Arnhem: The Selection of the Drop Zones and Landing Zones

After 75 years, the circumstances that led to the selection of the drop zones and landing zones at Arnhem are still frequently misunderstood and misrepresented. What follows is an attempt to inject some much-needed balance and context into the story, and to remind readers of a long-forgotten first-hand account of how the DZs and LZs were chosen.

Reference: Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story

Reference: The Royal Air Force and Airborne Operations, Normandy to Varsity

Some 75 years after Operation Market Garden (the Allied airborne invasion of Holland in September 1944), it is still common to read that the Allies failed to secure their primary goal – the Arnhem Road Bridge – because the RAF forced 1st Airborne Division to accept drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs) some seven miles northwest of the Arnhem road bridge, near Wolfheze. The distance between these zones and the primary operational objective is held by many to be chiefly responsible for the Allied defeat at Arnhem. Out of the entire division, only some 740 men, mostly from 2 PARA, managed to bypass German opposition and reach the bridge. After a heroic struggle over three days, they were overwhelmed by (numerically) far superior enemy forces. Had the division been landed closer in, it is argued, many more troops would have taken up positions in central Arnhem, and the bridge might well have been held until the arrival of XXX Corps.

Some caution is necessary here. The fact is that 1st Airborne Division's battle plan only ever envisaged the deployment of two battalions (2 and 3 PARA) in the immediate vicinity of the road bridge. The remainder of the division was supposed to form a perimeter defence line stretching around Arnhem's outskirts. For them, the distance between the landing areas and the bridge was an irrelevance.

We must also bear in mind the likelihood that a larger airborne deployment around the bridge would have precipitated a far stronger German counter-attack in the same area whereas, in the event, the landings at Wolfheze were followed by intense and protracted fighting in western Arnhem. This commitment resulted in a substantial diversion of German resources – a major factor in their failure to overwhelm 2 PARA for three days. Had this not been necessary, they would have been able to assign all their available strength to the task of recapturing the bridge. It therefore seems unlikely that a landing in its immediate vicinity would have made much difference. The presence of so many German troops near Arnhem on 17 September and the remarkable rapidity of their subsequent reinforcement left them with a range of potential options for countering an Allied airborne assault; a different threat would merely have provoked a different response.

Nevertheless, given the controversy that has surrounded this issue ever since, it clearly merits further investigation and a reminder of some long-forgotten evidence – the only first-hand account (to my knowledge) of the DZ/LZ selection process.

To begin with, it is important to remember that Market Garden grew out of the smaller-scale Operation Comet, planned in the first week of September 1944. It was at this stage that Browning and the commander of 1st Airborne Division, Major General Roy Urquhart, first sought DZs and LZs at Arnhem. Following deliberations with the commander of 38 Group, RAF, Air Vice-Marshal Hollinghurst, it was agreed that the landings should take place at Wolfheze.

Hollinghurst, the AOC 38 Group

In part, understandably enough, Hollinghurst's position reflected concerns about German flak. The operations under consideration were the first large-scale airborne missions conducted by the Allies in daylight; also, no previous landings had been made immediately adjacent to a large town or city, 100 miles inside enemy-occupied territory and very close to Germany itself. Allied intelligence – the only information available to him – showed a steady build-up of flak at Arnhem and Nijmegen, and also pointed to heavy flak concentrations north of Arnhem at Deelen airfield.

The routing to Arnhem, first developed for Operation Comet,
carefully avoided known German flak concentrations

The air approach to Arnhem devised for Comet and used in Market 
Garden, again designed to reduce exposure to flak

The air routing plans for Comet and Market Garden were determined by the unprecedented depth of the two operations – something that was entirely beyond the control of the two air forces. Of necessity, the Allies had to guide aircraft around known flak concentrations between the Dutch coast and the Arnhem-Nijmegen area. To achieve this, they identified an eastward route inland, orientated slightly south of Arnhem, necessitating a final sharp turn that commenced just east of 's Hertogenbosch into a north-easterly approach to the DZs and LZs.

Had the landing area been located near to the road bridge, the Allied transport aircraft would have had to over-fly slowly, straight and level, and at low altitude, the anti-aircraft defences of both Nijmegen and Arnhem; then they would either have had to exit straight over Deelen airfield or bank east towards Germany. The Dakotas that equipped the bulk of the Allied air transport force lacked both armour and self-sealing fuel tanks; the gliders were even more vulnerable. Furthermore, quite apart from the losses that seemed likely to result, one important lesson of earlier operations (Normandy and Sicily, for example) was that heavy flak tended to cause widely dispersed and inaccurate drops and the loss of much vital equipment. In short, on grounds of flak alone, there seemed to be good reasons for avoiding central Arnhem.

After Comet was planned, and during its transformation into Market Garden, Allied air reconnaissance revealed a sharp increase in German anti-aircraft artillery deployments around Arnhem and Nijmegen. On 6 September, one 1st Airborne Division report based on air imagery noted ‘heavy concentrations at Deelen airfield, Arnhem and Nijmegen, respectively 30 light and 24 heavy guns, 36 light and 36 heavy guns, 24 light and 12 heavy guns.’ These numbers were expected to increase. On the 7th, XXX Corps recorded that heavy and light flak at both Arnhem and Nijmegen was increasing very considerably. ‘Guns getting into position (with vehicles and pits under construction) can be seen on several photos and there is railway flak at Arnhem.’  

