Air Power in the Ardennes, December 1944

The last 75-year anniversary of 2019 is the Battle of the Bulge, the popular name for the German Ardennes offensive of December 1944. The Ardennes is invariably treated as a land battle; the role of air power tends to be forgotten. Yet the RAF and the USAAF made a critically important contribution to the Allied victory.

At 0530 hours in the rain and mist of Saturday 16 December 1944, a barrage of some 1,600 artillery weapons heralded the launch of Nazi Germany’s last western counter-offensive of the Second World War. Targeting the densely forested Ardennes region of Wallonia in eastern Belgium, northeast France and Luxembourg, the German advance extended along a front of some forty miles, from Monschau, south of Aachen, to Echternach, just above the junction of the Saar and Mosel rivers.

Planning for the counter-offensive began in the middle of October. Three armies consisting of eight panzer divisions and 16 panzer grenadier and infantry divisions, were assembled within the area of Army Group B. They were tasked to destroy the Allied armies positioned between Antwerp and Bastogne and seize the vital supply bases of Antwerp, Liege and Brussels. The Sixth SS Panzer Army, was given the most important role of seizing crossings over the Meuse north and south of Liege. It was then to swing north and capture Antwerp.

In the centre, the Fifth Panzer Army, re-equipped after its mauling in Normandy, was to penetrate the weakly held Ardennes front on the axis Bastogne-Namur and hold the line of the Meuse around Dinant. Afterwards, it was to extend northwards to cover Brussels and Antwerp and so protect the Sixth SS Panzer Army. The resuscitated Seventh Army was to strike towards the Meuse from Echternach, but its main task was to safeguard the flanks of the two Panzer Armies from the south and south-west.

Absolute tactical surprise was vitally important to the success of the operation, and the Germans recognised they would need to secure the Meuse crossings within 24 hours if they were to stand any chance of achieving their objectives.

Another critical factor was the provision of sufficient fuel for their mechanised forces. Allied bombing and the loss of the Romanian oil fields had caused German supplies to run dangerously low. It proved necessary to delay the operation to provide time to increase stocks, yet they were known to be inadequate on the eve of the offensive, and the Germans were forced to gamble on the capture of Allied fuel depots. Moreover, the need to conserve fuel left them heavily dependent on rail transport to bring troops and vehicles close to the front. This helps to explain why the Allied strategy of railway interdiction subsequently proved so effective.

Finally, although a revitalised Luftwaffe planned to provide air cover for the ground advance on a considerable scale, the German plan nevertheless relied on the prevalence of poor weather to counter-balance Allied air superiority.

Allied intelligence had observed signs of a German build-up to the east of the Ardennes before the offensive was launched. In the last week of November, SHAEF commanders were advised that air reconnaissance, taking advantage of an improvement in the weather, had identified rail movement through the Ruhr to the Cologne-Dusseldorf district. The lines from Darmstadt and Frankfurt were also busy. Four panzer divisions of Sixth SS Panzer Army were believed to be in reserve in the Cologne sector. Similarly, the US IXth Tactical Air Command obtained evidence of large armour and vehicle concentrations in the Eifel district, which was passed to General Hodges of First US Army.

Nevertheless, when the offensive was launched on 16 December, it achieved complete tactical surprise and penetrated the entire length of the Allied front. The initial air response came from the IXth Air Force, which flew over 1,200 sorties on 16 December, attacking observed German ground movements between Cologne and Trier in the face of determined Luftwaffe opposition. The following day, the weather deteriorated, but American Thunderbolts nevertheless struck transport along the roads through Malmedy and Stavelot.

By the 17th, the Allies had agreed that all available aircraft from Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) should support the IXth Air Force on the following day, leaving behind the minimum number to protect the British sector of the front. US aircraft were to give close support to the First and Third US Armies, while the British provided air cover and, in addition, operated east of a line determined by the IXth Air Force. However, nearly all the Typhoons dispatched on 18 December flew abortive missions because of low cloud. That night, 2 TAF Mosquitoes were ordered to search roads leading from the Rhine towards the front in an area stretching from Düsseldorf as far south as Trier. With the help of navigational aids, they bombed cross-roads and rail junctions and attacked several motor convoys.

