, kept all but a few raiders away. As 84 Group consolidated their position on the continent in support of 1st Canadian Army, more RAF Regiment squadrons deployed, and a total of 18 AA squadrons had been incorporated into 83 Group and 84 Group by the end of August.

During Operation Market Garden in the second half of September, combat aircraft from 83 Group deployed to Eindhoven, Grave and Volkel airfields in The Netherlands. Close to the front line and at first benefiting from only limited radar coverage, all three were potentially vulnerable to air attack, and they were soon occupied by a total of ten RAF Regiment LAA squadrons;(16) but growing Allied fighter strength over eastern areas of The Netherlands in late September and October eliminated much of the threat.(17) Eindhoven was visited by a lone Me 109 on 27 September, which was driven off by a single gun, and four Ju 88s ran into a storm of Bofors fire over Grave on the following day. The gunners subsequently claimed two hits.

RAF Tempests at Volkel; while under Luftwaffe occupation, 
the base had been heavily bombed by the Allies.

Typhoons at another forward base - Eindhoven.

A new challenge first appeared on 2 October, when a formation of six Me 262 jet fighter-bombers attacked Grave, causing about 35 casualties but without damaging any aircraft.(18) Another two jets targeted Grave on the 6th, wounding three RAF Regiment personnel,(19) and there were further raids on 7, 11, 12, 13 and 21 October; five more Me 262s bombed the airfield on the 22nd.(20) The Luftwaffe also attacked Volkel on 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 21 October. The second of two raids on the 11th left one Typhoon damaged, and three raids on the 12th caused both damage and casualties, including some fatalities. Between five and ten Me 262s were reportedly involved on the 14th.(21) Yet the documents show that the airfield attacks virtually ceased in the second half of the month. It was in this context - and with radar coverage improving steadily - that the 83 Group’s visual observation capability was withdrawn. The observer units appeared to be serving no useful purpose.(22)

November again witnessed a few attacks on Volkel, Eindhoven and Grave, but the German aircraft largely maintained attack profiles that made them very difficult to engage, typically flying at altitudes beyond the reach of the Bofors guns or making single passes at high speed and very low level.(23) However, on the 26th, 2875 LAA Squadron RAF Regiment, based at the newly constructed Helmond airfield, became the first ground unit in history to shoot down a jet aircraft - another Me 262 - for a total ammunition expenditure of 32 rounds. The gunners apparently observed the Me 262 formation bombing north-east of the airfield before they opened fire, and the aircraft was flying at around 2,000ft when it was hit - significantly higher than the typical Luftwaffe ‘hedge-hoppers’ but well within the Bofors’ engagement envelope. An approach at this altitude would also probably have generated a radar-based warning of impending trouble.(24) Two days later, Regiment gunners engaged two more Me 262s over Helmond and the lower aircraft, flying at about 1,000ft, was shot down during the discharge of 21 Bofors rounds.(25)

The Me 262 shot down on 26 November.

After the Germans launched their offensive in the Ardennes on 16 December, the 83 Group airfields faced a renewed challenge. Eindhoven and Volkel were among the targets of some nine attacks on the 17th, when RAF Regiment AA squadrons fired no fewer than 1,679 rounds and claimed five enemy aircraft damaged. There were further attacks the next day, and Helmond was targeted by a pair of Me 262s on the 23rd. On the 25th, the Luftwaffe struck Eindhoven, hitting the Communications Flight dispersal, destroying four Austers and wounding five airmen. None of the attackers were shot down but another Me 262 was destroyed during a raid over Heesche airfield.(26)

At the end of December 1944, the capacity of the forward Allied airfields was particularly stretched. With the Ardennes battle still raging, the pressure on ramp space was acute, and by no means every airfield in Allied hands was suitable for all-weather operations. Theoretically, 2 TAF policy was that no more than one flying wing should be assigned to each base, but this restriction had proved impossible to maintain in practice, forward deployment being essential to maximise aircraft endurance over the battle front and beyond.(27) And along with all the aircraft crammed into the main Dutch and Belgian bases came vast quantities of munitions and aviation fuel.

RAF Regiment Bofors crew in the freezing winter
of 1944-45.

Loading Bofors shells in sub-zero temperatures
 - with no gloves.

The airfields were of course heavily defended by fighters and by RAF Regiment and Army LAA units, although the scale of Army LAA cover had been cut and RAF Regiment reductions were under consideration.(28) Radar coverage from the Low Countries into north-western Germany was excellent by this time, and, as always, the ‘Y’ Service supplied further intelligence for warning and tracking purposes. However, as we have seen, visual observation no longer formed part of the air raid reporting system.