Air imagery showing the build-up of anti-aircraft artillery around Arnhem
and Nijmegen in the second week of September 1944

These developments would have been worrying enough under any circumstances, given the inherent vulnerability of airborne air transport. But the build-up of German flak around Arnhem and Nijmegen gave cause for particular concern because it was suspected of being far from coincidental. Both Hollinghurst and Browning feared that operational security had been breached, and these concerns were shared by 1st Airborne Division’s head of intelligence. On 14 September he wrote:

Perhaps as usual the Germans have misappreciated our intention and they really do think we wish to destroy the bridges which we photograph but do not bomb, or perhaps they perceive as we have that the bridges are a suitable airborne target. Even if they do not realise this the security for the operation has been so appalling that some breeze must have reached them.

In fact, while the Germans were expecting an Allied ground offensive in Holland, as well as the possible use of airborne troops, they do not appear to have identified Arnhem as a potential airborne objective. However, Luftwaffe records do confirm that flak was being strengthened in the Market Garden area as a direct result of the decision to establish a defensive line between Antwerp and Maastricht. Both the formation and sustainability of this line depended on the integrity of the communication routes behind it. On 5 September, Luftgau Belgium-Northern France Field Headquarters received orders ‘to put A.A. [anti-aircraft] artillery into the German western position to provide defence against air attack for troops fighting there, and also to cover defiles, bridges etc. on supply routes.’ The headquarters was specifically instructed to protect the area ‘between Antwerp and Maastricht’. The lines of communication serving the more westerly sector of this region ran directly through Arnhem and Nijmegen, and could have been severed if their vital bridges over the Neder Rhine and the Waal had been destroyed. This doubtless explains why they were singled out for the additional flak cover noted by Allied air reconnaissance.

However, predictions about the strength of German anti-aircraft artillery played only a part in the decision to locate the DZs and LZs at Wolfheze. Of equal if not greater importance was the problem of identifying suitable terrain for the glider landings, which involved more than 500 aircraft. There was never any realistic prospect of safely landing hundreds of heavily laden assault gliders in the countryside south of the Arnhem road bridge. Since the war, this area has been transformed by drainage and a significant level of agricultural consolidation. However, in 1944 it was polderland, criss-crossed by hundreds of dykes and drainage ditches. This can be confirmed merely by examining maps from the period and the surviving imagery. According to one post-war official account, the land was divided by ditches into plots of 50 to 100 metres in width, and 100-200 metres in length; the ditches were 2-3 metres wide and 1.5 metres deep, and contained water about half a metre deep.

A highlighted secton of the polderland south of the Neder Rhine

After the extreme difficulties encountered in Sicily and Normandy, no one involved in planning the Arnhem operation could have authorised a large-scale glider landing in such heavily subdivided country. To have done so would have involved a high risk of serious damage to the gliders and their cargoes, injury or worse to their passengers and acute difficulties unloading and transporting vital equipment. Away from the polders, much of the countryside around Arnhem was characterised either by dense woodland or small fields. The only larger and more open fields near the town were those actually chosen for the landings, and they were only just large enough. The fact is that there was no practicable alternative to Wolfheze. It was therefore selected as the landing area for Comet, and retained when Comet was replaced by Market Garden.

The commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, Colonel George Chatterton, allegedly suggested that it might be possible to land a small glider force (five or six gliders) in the immediate vicinity of the road bridge. However, while such an operation was approved for Comet, this was only on the basis (1) that it would be executed under cover of darkness and (2) that the first main lift would reach Arnhem only shortly afterwards, just after daybreak. These stipulations could not have been applied after Comet was succeeded by Market Garden because the first main airlift was rescheduled to the early afternoon. Flown according to the original Comet schedule, the coup-de-main glider force would in these circumstances have arrived too far in advance. If, on the other hand, the coup de main had been mounted in daylight, it would have faced significant dangers from German flak and, if executed successfully, it would have signalled to every German in Holland that a larger-scale airborne assault to seize the Arnhem road bridge was imminent.

Imagery of the polderland showing the multiplicity of
drainage ditches that extended right across the area

The DZ/LZ selection issue at Arnhem is invariably presented by historians as an inter-service problem, which resulted in Hollinghurst 'over-ruling' Urquhart. This is misleading, for the real tension was between the operational and tactical levels of command rather than the airborne and air components. The official documents (UK National Archives, CAB 44/253, P. 69) prove that, during the planning of Operation Comet, both Browning and Dempsey were made fully aware of the fact that there were no suitable areas for large-scale airborne landings immediately adjacent to the Arnhem road bridge. Almost certainly, Montgomery would also have been briefed to this effect. They nevertheless retained Arnhem as the objective for Market Garden, consciously accepting a major risk (in addition to many others) instead of seeking a different Rhine crossing point. The three operational commanders then simply handed off the problem to the tactical level, where it could not possibly be solved.

The records provide no evidence of a major inter-service dispute over the Arnhem landing area. It was only later, searching for scapegoats for the Allied defeat, that historians began to allege controversy and confrontation between Urquhart and Hollinghurst. Urquhart would have known that Browning, his superior officer, accepted the case for landing at Wolfheze, but it is very likely that the intelligence picture also influenced his position. When Comet was being planned, it was at first believed that elements of only three enemy divisions of very limited capability were deployed between the front line and Arnhem, where there was thought to be nothing more than a flak battalion. There would have been no serious cause to doubt the capacity of 1st Airborne to deal with such meagre opposition.