Meanwhile, Allied attention turned towards deeper targets - the railways, marshalling yards, roads, junctions and bridges sustaining the German advance. Their attack was assigned to the VIIIth Air Force and Bomber Command and began on the night of 17/18 December.

On the 19th, the Allies reorganised their command structure: British and American forces north of the German salient were assigned to Montgomery, while US forces further south remained under Bradley. Air command and control was altered accordingly to give Coningham command of the USAAF's IXth and XXIXth Tactical Air Commands (which normally supported the US First and Ninth Armies). A reinforced XIXth TAC was tasked to support Patton’s Third Army in the south, and the IXth Air Force was strengthened by XIIIth Air Force elements.

Extremely poor weather from the 19th to the 22nd severely disrupted operations by the Allied tactical and strategic air forces. Although Bomber Command attacked the important railway centre of Trier on the 21st, other operations were frustrated by dense cloud cover over the main target areas. During this period, the 5th Panzer Army was forced to bypass Bastogne but achieved more rapid progress towards the Meuse than the 6th SS Panzer Army to the north, which was delayed by stubborn American resistance, fuel supply and other logistical and transport problems.

The weather finally cleared on the 23rd, and conditions remained relatively fine until the 28th. Over these five days, the totality of Allied air power was committed to an all-out effort to halt the German advance. There was no time to devise a complex air plan, but it was clearly essential to delay the German thrust to the maximum extent, while sufficient ground forces were assembled for a counter-attack.

Heavy and medium bombers were sent out to strike communications centres and bridges stretching from directly behind the front to the Rhine and beyond. Meanwhile, the fighter-bombers were tasked to harass movement in the German salient to delay the road convoys supplying the forward troops from the railheads, and blunt the German spearheads by attacking their armour. Once German lines of communication were fully extended, the heavy and medium bombers sought to create choke points inside the salient to delay movement to and from forward areas.

Giessen - a deep but vitally important
railway target attacked by
Bomber Command.

By contrast, Trier lay only a short
distance behind the battle area.

Persistent attacks on railway centres and bridges had the effect of pushing back the all-important German rail-heads as far as the Rhine or even further east. This magnified the strain on motor transport, which in turn consumed fuel that was desperately needed to sustain the offensive. The state of the roads in the wintry weather and the poor condition of many vehicles aggravated transport difficulties. Against this background, the movement of supplies and reinforcements to the more forward German elements was severely delayed or even blocked completely.

Among the communication centres to suffer considerable damage were the important junctions of Bitburg, where movement was completely halted by the end of December, and Gerolstein, which could only be approached by one road. At Prum, motor transport was unable to pass through the town, and detours had to be constructed to bypass it. Strikes on bridges west of the Rhine (largely the work of US heavy and medium bombers), such as those across the rivers Ahr and Mosel, also helped to obstruct rail traffic heading for the front.

By targeting rail centres along the Rhine from Cologne to Coblenz, the Allied air forces drove German traffic out of the river valley as far east as Karssel and Wurzburg, exacerbating the delays and re-routings. The cumulative effect of these air attacks was such that rail travel west of Giessen became virtually impossible in daylight, except when bad weather prohibited flying. The impact was felt as far back as Hamm and Nuremburg.

Road, rail and bridge attacks executed by the RAF and the USAAF
during the Ardennes offensive.

Not only was the flow of supplies interrupted but reinforcements took days to reach the front. Many troops were forced to detrain east of the Rhine and had to make their way forward as best they could. On 28 December, for example, reinforcements for 9 Panzer Division had to detrain near Siegburg (south of Cologne) and then proceed on foot via Bonn for a distance little short of 100 miles. On about the same date, reinforcements for 104 Panzer Grenadier Division travelled for six nights to make the rail journey from Siegen to Bendorf, near Coblenz, and from that point had to march to Mayen, west of the Rhine. Reinforcements for the Volks Grenadier divisions supporting the panzer formations were held up for days because of bomb damage at Cologne, which was described by a USAAF Air Intelligence Summary on 7 January 1945:

Cologne/Nippes. After moderate damage sustained in attacks on 21 and 23 December by RAF formations, the marshalling yards here were very heavily hit on the 24th, again by the RAF. Two days later, the yards as a whole were completely unserviceable, with every siding cut in at least one place, and the locomotive depot and repair shops were further damaged. With the yard heavily loaded at the time of attack, a considerable quantity of rolling stock was derailed and damaged.

