The RAF and the Battle of the Falaise Pocket

The final rout of Hitler's armies in Normandy, viewed from the RAF's perspective. A series of official photographs vividly documents the German retreat.

On 25 July 1944, the First United States Army launched Operation Cobra. Preceded by another massive air bombardment, Cobra finally produced a breakout from the Normandy lodgement area, allowing the Americans to drive rapidly south and then east in an enveloping manoeuvre. The Germans counter-attacked towards Avranches on 7 August but were halted at Mortain. By the second week of August, British and Canadian forces were moving south towards Falaise, while the Americans pressed further east and then north towards Argentan. An opportunity thus presented itself to cut off the German retreat and destroy two entire armies - 5th Panzer Army and 7th Army - by closing the gap between Falaise and Argentan.

Such an encirclement was not originally anticipated by the Allied high command. On 6 August, Montgomery issued a directive that envisaged expansive operations across the whole area between Normandy and the River Seine, and it was not until the 9th that this strategy was revised. Only then were Allied forces ordered concentrate their efforts on closing the single German escape route. This was to be achieved by a Canadian assault on Falaise and a subsequent advance south to meet the Americans at Argentan. German defences around Argentan were thought to be stronger than those confronting the Canadians along the Caen-Falaise road. Unfortunately these assumptions were mistaken. As a result, while the Americans halted at Argentan, the Canadians were unable to capture Falaise until 16 August.

On the same day, a full-scale German retreat began, following more limited earlier withdrawals. At this point, as it was obviously too late to close the Falaise-Argentan gap, Montgomery sent his forces east, the Canadians towards Trun, the Americans to Chambois. Soon, the German evacuation was restricted to an area of just four miles between these two small towns, from which roads ran north-east towards Vimoutiers and, ultimately, the Seine. By the 17th, tens of thousands of German troops were moving into this area in broad daylight. Every conceivable form of motorised transport was in evidence, along with tanks and other armour, towed artillery and huge numbers of horse-drawn carts.

The only roads available were narrow country lanes that were easily blocked. When blockages occurred, the Germans took to farm tracks or drove straight across the fields. However, between Turn and Chamois they were confronted by a far more formidable obstacle - the narrow but steep-sided River Dives, which was impassable except via bridges at Trun, St Lambert and Chambois, and a ford at Moissy.

Barely more than a stream, the Dives still represented an

insuperable obstacle to many German vehicles 

The inevitable result was colossal traffic jam of German military transport along the few available approach roads. The Allied air forces were presented with an incredible target array. By the 18th, the area was also being subjected to continuous long-range artillery fire from the north. German losses of both manpower and materiel were of catastrophic proportions. The infamous Falaise ‘Pocket’, now a tranquil and picturesque expanse of the Normandy countryside, was in August 1944 the scene of one of the most destructive and horrific military actions in modern history.

Air operations over the Falaise Pocket have acquired an almost legendary status within the broader history of the Normandy campaign, epitomised by Wootton’s famous painting of rocket-firing Typhoons. But the role of the Allied air forces merits a level of analysis that extends further than the popular imagery. Indeed, Falaise provides an example of ‘reverse’ or ‘counter’ interdiction - preventing or limiting an enemy withdrawal from the battle area.

The most westerly of the official photographs; the German
vehicles were heading for the Putanges crossing
over the Orne

The first signs of a German withdrawal from their more westerly positions were noted by the Allies on 11 August. At this stage, they sought to use medium bombers to establish a ‘line of interdiction’ along the Orne River, which the Germans had to cross before passing through the Falaise-Argentan gap. The Allies also bombed the two towns. On the 12th, 21st Army Group proposed using heavy bombers to create a second line of interdiction with craters along the River Dives, between Trun and Chambois. After discussion, this concept was rejected, and the Allies decided that the strategic bombing forces could best be employed in direct support of First Canadian Army north of Falaise, and against more distant communications targets. Medium bombers would continue their efforts to create a line of interdiction on the Orne, but additional lines might be established along rivers further to the north-east.