It is of course true that intelligence subsequently reported that German defences in the Arnhem area were being strengthened. But this must be weighed against the fact that, in virtually every other respect, Market Garden represented a vast improvement over Comet for Urquhart’s men. Whereas Comet would have spread 1st Airborne Division far and wide via landings at Arnhem, Nijmegen, Groesbeek and Grave (for the bridge over the Maas), Market Garden focused the entire force on the Arnhem mission. At the same time, the daylight airlift promised far greater accuracy and concentration than had been achieved in darkness in the past. Given the absence of suitable landing areas elsewhere, there was simply no option but to use Wolfheze and devise the best possible plan for the subsequent seizure of the bridge.

The landings at Wofheze

Urquhart afterwards described the Arnhem airlift as ‘quite first class' and 'easily the most successful and accurate of any previously achieved either in operations or on exercises'. Moreover, in complete contrast to earlier airborne experience, ‘All units were able to move off to their tasks practically at full strength and in a very short time after landing.’ This factor, more than any other, explains why, in Market Garden, the airborne forces (British and American) were able to secure a far higher proportion of their objectives independently – without the support of conventional ground forces – than they had attained in the past.

And yet, at Arnhem, the advantages bestowed by the accuracy and concentration of the airlift might have been better exploited. The commander of 1 Parachute Brigade chose to advance on a broad front, dispatching his three battalions into the city along three different routes. By this means, even if one were blocked, the others might bypass enemy forces. Sensible as this appears, there was also a very obvious drawback – loss of mass. The plan dictated that 1 Parachute Brigade would be dispersed across a substantial area and ruled out any prospect of one battalion supporting another. As events turned out, the effect was magnified by the failure of 1st Airborne Division's communications. This was unfortunate but it should not have been unexpected, for poor communications had bedevilled earlier airborne operations and exercises.

2 PARA were ordered to capture the road bridge, but they were also lumbered with a variety of other tasks, which reduced their effective strength by at least one company before they reached their primary objective. In theory, 3 PARA was to ‘assist 2 Para Bn in capture of main bridge’. However, given the two battalions’ geographical separation, this was never likely to be easy. As for 1 PARA, they were not even sent to the bridge: rather, they were tasked to occupy high ground in northern Arnhem.

2 PARA duly reached the road bridge, in the process demonstrating that the location of the main landing area seven miles away was not, in itself, the fundamental cause of the British defeat at Arnhem. But a more effective strategy would have been to deploy 1 Parachute Brigade as a more cohesive force. Such a force would almost certainly have been able to overwhelm the fragmented and generally low-calibre German units that prevented 1 and 3 PARA from advancing into Arnhem on the afternoon of 17 September, well before the SS panzer elements encamped to the north and east could be deployed in the town in strength.

By focusing on the DZ/LZ issue and presenting it as the critical factor in Market Garden’s failure, historians have consistently drawn attention away from the other weaknesses of the plan. The past record of the German and Allied airborne forces is rarely considered in detail – their frequent failure to capture tactical objectives independently, their critical dependence on rapid reinforcement by conventional ground forces, the high casualties they sustained, the heavy losses of aircraft, and the extreme difficulty encountered in executing safe, accurate and concentrated airborne lifts; all of these issues are ignored, and readers are instead invited to accept a sanitised version of the airborne experience that dwells on Fortress Eben Emael and Pegasus Bridge, or otherwise implies that airborne operations began in September 1944.

Equally, there is a tendency to overlook the intimate relationship between operational and tactical-level planning in Market Garden. Instead, historians tend to consider the two levels in isolation. Thus, we are left with the argument – particularly common in British circles – that Market Garden was a daring and brilliant operational concept that was ruined by faulty tactical-level execution. In reality, the Allied plan fell victim to chronic weaknesses in higher-level command and control, where there was a failure to integrate the different components – land, air and airborne – at the conceptual stage, before Market Garden was submitted to Eisenhower for approval. Afterwards, largely as a direct result, the operational plan imposed rigid constraints on the tactical planners that left them with virtually no options other than those selected, and caused risks to accumulate in an entirely uncontrolled way.

Finally, there has been a reluctance to acknowledge the extent to which Allied airborne planning lost mission focus during the summer of 1944, when multiple operation plans were devised and then cancelled. Against this background, almost inevitably, ends and means became hopelessly confused, planning became dominated by the basic airborne infiltration task, and airlift demands increased relentlessly, the assumption being that more men and more equipment would improve the chances of mission success. In Market Garden, the mission – capturing the Arnhem road bridge – became overshadowed by the goal of deploying a full airborne division. Almost the whole of the Air Landing Brigade was used to hold the DZs and LZs for more than 24 hours to make full divisional deployment possible.

'More is better' - the principle that underlay Allied airborne
planning in 1944; but the accompanying requirement for
multiple lifts significantly reduced the flexibility and
dynamism of the airborne forces.

I have yet to read a history of Market Garden that acknowledged the publication of an account prepared by the RAF officer responsible for DZ/LZ selection in airborne operations. His name was Lawrence Wright and his book, The Wooden Sword, was published in 1967. Wright’s narrative lays great emphasis on the terrain issue and the problem of finding a suitable location for the glider landings. The key passage is as follows.