Even during the bad weather that characterised the first week of the offensive, the Allies achieved a substantial air effort. In that period, Bomber Command, operating by day and night, flew over 2,000 sorties against communication targets, while the VIIIth Air Force flew over 1,700. Constrained though they were by poor visibility, 2 TAF flew about 2,280 sorties and the IXth Air Force 3,970 sorties during this week.

Nevertheless, once the weather cleared, the scale of effort was magnified many times over. By 27 December, the armoured thrust to the Meuse had been halted and the German operation to seize Antwerp, which depended entirely on speed and surprise, had failed. This was before the Allied ground forces counter-attacked in strength. By the 27th, the RAF and USAAF had flown a total of 34,042 sorties since 16 December, most of which were directed against the German attack.

                                                   Sorties             Bomb    
                                                                           Tonnage

Bomber Command                        4,193                15,702

VIIIth Air Force (incl fighters)        8,404                10,302

IXth Air Force                              11,316                 6,643

2nd TAF                                        5,971                    550

1st (Prov.) TAF                              3,119                  1,511

RAF Fighter Command                   1,039

                                                   --------               ---------
Total                                            34,042               34,708

Out of the total weight of bombs dropped, about 23,830 tons were employed against railway and other communication targets serving the battle area. The Belgian town of St Vith provides one of the best illustrations of how effectively communications targets were interdicted. As well as a railway, roads to Vielsalm, Laroche, Recht and Houffalize passed through St Vith and made it the most important road junction on the Sixth SS Panzer Army front. On Christmas Day, Marauders struck the town, causing considerable damage. The Germans made frantic efforts to clear the streets of rubble during the night. By the morning, a little one-way traffic was possible.

However, at 1500 hours on the 26th, the town was bombed by 294 Lancasters, which dropped 1,138 tons of high explosive. Huge craters in the roads made all routes through St Vith impassable. German sappers, who worked on the St Vith-Malmedy road, stated that it was beyond repair for a distance of from two to three kilometres. On the following day, St Vith was placed out of bounds to both troops and civilians, and military traffic used secondary roads as bypass routes, a distance of about two miles to the north and south. One small bypass in the town itself was cleared through the railway yard on the 27th.

An early strike on St Vith.

The Bomber Command attack.

A higher-altitude image of the raid.

The aftermath.

Of all the attacks on choke points during the Ardennes battle, this was the most effective. Clearance work did not begin in earnest until 29 December, and the roads through the town were still impassable to traffic on 3 January. More German engineers arrived on the 8th, but they were mainly tasked to keep open the by-pass north of St Vith. Attacks by fighter-bombers constantly interrupted repair work, while long-range American artillery intermittently shelled the area. By 11 January, 16 days after the last air bombardment, all roads running through the town remained blocked. Only the junction of two routes leading to Malmedy and Monschau (located in the northern outskirts) had been opened.

The impact of air attacks on German convoys between the rail heads and the front was no less pronounced. It is evident that, when the weather initially improved, the Allied tactical air forces were presented with something of a Turkey shoot. From then on, German vehicles moving along roads through the salient in daylight were running the gauntlet. From the 23rd to the 26th, 2 TAF reported that some 486 attacks on ‘MET’ had destroyed 132 vehicles and damaged 280. Bearing in mind that many more sorties were flown by the Americans over the same period, the total level of destruction wrought on the German columns would have been greater still. One Allied analyst estimated that the two tactical air forces might have destroyed or damaged at least 500 vehicles on the 24th alone, and added:

In addition to whatever effect destruction of vehicles and loads may have had, there is another effect, which may have been more important. The presence of the fighter-bombers caused the enemy to take cover when aircraft were seen or heard, and to proceed mainly at night. The delay so induced must have been considerable.

The 2 TAF Operational Research Section examined the impact of Allied air attacks on the German offensive and reached the following conclusions. The heavy and medium bomber attacks had struck both railway and road systems, targeting key points, including detraining stations, bridges and marshalling yards. The weather did not allow a large effort during the first week of operations, when bomb release averaged about 500 tons per day; however, during the second week, the weight of bombs rose sharply to over 1,500 tons per day and remained at that level.