It was against this background, and in conditions of the utmost secrecy, that the Luftwaffe planned Operation Bodenplatte to target the more easterly 2 TAF and IXth Air Force airfields. Ranking as the largest single German counter-airfield operation since the invasion of the Soviet Union, Bodenplatte was eventually launched on New Year’s Day 1945. Between 790 and 870 fighters were involved, and the inclusion of a training formation within this force suggests that all available aircraft were committed. Few such operations could better illustrate the importance of layered air defence. Luftwaffe preparations were missed by Allied intelligence (layer 1); the German fighters evaded radar (layer 2) by flying at ultra-low level; unobserved by radar, they also evaded fighter interception (layer 3); they rendered themselves invulnerable to ‘Y’ (layer 4) by maintaining strict radio silence; and they were not reported by observers (layer 5) because visual observation had ceased.

Yet layer 6, the guns of the RAF Regiment and the remaining Army airfield defence AAA, could not be evaded. Moreover, Allied fighters became involved on an increasing scale as Bodenplatte progressed. The Germans secured near-complete tactical surprise, but their achievement in terms of Allied losses has proved difficult to establish with certainty. Many airfields were left in a state of chaos, strewn with wrecked aircraft and shrouded in smoke and flames; early calculations of around 300 Allied aircraft destroyed or damaged (29) have been raised in some recent histories, and innumerable bomb dumps and fuel depots also went up in smoke.

Yet the Allies escaped with relatively few personnel casualties. By contrast, Luftwaffe losses on 1 January 1945, originally estimated at between 210 and 220 aircraft destroyed or damaged, may also have been higher, and German aircraft losses were matched by aircrew casualties killed and captured. Inexperienced or under-trained, or both, many of the German pilots lingered for too long at low altitude near the Allied flak guns.(30)

The shambles of Operation Bodenplatte: USAAF B-17s.

Firemen trying to save a burning RAF Lancaster.

Another incinerated aircraft, this time a Dakota.

A burnt out RAF Mitchell.

Predictably, over-claiming was rife. While the Allied fighter forces claimed a total of 92 aircraft destroyed, British Army gunners claimed 122 and US Army gunners 194. There were doubtless many occasions when one aircraft was engaged by several guns. The RAF Regiment, positioned on the target airfields, claimed a more modest 43, but this was the highest number of claims submitted by the Regiment on a single day throughout the war by a substantial margin.(31) One Regiment gun commander was Sergeant George Daniel Toye. According to the London Gazette,

In January, 1945, Sergeant Toye was in command of a detachment which had been withdrawn from action for airfield patrol duties. The gun had been left in a position ready for action. At about 09.25 hours another airman, who was on sentry duty, warned Sergeant Toye of the approach of between 36 and 50 enemy aircraft. Sergeant Toye immediately ordered his men to ‘take post’ and in spite of the automatic loader being filled with A.P. [armour piercing] ammunition, got the gun into action with such speed that he was able to engage the first of six M.E.l09’s which came in to attack a nearby dispersal ground. Immediately afterwards 4 F.W.190s and 2 M.E.109s attacked Sergeant Toye’s gun post. Cannon shells and machine gun bullets struck all around and casualties were sustained. Undeterred, Sergeant Toye continued to instruct his men and engaged the attackers as they dived low to attack; one after another in rapid succession. The deliberate attack against the gun post was temporarily abandoned.  Sergeant Toye then engaged a M.E. 109 which was coming in to attack aircraft on the ground; a hit was obtained and the enemy aircraft was observed to go down omitting black smoke. A further 2 F.W.190s then came in to attack the gun post.

Sergeant Toye remained unperturbed and engaged the aircraft as they came in to attack almost simultaneously from different angles. One of the attackers was hit and set on fire. This was the first occasion on which the detachment had been under enemy fire. Sergeant Toye’s outstanding courage, initiative and leadership inspired his comrades and contributed largely to the success achieved.(32)

Toye was subsequently awarded the Military Medal.

A Luftwaffe Fw 190 shot down during Bodenplatte.

Another victim - a Luftwaffe Me 109.

The tail plane of another Fw 190.