‘Only three areas offered any possibilities. About four miles north of Arnhem, beyond a dense belt of woods, was some rough heath and dune land, quite fit for parachute dropping and for limited glider landings, but this was an active military training zone, with an active airfield in its centre, heavily ringed by flak and ground defences. This we rejected as unsuitable. (Subsequent knowledge confirmed this, though it weighted the reasons differently: the flak risk had been overestimated, but the ground forces were far more formidable than predicted.)

Extending almost continuously southward from the river bank is a vast area that might be thought, from a glance at a small-scale map or even from a superficial view on the spot, to be ideal Airborne terrain, flat and free from walls or hedges. But all this is reclaimed, low-lying, soft polderland, cut up by countless ditches and banks into small fields, with very sparse road or track access. In a 3-mile radius from the bridge, only one group of fields deserved closer study: the ‘Malburgsche Polder’. This was enclosed on two sides by power transmission lines, and ringed all round by a dyke 8 feet high. The flak map showed a battery of 6 heavy and 6 light A.A. guns on this perimeter, and the tugs would have had to fly on after release over the airfield area predicted to be thick with flak. If a tug had to jink, and shed its glider, or if the glider was shot down, they might just as well never have started. During deplaning and unloading (which often took half-an-hour) the whole area would have been under observation and fire from good cover on the higher north bank. We accepted the Malburgsche Polder as a D.Z. for the parachute reinforcements to drop on the third day, by which time the Division should be concentrated around the bridge and able to offer some protection, but Chatterton and his staff supported our view that it was quite unfit for mass glider landings.

The only really good air landing terrain was W.N.W. of the town. In Holland, an elevation of a few feet greatly affects the firmness of the surface and the need for ditches, and here the level rises above 65 feet, in large grass clearings in a wooded belt offering excellent cover for assembly. A high railway embankment intersected the area, but left ample spaces. The one serious drawback was that when sufficient ground had been chosen to accept the two successive lifts (and it was unlikely that many of the first could be moved to make room for the second) the line of landing zones extended from 2½ to 8 miles from the objective [i.e. defining the perimeter line as well as the bridge as the objective].

The DZ/LZ locations at Arnhem; it is often forgotten that the 1st Airborne Division plan was substantially based on the creation of a perimeter around Arnhem - the theoretical objective for many of the troops put down in the Wolfheze area

Command of 1st Airborne had been taken over by Major General R.E. Urquhart, D.S.O.; this was his first experience in Airborne. We had thoroughly thrashed out the landing zone problem with his Intelligence officers for about a fortnight, when I went to Moor Park for a final agreement with them. My arrival threatened to spoil their plan to take an hour off for a well-earned swim, but the General hearing of this, sent them off and summoned me; thus I was honoured with a first-hand exposition of his thoughts about Arnhem. I found him alone in the garden, seemingly painting a landscape, but his easel held the battle picture. He was of course fully aware of the basic dilemma. Although his initial force, with the advantage of surprise, might assemble successfully at an objective so distant, the protection of the zones for the next day’s landings would require all the glider-borne troops from the first lift, leaving only the lightly-armed Reconnaissance Squadron and 1st Parachute Brigade to hold the bridge for 24 hours. – We shall be too thin on the ground, he predicted, and he reopened the question of landing gliders on the polder, making me restate the pros and cons of the terrain. It was not for the Air side, nor even for Holly [Hollinghurst] or for Leigh-Mallory, to say whether greater losses would be suffered in landing on bad ground near the objective, in a flak area, than in fighting several miles towards it with a force initially intact. That was for Urquhart to judge, and he chose the latter. We were soon writing our orders accordingly.’

In his concluding comments on Market Garden, Wright referred to the barrage of criticisms later directed at the RAF concerning the DZ/LZ selection issue, and particularly to Urquhart’s assertion that gliders could have landed in the polderland south of the Neder Rhine.

‘The 38 Group forecast, accepted and urged by Leigh-Mallory, was not that it was impossible to land gliders in the polder, but that the polder was unfit for a mass glider landing. This view can be confirmed by a simple test, though it could not have been made before the operation. The actual glider landings of the first and second days were carefully plotted, from photo cover, on map overlay. Let this overlay be superimposed on the map of the Malburgsche Polder. Even ignoring the maze of ditches (substantial enough to feature on a 1:25,000 map) and assuming (absurdly) that gliders could have landed there at the same high density as was attained on the great clear spaces actually used, there is room for only a fraction of the number that landed on the first day alone. Many, probably most, of the loads would have been damaged, and others marooned amid impassable ditches. The use of Hamilcars was unthinkable; even on the comparatively firm ground used, two nosed in and another broke up. Some Horsas did the same on the far better fields in Normandy.’

The only viable alternative, as Wright himself acknowledged, would have been a division of force – a parachute brigade landing on the polder with limited glider support. The drawbacks of such an approach are obvious. First, the parachute brigades themselves depended heavily on gliders to convey their equipment and supplies – not least the anti-tank guns that played such a vital role in the defence of the Arnhem bridge. Gliders also carried the divisional elements that underpinned brigade-level operations. Hence, a parachute brigade could only have landed with small-scale glider support by accepting a substantial loss of combat power.

Second, it would still have been necessary to land the majority of the gliders eight miles away from the parachute brigade and on the other side a major water obstacle – the Neder Rhine. The disadvantages that this would have involved seem so obvious that they require no further comment. There is no record that any senior Allied commander seriously considered or promoted such a scheme at the time.