The German rate of advance continued at about 20 km per day until the 23rd. It slowed on the 24th and ceased altogether on Christmas Day. There was no sudden change in resistance on the ground to account for the abrupt cessation of the advance, whereas the timing of the air effort fits the events perfectly. Although some of the effect of bombing on lines of communication would have been felt at the front within 24 hours, a two-day time lag would represent a more reasonable allowance for the full effect on supplies travelling from the bombed area to the forward troops, and this more extended cause-and-effect sequence was reflected in the measurable deceleration of German progress, the intensification of Allied bombing, and Allied intelligence reports revealing significant shortages of fuel and ammunition among forward German units.

In the same way, the fighter-bombers also played an important part in halting the offensive. Nearly 600 sorties reported attacks on German vehicles on the 24th, and there was no reduction in the flying effort over the next few days. By the 25th, it was impossible for the Germans to make any further progress. Allied fighter-bomber missions were flown nearer to the front than bomber missions, and a time lag of one day would fit the theory that their attacks also substantially reduced the flow of supplies and reinforcements to the armoured spearheads.

The evidence did not show that any part of the indirect air effort was more important than another part. In fact, it seemed probable that attacks on distant marshalling yards and lines of communication, both behind the salient and within it, exerted effects that were complimentary and mutually reinforcing.

The 2 TAF report concluded:

(1) During the period of bad weather before Christmas when little or no flying was possible, the rapid advance continued.

(2) The first day of really heavy bombing in the rear areas coincided with a day of considerable advance by the Germans. 

(3) The following day, when the fighter-bombers resumed their activity, and when the effect of the previous day’s heavy bombing was beginning to be felt on the L of C, the enemy’s advance was very much reduced.

(4) The next day, when the effect of the fighter-bomber attacks on transport and that of the heavy bombing attacks in the rear, had both made themselves felt in the forward areas, the offensive came to a standstill.

Typical of the German experience from 23 December: a demolished bridge, snowy
fields pockmarked by exploding munitions and a road littered with destroyed
or abandoned vehicles.

The perspective of 2 TAF’s fighter-bomber squadrons on this process is well recorded in 83 Group’s intelligence summaries. After several days of relative inactivity, pilots initially struggled to find many profitable target areas. However, on Christmas Day, 83 Group recorded their most successful attacks on ground targets for some months.

The weather was good and in the areas closer behind the battle, flak was much reduced, compared with the deeper L of C covered yesterday … The general area East of MALMEDY was well searched, and excellent results achieved. Movement was scattered and much of the MET was found sheltering in small villages. The biggest concentration attacked was 80+ ….

143 Wing, released from the railway lines, produced a steady score from almost every mission, and their efforts were matched by the other Typhoon Wings.

An accompanying report on the ground situation noted:

Both 1st and 3rd US Armies report a considerable decrease of enemy movement and offensive activity. Much of the credit for this satisfactory state of affairs can be undoubtedly taken by the Air Forces.

The following day produced very similar results:

Practically every mission that went out came back with some MET to its credit, and for the second day in succession a very satisfactory total was achieved. The highest single score of the day came from 143 Wing, who claimed 8 MET destroyed, including 4 petrol bowsers, and 16 MET damaged near St Vith.

181 Squadron of 124 Wing, on an Immediate Support call SE of Dinant, attacked a number of tanks, reporting many of the crews killed and 2 tanks destroyed, 2 damaged. Forward troops later reported 7 tanks “knocked out”, one of which was a Royal Tiger.

There are numerous ground photographs of destroyed German tanks in the area where this engagement took place, but Royal Tigers are not in evidence. However, such was the bulk of these 68-ton monsters that several appear in high-altitude imagery of another area of the front. They belonged to the notorious Kampfgruppe Peiper, part of Sixth SS Panzer Army, which penetrated as far as the mountain village of La Gleize before running out of fuel and abandoning all vehicles. When at last the sun shone down on the Ardennes on Christmas Eve, 1944, they were captured for posterity on the surrounding slopes, just hours after Peiper and his men began their trek back to German lines (link to whole photo).

Tigers 213 and 211 just south of La Gleize; other tanks
are visible (arrowed) in the village.

Tiger 213 at the same location.

Now in the village square, Tiger 213 is by far the
most famous resident of La Gleize.

Tiger 223, east of the village, was abandoned early in
the battle after losing a track.

A ground photo of Tiger 223 - minus one track - after
the Americans captured La Gleize.