It is unlikely that the statistical discrepancies generated by Operation Bodenplatte will ever be fully resolved, but they are not especially important. The key issue is that, in the context of front-line strength, reserves and logistical capacity, the losses inflicted on the RAF and the USAAF were sustainable, whereas those incurred by the Luftwaffe were not. Indeed, they were disastrous. The Germans lost aircraft and aircrew that they could not hope to replace. Otherwise, Coningham ordered a review of 2 TAF orders for the protection of airfields and there was some reallocation of aircraft between bases to improve dispersal; on-airfield dispersal drills were similarly revived, and 2 TAF reversed their plans for cutting AAA protection. By 18 February, there were 28 RAF Regiment LAA Squadrons on the continent. But Bodenplatte would never be repeated, and these enhanced air defence measures were barely tested before the final collapse of Hitler’s Reich.

For the Allies, the Second World War in Europe ended with a salutary lesson in the dangers of reducing airfield air defence. After a long period of pinprick hit-and-run attacks on forward Allied bases, a major Luftwaffe strike seemed so unlikely by December 1944 that 2 TAF had reduced dispersal measures and withdrawn their visual observation capability. The scale of Army AA defences had been lowered, and RAF Regiment LAA cuts were also under consideration when, on 1 January 1945, the Luftwaffe delivered the sucker punch of Operation Bodenplatte. After the German fighters skillfully evaded multiple Allied countermeasures and reached the target airfields in the Low Countries and France, their only remaining adversary was the anti-aircraft gun.

Notes

1. Kingsley Oliver, The RAF Regiment at War (Leo Cooper. Barnsley, 2002),  p. 104.

2. The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord (draft Air Historical Branch narrative, no page numbering), Appendix 2. The balance for airfield defence in the UK totalled 192 guns; for 25 LAA squadrons in 2 TAF, each assigned 12 guns, the total would have been 300 without any provision for replacements.

3. Brigadier AL Pemberton, The Second World War 1939-1945, Army, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment (War Office, 1950), p. 219.

4. Pemberton, Artillery Tactics and Equipment, p. 219; AHB monograph, The Second World War 1939-1945, Royal Air Force, Signals Vol IV, Radar in Raid Reporting (Air Ministry, 1950), p. 420.

5. Report by Group Captain WG Tailyour, Air Staff Officer, Force S, 19 June 1944, Appendix IV/36, Notes on the Planning and Preparation of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the Invasion of North West France in June 1944, Appendices to Chapters I-IV, AHB.

6. AHB, Radar in Raid Reporting, pp. 429-430.

7. AHB, Radar in Raid Reporting, pp. 429-430.

8. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

9. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

10. AHB narrative, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol IV, The Break-Out and the Advance to the Lower Rhine, 12 June-30 September 1944, p. 29.

11. AHB, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol IV, p. 30.

12. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

13. AHB narrative, The Royal Observer Corps, pp. 168-169. 

14. Due to the inadequacy of the HAA gun at low altitudes and to the lack of suitable radar equipment for laying the LAA gun, LAA barrages had become increasingly important. Barrage zones were calculated from radar information received by the LAA control nodes and passed to the guns.

15. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

16. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

17. AHB narrative, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol V, From the Rhine to the Baltic, 1 October 1944-8 May 1945, p. 30.

18. 83 Group Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1944 (held at AHB).

19. 83 Group Intelligence Summary, 7 October 1944.

20. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord; 83 Group Intelligence Summary, 22 October 1944.

21. 83 Group Intelligence Summaries of 12, 13 and 15 October 1944; Air Ministry War Room ASO Summary 1423, 14 October 1944 (AHB); AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

22. AHB, Radar in Raid Reporting, p. 455.

23. 83 Group Intelligence Summaries of 4, 5, 7 and 11 November 1944.

24. TNA AIR 29/1118, 1309 Mobile Wing RAF Regiment Operations Record Book, November 1944; 83 Group Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1944.

25. 83 Group Intelligence Summary, 28 November 1944.

26. 83 Group Intelligence Summaries of 17, 18, 23 and 25 December 1944.

27. AHB, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol V, p. 102.

28. AHB, The RAF Regiment in Operation Overlord.

29. AHB, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol V, p. 101.

30. AHB, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol V, p. 101. One contemporary German estimate based on air reconnaissance imagery was that 479 Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in air combat, and 114 were damaged; see Operation Bodenplatte, translation AHB5/234, Attack on Allied Airfields on 1st January 1945 (AHB Box 485).

31. AHB, The Liberation of Northwest Europe, Vol V, p. 102.

32. London Gazette, 13 April 1945.