It was also agreed that retreating German forces should be targeted by the fighter-bombers of Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) and the US Ninth Air Force, and their spheres of action were then carefully demarcated. 2 TAF was assigned to the northern area of the Falaise Pocket and the roads extending north-east through Vimoutiers towards the Seine. Ninth Air Force assumed responsibility for the south and west of the Pocket, and for supporting US ground forces during their drive towards Paris.

Night reconnaissance image of Putanges; German columns can be
seen crossing the Orne to pass through the Falaise-Argentan gap

The area of the Falaise-Argentan gap and the Falaise Pocket

Ultimately, it would prove extremely difficult to create lines of interdiction between the Pocket and the Seine. There were several rivers with numerous potential crossing points, and there was insufficient time to bomb them all, given the scale of effort required. Of 47 crossings over the River Touques and the River Risle, 15 were targeted, but a complete blockage was only achieved at three; there were partial blockages at eight. In truth, the pre-D-Day interdiction bombing of the Seine bridges made a far greater contribution to the reverse interdiction task during the German retreat from Normandy, and this would eventually give the medium bombers other opportunities to intervene decisively.

Many German troops went through the gap at Clinchamps

A wartime enlargement from the same photo, showing 
lanes literally crammed with German transport

Northeast of Clinchamps, the German columns entered
the Bois de Feuillet

Period mapping of the Falaise-Argentan gap

The fighters and fighter-bombers of 2 TAF found increasing numbers of targets moving north-east into the area of the Falaise Pocket on 13 August. Between the 13th and the 16th, their pilots claimed the destruction of some 500 motor vehicles and 40 tanks and armoured vehicles. On the afternoon of the 17th, when vast German columns converged on the Dives crossing points, 83 Group claimed to have destroyed or damaged 600 German vehicles. Their account of events the following day deserves to be quoted verbatim.

Like most battles, the great plan to encircle the German forces in Normandy took longer than was expected to reach its climax, and the targets that we have been awaiting for nearly a week did not appear until today.

No better targets have, however, been offered in the course of the war. All mobile forces in the Argentan area - the majority being from Panzer divisions - were forced into a narrow funnel by the allied advance, and emerged at CHAMBOIS S.E. of TRUN. From here they pressed N.E. towards VIMOUTIERS and on to BERNAY. A mass of M.T. and tanks jammed the roads in this area, and were attacked with every available A/C in the Group.

As the roads became blocked with burning vehicles, some drove off into the woods, some were abandoned where they stood, and some were seen heading back westwards in order to find a free road. The usual mass of ambulances was reported, and even white flags were reported from VIMOUTIERS. In all this mass of equipment, it is possible that some tanks and M.T. were attacked more than once. Even, however, if the “destroyed” figures only are taken, it is obvious that a very damaging blow has been struck at the most dangerous portion of the German Army in France.

Visual Air Reconnaissance over the Falaise Pocket 17 August 1944

18 August witnessed the greatest destruction, as 2 TAF hit convoys heading from the Pocket to Vimoutiers – the area that was soon christened the ‘Shambles’. Subsequently, Allied ground troops closed on Trun and Chambois, forcing an extension of the bomb-line that prevented further air attacks inside the Pocket. 2 TAF’s focus then shifted north-east, to the area between Vimoutiers and the Seine.

Ultimately, some 5,644 destroyed, damaged or abandoned German vehicles were counted in the Shambles, including 358 tanks and self-propelled guns. Operating over a somewhat larger area on the 18th, 83 Group claimed 3,003 mechanised vehicles destroyed or damaged and 164 tanks – the result of some 1,318 sorties, 1,041 of which were armed reconnaissance sorties sent out to find targets of opportunity.

Blazing German vehicles in the Gouffern forest,
north of Argentan

German vehicles under rocket attack from RAF Typhoons in
the Falaise Pocket; this photo was taken just outside
Tournai sur Dives

Another Typhoon rocket attack, between Tournai sur
Dives and Chambois

The ford at Moissy littered with wrecked German equipment

Subsequent operational analysis conducted by 21st Army Group cast doubt on 2 TAF’s claims - at least in so far as they applied to the Shambles - and the findings of their Operational Research Section (ORS) have often been accepted uncritically by historians, their assumption being that the ORS’s perspective was objective and scientific. Quite how objective it really was may be gauged from one statement that the large-scale German withdrawal was ‘enforced by land action’ and by the ultimate, mysterious, omission of an early draft statement that ‘whenever an RP was found to have hit an armoured vehicle, that vehicle was invariably destroyed.’ Furthermore, the ORS study was based on only 3,379 vehicles. It was not until later that 197 Infantry Brigade’s Battlefield Clearance Group established that this represented an underestimate of 2,265.