Tiger 334 was deployed north-east of La Gleize.

A ground view of the same tank.

The employment of air power in the Ardennes was not solely concerned with offensive air operations. The  Allied strategic and tactical reconnaissance squadrons also played an important role. Air imagery provided ground commanders with much valuable information on the movement of enemy divisions directly behind the front, and reports were supplied on communications targets that were of inestimable value for planning interdiction strikes from one day to the next. As soon as the weather over the Ardennes improved, Allied commanders benefited from far better situational awareness than their German adversaries.

Equally significant was the role of air transport, notably parachute and glider-borne resupply to the beleaguered garrison of Bastogne, despite very poor weather conditions and strong German opposition. Moreover, the assembly of reserve ground formations for the Allied counter-attack in the New Year was accelerated by the airborne deployment of an entire division to the continent from the UK.

German ground forces showed up well against the snow 
in night reconnaissance imagery.

Taken on 24 December, this image captures the Baugnez 
road junction, scene of the infamous Malmedy
massacre (arrowed).

Another RAF air reconnaissance image showing
American Waco gliders littering the fields
around Bastogne.

At the same time, the Allied fighter forces frustrated the Luftwaffe’s attempts to secure temporary air superiority west of the Rhine. Although flying an average of around 600 sorties per day, the Luftwaffe exerted little influence on the course of the battle. At best, they diverted a proportion of the Allied fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons from attacking ground targets for a time, but their efforts proved impossible to sustain, partly because of air-to-air combat losses and partly because of Allied air attacks on German airfields.

Arguably, the Luftwaffe should have struck against the more forward Allied airfields at the start of the offensive to reduce the scale of the Allied air response as far as possible. Instead, committed to a vain effort to provide cover for German ground forces, they delayed their attack on the RAF and the USAAF (Operation Bodenplatte) until New Year's Day. Achieving complete tactical surprise, they destroyed a number of Allied aircraft that will never be established with certainty. The lower estimates suggest around 140 destroyed and 110 damaged, but more recent research points to higher figures, and one contemporary German estimate based on air reconnaissance imagery claimed 479 Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground or in air combat, and 114 were damaged.

However, in the process, the Luftwaffe sacrificed nearly 200 aircraft, having already lost over 700 since 16 December. Bodenplatte exerted no significant effect on the Allies but initiated the Luftwaffe’s final, terminal decline.

Expensive but sustainable: an RAF Lancaster destroyed
during Operation Bodenplatte.

Unsustainable attrition: one of the many German fighters
shot down during the operation.

Last, but by no means least, it is all too easy to forget the RAF's ground presence in the Ardennes in December 1944. On the 16th, the radar and signals units of 72 Wing were deployed well forward in an area extending from Vielselm in the north to Bastogne in the south, under the protection of two RAF Regiment armoured car squadrons and a rifle squadron. Often in close proximity to German forces, the Regiment squadrons subsequently acted as pathfinders, escorts and rearguards to ensure that the technical units and nearly all the highly-classified tools of their trade were withdrawn to the safety of Allied lines. What remained was destroyed before it could fall into enemy hands.

Walcheren: Flooding an Island

The flooding of Walcheren was one of the most remarkable actions of the campaign to liberate northwest Europe in 1944, yet today it is one of the least remembered. Conducted to support two amphibious landings on the Dutch island, the flooding occurred against a background of worsening manpower shortages in Britain and Canada. Neither country was in a position to absorb heavy casualties by this stage of the war, yet the capture of Walcheren had the potential to be an extremely complex and costly operation.

Reference: Flooding Walcheren: Allied Conference of 29 September 1944

The reason for launching amphibious landings on Walcheren on 1 November 1944 can be summed up in one word - sustainability. The Allies had expected the campaign to liberate northwest Europe to involve a steady advance from Normandy towards Germany. In reality, they found themselves bottled up in Normandy for more than two months. Then at last came the breakout. The Germans suffered enormous losses during the retreat from Falaise in August and were unable to re-establish a defensive line. The Allies advanced into northern France and Belgium virtually unopposed. But a new problem quickly developed - logistics.