Typhoons in the Battle of Mortain, August 1944

On 7 August 1944, the Germans launched Operation Luttich, their only major counter-offensive of the Normandy campaign. The aim was to capture the town of Mortain and advance to the coast at Avranches to halt the American breakout to the west. This blog reproduces the Air Historical Branch narrative on the RAF's role in the Battle of Mortain, and provides some further observations on the subsequent investigations of 21st Army Group's Operations Research Section.

Operations on 7 August

After all these delays, General Eberbach’s force was at last assembled on the evening of 6 August. The attack was planned to be launched under cover of darkness and it was hoped that sufficient progress would be made before the Allied Air Forces could begin their harrying tactics. About 300 fighters of the Luftwaffe had been gathered together from far and near to provide cover for the ground forces. Von Kluge himself came to the battle area to watch the start of this attack in which German supremacy in Normandy was at stake. The Panzers moved westwards on a front of three divisions, the 2nd Panzer Division being in the centre, the 116th to the north and the 2nd SS Panzer Division to the south.

The American force holding the rugged and wooded ground in the neighbourhood of Mortain consisted of the 9th Infantry Division at St Pois (east of Sourdeval) and the 30th Infantry Division which had just moved into the area between Juvigny and St Barthelmy. The Panzers were first encountered by a reconnaissance patrol from the latter division at about 0100 hours on 7 August and were seen to be moving along a lane from Grand Dove to Le Mesnil Adelee. The American troops were soon overwhelmed by this superior force and, although they fought back hard with their anti-tank weapons, some units were cut off. The advance by the 116th Panzer Division in the north did not, however, make much progress during the early hours of the morning despite the surprise it had achieved.

The low-lying mist and haze to which the Air Forces had grown accustomed during the first few days began to clear over Normandy at about 1100 hours but it was not until over an hour later that extensive air operations could begin. Mustangs of the IXth Air Force took off at 1100 hours to make a reconnaissance of the battle area in general but they appear to have discovered nothing of interest. Indeed, the Germans assisted both by the weather and the wooded nature of the countryside in addition to their thorough training in the art of camouflage succeeded in concealing their preparations for the thrust on Avranches. The area immediately north of Mortain, being in the American sector, was of course the responsibility of the IXth Air Force.

But the day before (6 August), Mustangs of 2nd Tactical Air Force had reconnoitred the road from Vire to Tinchebray without observing any unusual activity. One interesting comment recorded by the squadron undertaking the mission was that the neighbourhood between Tinchbray and Flers was obscured by a dense smoke screen. No extraordinary activity was seen by American pilots.

As the morning wore on, it became all too clear that the enemy was making a desperate attempt to reach the sea and cut off the Avranches corridor. The heavy tanks continued to lumber through the mist and the Americans attempted to halt them with their Bazookas and anti-tank guns but without much avail. By mid-day, the 2nd SS Panzer Division had captured Mortain and the 2nd Panzer Division had taken the villages of St Barthelmy, Cherence and Le Mesnil Adelee. A situation had arisen where there was not time to bar the way with strong Allied forces which could ensure that the enemy armour would not break through. Nor was there sufficient time to lay on an attack by the powerful forces of heavy bombers at the disposal of the Supreme Commander even if there had been targets or well defined enemy positions or concentrations for which their employment was suitable.

At Allied Air Headquarters in Normandy, consultations took place when the news from Mortain came through. The Commanding General of the IXth Tactical Air Forces and Air Marshal Commanding 2nd Tactical Air Force agreed that the latter’s rocket-carrying aircraft should deal exclusively with the armoured columns while the IXth Air Force was to put up a fighter screen to ward off enemy aircraft, and their fighter-bombers were to attack transport moving to and from the battle zone. It must have been some time before 1000 hours that the IXth Air Force informed the Headquarters of 2nd Tactical Air Force of the grave situation at Mortain. At all events, General Nugent of IXth Tactical Air Command was told by an officer of Air Staff 2nd Tactical Air Force that the total resources of No 83 Group were to be dispatched to the threatened area between Mortain and Sourdeval. Shortly after this, the Senior Air Staff Officer of 2nd Tactical Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Green, spoke to Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst over the telephone and instructed him to assist the Americans with all his resources. Plans were then co-ordinated directly between the Headquarters of No 83 Group and the IXth Tactical Air Command. The good communications that existed between the British and American air headquarters greatly facilitated the speedy transmission of orders.

The first British aircraft to participate in the battle at Mortain were from Nos 174 and 181 Squadrons. They took off from the advanced landing grounds at 1215 hours and 1225 hours respectively and went into action shortly before 1300 hours. They spotted some 50 to 60 tanks and 200 vehicles filling the hedge-lined road from St Barthelmy to Cherence via Belle Fontaine. The tanks were bunched together and it appeared that they had not foreseen that the mist would clear so rapidly. The Typhoons dived down on the front and rear of the column, bringing it to a halt, and at once caused great confusion. At about the same time, 24 Thunderbolts of the IXth Air Force discovered and bombed a concentration of motor transport near Sourdeval.

Another US fighter squadron equipped with rockets operating in the vicinity attacked vehicles near Mortain. There seems to have been some enemy air activity at this time, for the pilot of a Thunderbolt claimed that he had scored a ‘probable’ against an enemy fighter. According to the Intelligence Summaries issued by Headquarters, AEAF, there appears to have been no action taken by the IXth Air Force against the enemy offensive before midday, presumably because of the foggy weather.