In the Shambles area, where the Germans had come under artillery as well as air attack, the ORS went to great lengths to demonstrate that ground fire had caused more destruction than air attack – a conclusion that should hardly give cause for surprise, given that 2 TAF was prevented from attacking the Shambles by the extension of the bomb-line after 18 August. In any case, conditions in the Shambles were so utterly chaotic that meaningful, scientific distinction must have been all but impossible. Indeed, it was found that the vast majority of the vehicles omitted from the ORS study had been hit neither by artillery shells nor air-to-ground munitions. They had simply been abandoned.

As we shall see, when confronted by equally massive German attrition in an area where no ground fire was involved, the ORS had to change their methodology. The truth is that the Shambles was the outcome of combined land and air operations that were mutually reinforcing. Moreover, the physical destruction examined by the ORS told only part of the story. Other effects such as demoralisation, confusion, lack of supplies and maintenance facilities lay behind the mass abandonment of vehicles and equipment.

The road from Trun to Vimoutiers

Horse-drawn 'ambulances' near Orbec; the abuse of
the Red Cross was widely reported by RAF pilots

At the same time, air operations over the Falaise Pocket should not simply be viewed as a turkey shoot. The areas of responsibility assigned to 2 TAF and the US Ninth Air Force required periodic adjustment - partly as matter of efficient apportionment but also as a guard against air-to-air fratricide. The situation on the ground was confused and highly fluid, and often difficult to understand from the air. There was very little direction from the ground. Combat identification inevitably proved extremely difficult, and Allied aircraft attacked their own ground forces on a number of well-documented occasions. Much effort was also wasted attacking targets that had already been abandoned and destroyed, and air-to-ground attack was further complicated by the widespread German abuse of the Red Cross and by attempts to withdraw under the White Flag.

Most of all, the Allied air forces were frequently engaged by mobile light flak that took a considerable toll. On 18 August, 83 Group lost 17 aircraft while 84 Group lost eight more – the heaviest losses sustained by 2 TAF on a single day throughout the Normandy campaign. On the following day, Coningham’s squadrons lost another 15 aircraft.

The majority of German forces seeking to escape from the Falaise Pocket towards Vimoutiers faced a protracted climb towards the summit of Montormel after they had crossed the Dives. Elements of the Polish Armoured Division - part of First Canadian Army - took up position on Montormel on 19 August, blocking the German retreat.

The Poles had 87 Sherman tanks and 2,000 supporting infantry - a formidable force. They were also accompanied by forward artillery spotters who could call in fire support from long-range guns located to the north-west. German forces emerging from the Pocket soon found themselves under heavy fire.

Google Earth shows this location to be
south of Vimoutiers

A German vehicle destroyed between
Montormel and Vimoutiers

Vimoutiers was heavily bombed; at high
magnification a German column is
clearly visible

The German plan to unblock the escape route involved a southerly attack by II SS Panzer Corps from Vimoutiers and a simultaneous push from the Pocket area. II SS Panzer Corps were to strike along two roads, sending 2 SS Panzer Division towards Montormel and 9 SS Panzer division to Trun. Had a co-ordinated attack occurred from inside and outside the Pocket, the Poles might have been overwhelmed. However, the attack from Vimoutiers, timed for the night of the 19th, was delayed until the 20th after the town was heavily bombed - a fact confirmed by Ultra decrypts.

Nevertheless, the Poles still faced a desperate struggle. Periodically, their lines were breached, there was intense fighting at very close quarters, and their logistical situation became increasingly parlous. Direct air support proved impossible in the absence of a clear bomb-line, and supplies dropped by the RAF fell into German-held territory. In these circumstances, the artillery spotters played a critically important role in the defence of Montormel. With artillery support, the Poles held out until 22 August, when Canadian armoured forces arrived to relieve them. They inflicted further heavy losses on the Germans but lost 20 per cent of their strength in the process, and many Germans succeeded in bypassing their positions to escape north.