The good visibility which had begun after midday continued. This was momentous because it afforded the Air Forces their first opportunity to make prolonged attacks against an armoured concentration. Another two squadrons of No 83 Group became airborne at 1300 hours and 1335 hours and attacked the great concentration of tanks and transport. But it was half an hour later that the ‘shuttle service’ of Typhoons began; flight after flight then sought out their targets, fired their rockets and returned to base to refuel and rearm. After the first attacks the enemy had managed to disperse a little and the fighter-bombers had to seek out and attack the enemy armour wherever it was to be found in the fluctuating battle. This was waged at speed; American and German units became interlocked and tanks advanced and retreated along the lanes, fields, hillsides, woodlands and as often as not in the practically dry bed of the River See. From 1400 hours to 2000 hours that evening, the British fighter-bombers took off from their landing grounds every twenty minutes.

Pilots used their cannon as well as rockets and great destruction was wrought amongst the ‘soft’ or unarmoured vehicles. Enemy tank crews and drivers were seen to abandon their charges and run to cover under the trees and hedgerows. The Typhoon pilots were greatly impressed with the moral effect of the rockets and so were the troops on the ground, whose vulnerable position was at once relieved.

By the afternoon, the situation had eased a little, and the Americans were able to re-establish part of their front between the Panzers and their objectives. The German right wing did not penetrate beyond the village of Le Mesnil Adelee, lying some 14 miles from Avranches by country roads, and this was the nearest the enemy stood to the Atlantic coast. Further south, the situation was still grave, and radio messages which reported that reconnaissance tanks belonging to the southern prong of the attack had reached St Hilaire, seven miles south west of Mortain on the Route National to Brittany, were intercepted by the Germans at Midday. Meanwhile, the 1st SS Panzer Division had joined in the battle at St Barthelmy, while further armoured forces were being organised in a LVIIIth Panzer (Reserve) Corps and concentrated in the hills and forests round Ger.

At this stage, the views of the enemy are of particular interest. Early in the afternoon the Seventh Army Headquarters had urgently requested General Bulowius to provide the XXXXVIIth Panzer Corps with the air support planned, as the latter was being subjected to heavy fighter bomber attacks. Bulowius replied that fighters of Jagdkorps II were over the battle at that very moment with instructions to hold off the Typhoons. Later that evening, the Luftwaffe admitted that they had been so hard pressed by Allied fighters on taking off from their bases that the German fighters were unable to reach the Mortain area. Thus the arrangement made between the British and American Tactical Air Forces whereby the British aircraft attacked the tanks and the US squadrons held back the enemy fighters proved highly successful.

The nearest point to the battle reached by the Luftwaffe appears to have been Couterne, well to the east of Mortain and over 40 fighters were intercepted by the IXth Air Force that evening. Credit is also due to the VIIIth Fighter Command, whose fighters were out in great strength during the day over German advanced airfields, around Chartres and east of the Seine.

Throughout the afternoon, the complaints of the Panzer Commanders were passed back to Army Headquarters. At 1520 hours, a message was recorded stating that the attack of the ‘Leib Standarte (1) had been brought to a complete halt as a result of fighter-bomber action in a position two kilometres east of Juvigny’. By this time, clouds of dust and smoke hung over the battlefield, which made it difficult for the pilots to identify their targets. It was then that a call was received from the Second Army sector at Vire, where another Panzer column had begun to attack. At once, the Typhoons were switched to the new area and some five tanks were claimed to have been brought to a standstill. But the enemy was still driving forward into the American front, and once the pressure against the British had been relieved, the fighter-bombers returned to harry the columns at Mortain.

It is important to remember that the pilots of No 83 Group were greatly handicapped during these operations. Not only were they unfamiliar with the country round Mortain, which was so rugged and thick with cover for vehicles, but the troops on the ground with whom they were operating were unacquainted with their technique of close support. Yet great appreciation of the RAF was shown by all ranks of the troops involved, and in spite of the fact that American and German units were often fighting at close quarters, there was only one case of a British pilot mistaking US troops for the enemy.

At 1940 hours, the Chief of Staff of the Seventh Army telephoned to the Chief of Staff of Supreme Command West that the armoured attack had been at a standstill since 1300 hours due to the ‘employment of fighter-bombers by the enemy and the absence of our own air support’. Five years later, General Speidel, who was Chief of Staff to Rommel and then Von Kluge, confessed in his book, ‘Invasion 1944’, that the ‘armoured operation was completely wrecked exclusively by the Allied Air Forces, supported by a highly trained ground wireless telephone organisation’. At 2035 hours that evening, General Funk (XXXXVIIth Panzer Corps) told General Hausser (Seventh Army), that the tank situation was very serious, and this was repeated by the latter to Von Kluge. The Field Marshal replied that if a considerable advance was not achieved during that night and the morning of the 8th, then the whole plan would fail. The Panzers were told that they must get through regardless of the cost, and arrangements were made to add the 10th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions to their strength.

By nightfall, No 83 Group had flown 294 Typhoon sorties against the Panzer divisions spread over a period of about eight hours.

The claims made by the pilots were as follows:-

                           Flamers              Smokers           Damaged

Tanks                      84                       35                      21

Motor Transport      54                       19                      39

Several Typhoons were damaged by flak, but fire from the ground was less concentrated than had been experienced when tanks were laagered, and only three Typhoons were lost. No losses were incurred from enemy aircraft. Thus ended perhaps the most decisive air operation in the north-west European campaign, and the Avranches corridor was preserved. The credit for stopping the armoured thrust should indeed be shared both by the Air and ground forces. But the fighter-bomber, owing to the fact that it could be switched at short notice to any critical sector of the front, had proved itself to be once again a battle-winning factor. Its flexibility, ease of control and the weight of firepower that it could bring to bear quickly on any threatened point, justified the confidence that Allied commanders reposed in it during the crisis.

It has always been accepted that the employment of Typhoons was timely and decisive on that day because the attacks by enemy armour were broken up and, though fighting on the ground was exceptionally bitter for the next four days, the large-scale attack by Panzer divisions was never renewed. But the claims by pilots to have destroyed and damaged such large numbers of tanks have frequently been called into question. On the whole, such evidence as has been obtained from the ground examination of vehicles after the territory had passed into Allied hands has not inclined to support large claims on behalf of rockets but destruction by cannon fire was very great.

The difficulties in accurately assessing the results of rocket projectile attacks has always been recognised by the RAF. In the first place, there were no combat films with strike photographs to show hits by rockets because the aircraft had to be pulled out of its dive as soon as the projectiles were discharged. Thus there has never been a convenient way of comparing the accuracy of rockets with that of cannon and guns. However, it had long been known that it was difficult to secure a large percentage of hits with rocket projectiles. On the other hand, one hit invariably disabled a tank. There remained the constant probability that claims admitted must have included cases where several pilots had attacked (and claimed) the same tank. And, finally, it must be added that, mainly because of difficulties of recognition from the air, any armoured vehicle was likely to be called a ‘tank’ by pilots.

On 9 August, a signal was received by AEAF and 2nd Tactical Air Force asking that information be sent to the Director of Air Tactics (Air Ministry) about the salient features of the operation, and Operational Research Branch reports were compiled as a result.

In brief, the Air Marshal commanding 2nd Tactical Air Force said that the only definite conclusion that could be drawn from that operation was that air action was capable, in certain conditions, of breaking up a determined land attack. On that occasion, the following circumstances existed:-

(a)   An ideal target was presented by tanks and MT head to tail in close country.

(b)   Air opposition was negligible.

(c)   Maximum air effort was used at a critical stage of the battle.

Such circumstances as these had rarely occurred together – at any rate, on the British front, but the clouds had lifted suddenly. The interrogation of prisoners had shown them extremely nervous of the rocket-projectile attack despite the fact that the chances of a direct hit were small. That might have been due to the knowledge that the chances of survival if hit were known to be slight. At all events, many tanks were abandoned when only superficially damaged, although the enemy recovery service was definitely efficient after the battle.

Commentary

The official RAF account – frequently quoted, sometimes without attribution – remains probably the best description of the role of air power at Mortain on 7 August 1944. It laid particular emphasis on the effect of air power as reported by German commanders and US ground forces, but also acknowledged over-claiming by RAF and USAAF aircrew. At the same time, it pointed to the extreme difficulty of establishing the facts reliably and objectively.

The perspective of its final paragraphs was undoubtedly influenced by another report by the 21st Army Group ORS. It did not specifically mention the report in the text - only in a footnote. At the time, the convention was to avoid especially combative argument in official accounts.

The 21st Army Group ORS report has subsequently been cited by numerous authors. Their supposition, as with the report on Falaise, is that the ORS was a purely scientific body that did not participate in inter-service argument. In my blog on Falaise, I demonstrated that there is good reason to doubt the ORS’s objectivity. In the light of this conclusion, there seemed also to be a case for questioning their frequently quoted findings on Mortain.

The basic argument presented by the ORS was that RAF and USAAF airmen massively exaggerated the losses they inflicted on the Germans at Mortain. In total, they reported the destruction or damage of 480 German vehicles, including 252 armoured vehicles.

However, after the German withdrawal, the ORS found just 78 armoured vehicles and 128 other vehicles in the battle area, many of which had apparently been destroyed by ground weapons. In other cases, the cause of destruction was unclear, and some vehicles had simply been abandoned. It should be noted here that the 21st Army Group survey was conducted alongside a similar survey by 2 TAF investigators, which drew very similar conclusions from almost identical evidence viewed in the same locations.

However, while the 2 TAF report was somewhat tentative in tone, the author of the 21st Army Group report was adamant that there was no basis on which his findings could be challenged. He specifically ruled out any possibility that the ORS had missed vehicles or that damaged vehicles might have been salvaged. Investigators had even flown over battle area, and had observed no more vehicles than they had discovered on the ground.

The ORS report is compelling but perhaps not so far beyond question as its author suggested. The fact is that the discrepancy between the aircrew claims and the number of vehicles found by the ORS is too large to accept at face value.

Most probably, the reports from the airmen related to a significantly larger area. In this regard, it is notable that most of the map references produced by the ORS are concentrated in a small area north of Mortain, while substantial parts of the battle area appear to have been entirely free of German equipment. Given the scale of the forces deployed and the breadth of the German front, this seems extremely unlikely.