9 SS Panzer Division’s thrust from Vimoutiers towards Trun was substantially thwarted by 84 Group’s Typhoon squadrons. Again, there were difficulties establishing a bomb-line because of the close proximity of Canadian and Polish troops. However, on this occasion, a forward air controller - known as a Visual Control Post (VCP) was on hand to direct the Typhoon attack, which was very successful.

Although published histories of the Battle of the Falaise Pocket invariably focus on the Shambles, the rout of the retreating German armies continued right up to the River Seine. Indeed the area between Vimoutiers and the Seine – 2 TAF’s area of responsibility – became known as the Chase.

Map of the Chase

Considering the judgements of the ORS regarding the Shambles, the story of the Chase merits closer scrutiny than it has sometimes received, for there was no land battle in this area. The overwhelming majority of German losses were inflicted by air directly (through destruction), indirectly (through the destruction of essential support vehicles) or through psychological effect - the fear or expectation of aerial interdiction.

Again, while the ORS found numerous abandoned tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured vehicles, few German AFVs showed signs of rocket damage, but many supporting soft-skinned vehicles had been shot up by cannon or machine gun fire, which was far more accurate. The loss of transporters, support vehicles and fuel bowsers would have been enough to prevent much of the armour from reaching safety; the prospect of moving even a single tank from Falaise to the Seine without transporters or a significant supporting effort was extremely remote.

The Chase: a disabled tank blocks the Vimoutiers-Orbec road
near the Bois de Mille, forcing a detour on other vehicles

This remarkable photo of a Spitfire attacking German vehicles
was taken on the road from Livarot to Orbec

The Germans felled trees to slow the Allied pursuit

The ORS afterwards counted 3,648 vehicles in the Chase, including 150 tanks, 154 other armoured vehicles, 3,178 soft-skinned vehicles and 166 artillery guns. However, their analysts focused on main roads, so their figures were lower than the total; indeed they themselves estimated that there were between 5,000 and 6,000 vehicles in all in the Chase – as many as in the Shambles. In some areas they came across huge concentrations of destroyed equipment, notably between Vimoutiers and Bernay and on the southern bank of the Seine at Rouen. There, they discovered ‘a mass of burnt vehicles and equipment, consisting of 20 AFVs, 48 guns, and 660 other vehicles. It appears that a traffic jam was formed owing to a misapprehension that there was a serviceable bridge. The RAF and IX USAAF attacked the jam and started fires which destroyed the lot.’ In fact, this devastating strike was substantially the work of 2 TAF's 2 Group medium bombers, and the traffic jam on the river bank was exacerbated by the destruction of numerous ferries by the fighter-bombers during the preceding days.

In summary, the Allies inflicted a crushing defeat on the Germans during the retreat from Normandy, and it would probably have been optimistic to expect much more. The Falaise-Argentan gap could have been closed earlier, and this phase of the Allied envelopment was mismanaged between Montgomery and Bradley, who were clearly not working well together. Nevertheless, many of those who escaped were not front-line combat troops, and the Germans still lost an estimated 10,000 killed and 50,000 taken prisoner, and vast quantities of equipment, including much of their armour.

Allied air power played a vital role in operations around the Pocket, both independently and in combination with ground forces. It did as much as could reasonably have been anticipated, given the technological limitions of the period. In Normandy, since D-Day, the two tactical air forces had all too often been thwarted by the weather or by highly effective German passive air defence measures. However, at Falaise, the weather provided little protection to the Germans, and they were compelled to retreat in staggering numbers in broad daylight. It was an unprecedented opportunity for the RAF and the USAAF, and they took full advantage of it.

German vehicles under attack yet again while approaching the
Seine near Rouen

Allied reconnaissance aircraft observed hundreds of German
vehicles crammed on to the bank of the river at Rouen

The inevitable result: Allied bombing set off an inferno

The aftermath: a mass of incinerated vehicles and equipment
clogged the Seine's southern bank at Rouen

Retreat from Falaise Then and Now