The possibility that air power was brought to bear over a considerably larger area than the ORS supposed is also raised by Leigh-Mallory’s diary references to Mortain. In an entry written after the battle but before the appearance of the ORS report, he recorded: ‘A certain number of the leading German tanks penetrated quite a long way, but their rear echelons were so heavily attacked from the air that they were bashed up and utterly unable to get forward.’ In short, as he understood the battle on 7 August, much of the Allied air effort focused on the German rear rather than the spearhead, which was the primary focus of the ORS study.

While it may seem surprising that the ORS might have missed at least some German equipment, it should be recalled that, only a few weeks later, they overlooked the presence of some 2,265 destroyed or abandoned vehicles in the Falaise pocket.

The area covered by the German offensive

The areas where destroyed or damaged vehicles were found by the ORS

There is a second obvious reason to reconsider the ORS’s findings, which lies in the chronology of events. Although it is sometimes thought that the RAF participated in the fighting at Mortain for the entirety of the battle – from 7 to 12 August – in fact their involvement was confined to the 7th. 2 TAF was subsequently employed in the British and Canadian sector in operations north and northwest of Falaise. USAAF support continued, but the operation largely turned into a ground battle in which air power played but a limited role. The opposing forces fought at close quarters and much of the battle area was subjected to heavy artillery bombardment.

The Germans finally withdrew on 12 August, the day the ORS arrived to begin their investigation. It is quite possible that many features of the battlefield would have changed significantly in the intervening period, particularly in the areas that witnessed the heaviest fighting. That the ORS overlooks this elementary point again raises questions about its methodology and objectivity. After one afternoon of air attack and four consecutive days of intense ground combat, it is hardly surprising that they should have found that many German vehicles had been hit by ground fire.

The records also demonstrate that very little time was available to document the ground situation after the battle before it was irrevocably altered. The 2 TAF investigators arrived in the Mortain area on the evening of the 12th and were taken to see Lieutenant Colonel Johnson of the 117th Infantry Regiment. They subsequently recorded:

Shelling at the time prevented our visit to the site of the stricken tanks on the road into St Barthelmy, but Lt Col Johnson advised me to come early in the morning, because the road engineers were already planning to clear the road. From 0730 to 1500 on the 13th Lt Adams and I carried out a survey of the 25 vehicles (15 tanks) on the road between T.568147 and T.579140 … The engineers cleared the road by the time our survey was finished.

As I’ve already said, the possibility of German salvage activity was ruled out by the 21st Army Group ORS. This was on the basis that vehicles hit by air weapons would not have been worth salvaging. Their report also claimed that salvage units were being pulled out of Normandy during the Mortain operation; no supporting evidence was provided. In fact, while their statement was possibly true by 12 August, it was probably untrue for early stages of offensive.

The 2 TAF ORS was later alerted to the presence of three salvage depots near Athis, which lies between Mortain and the Falaise gap. However, by the time they reached Athis, nearly all the German vehicles had been removed.

There is no intention to play down the role of US ground forces in this commentary. Confronted by the largest German counter-offensive of the Normandy campaign, the courage and tenacity of their defence was truly remarkable. It is right that Mortain is universally viewed as one of the most glorious chapters in the history of the US Army. It therefore seems appropriate to conclude with their observations on the battle.

All – commanding officers, officers and NCOs - agreed that their dangerous situation was saved by the opportune arrival of the Typhoons and their participation in the battle on August 7th.

The head of intelligence of the 30th Infantry Division wrote:

The enemy thrust began on the 7th and was expected to be reinforced on the 8th. The 30th Division had only just moved into the sector and was not well established. The divisional artillery was deployed, but not well registered. The attack on the 8th, which was expected to be heavier than that of the 7th, was not in fact so difficult to withstand. This could be ascribed to the disorganisation caused by air attack of the reinforcements on the 7th, and to the better establishment of the ground forces.

It should be noted that this reference to ‘air attack of the reinforcements’ accords very closely with Leigh-Mallory’s assertion that a significant volume of Allied air power was brought to bear well behind the German spearhead. Meanwhile, the 117th Infantry Regiment recorded:

The enemy armour attacked on the 7th, coming up through the mist. The 117th Infantry shot at them with Bazookas and 57 mm guns, and succeeded in stopping some of them. The armour had however penetrated the positions … The mist lifted at soon after 1230 hours and Thunderbolt aircraft and Typhoon aircraft came in immediately and attacked. The Typhoons attacked repeatedly for what seemed to him to be about 2 hours. This, added to the resistance of the ground forces, stopped the thrust.

Lieutenant Colonel Bond, of the 39th Infantry Regiment provided the following account to 2 TAF:

His anti-tank force was insufficient to deal with such a force of Panther tanks, and his A-T shells do not penetrate the armour plate, except in a fair lateral strike on the body of the tank. The attack did not develop in the strength anticipated; but he remained vulnerable and anxious until about 1300 when the Typhoons attacked the spear point.

Lt Col Bond said that he wished me to stress the direct value of the service rendered by the Typhoon aircraft that day; and, that although in general he considered that claims from the “Air Corps” on tanks were optimistic, he did not disbelieve a claim of the order of 100 for the total effort that day.

An experienced NCO from an American anti-tank troop offered his own explanation for the fact that the Germans had abandoned a number of undamaged tanks and other vehicles. ‘There is nothing but air attack that would make a crack Panzer crew do that.’

(1) 1st SS Panzer Division