It was always clear that the availability of ports would be crucial to the progress of the Allies’ advance - hence the importance attached to the Mulberry harbour and the capture of Cherbourg soon after the D-Day landings. However, by early September, the Allied armies had reached Belgium and northeast France, and were still relying on a supply chain stretching back to Normandy. The logistical strain became increasingly severe. It had been hoped that the more northerly channel ports would soon fall into Allied hands, but the Germans strenuously defended Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais, compelling the Allies to lay siege to them, one after the other.

The capture of the channel ports was assigned to First Canadian Army, under General Harry Crerar, supported by Bomber Command and half of Coningham’s 2nd Tactical Air Force; the channel ports represented Bomber Command’s main effort in September 1944. They were ultimately captured, but their harbour facilities were largely wrecked by the action of German demolition teams.

In the meantime - indeed, before any of the channel ports had been liberated - British forces reached Antwerp, then the largest port in Europe. They encountered minimal opposition and, with the help of the Belgian resistance, captured the harbour virtually intact. Yet shipping can only reach Antwerp via an extended western approach through the Scheldt Estuary, and the land north and south of the estuary remained in German hands. To the north, the Dutch island of Walcheren dominated the mouth of the river. Walcheren was as strongly defended as any of the channel ports and was one of the most formidable parts of the Atlantic Wall: it was literally encased in concrete. To the south, the area around Breskens was also a German stronghold.

On 5 September, Eisenhower told Montgomery that it was vital to open up the approaches to Antwerp, but Montgomery did not embrace the task enthusiastically. His focus was to the northeast - to the Rhine and the German frontier - and he believed that Dempsey's Second Army might soon cross the Rhine and enter Germany if it was given logistical priority over the American forces further south. He did not secure the logistical support he was seeking but nevertheless persuaded Eisenhower that he should launch Operation Market Garden - the largest airborne operation of the war to date - in an attempt to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine. Market Garden proved a costly failure, but early in October, a month after the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery was still seeking a route into Germany. He had eventually to be forced, very reluctantly, to reorient his focus towards the Scheldt Estuary.

The task of capturing Walcheren was again assigned to the First Canadian Army. To begin with, it was necessary to secure the approaches to the island, namely the area around Breskens south of the estuary and the South Beveland Peninsula, east of Walcheren. This proved extremely difficult due primarily to the terrain, which favoured defence. It was largely polder-land, consisting of soft ground interspersed with numerous obstacles - drainage channels, rivers, streams and canals. The Germans had also flooded substantial areas. The few roads were narrow and often raised above the surrounding fields, so that vehicle and troop movements along them were extremely vulnerable. Ultimately, Breskens and South Beveland were taken, but their conquest proved difficult and costly, and it seemed certain that Walcheren would be an even more hazardous objective.

We will consider Walcheren’s defences in more detail later. For the moment, the key point is this: to stand any chance of capturing the island without incurring heavy casualties, it was vital for the Allies to identify and exploit German vulnerabilities. They came to the conclusion that there were two.

First, while the Germans occupied very strong defensive positions on land, the Allies had air superiority and complete control of the sea. Hence, there was clear scope for exploiting all three environments to gain advantage over the German defenders, exposing them to multiple parallel air, land and maritime effects. Ultimately, this would involve an extended preparatory air bombardment of the island, one ground assault from the South Beveland Peninsula (which failed), and two amphibious landings, which were both staged successfully on the morning of 1 November. The first of these, Operation Infatuate 1 (155 Brigade spearheaded by 4 Commando), took place at Vlissingen; the second, Infatuate 2 (4 Special Service Brigade), was staged at Westkapelle on the west coast of Walcheren. Extensive fire support plans were drawn up, incorporating air support, long-range artillery fire from across the Scheldt, and naval bombardment for the operation at Westkapelle.

The second German vulnerability lay in the topography of Walcheren: much of the island was below sea level. Crerar’s principal corps commander, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, therefore proposed bombing the sea wall and using flooding as an offensive weapon. Simonds’ proposal could be seen as an early application of ‘effects-based’ warfare. Obviously, he had no interest in destroying the sea wall per se. Rather, he was interested in the effects of the subsequent flooding, which he expected to eliminate German defences behind the sea wall and destroy the integrity of the defending force - its command and control, movement and logistics. The German garrison would be left fragmented and confined to the few higher areas of Walcheren.

Crerar 

Simonds

Flooding was also likely to strike a significant blow against German morale. Germany was scraping the barrel for manpower by the later months of 1944 and the quality of some of the defending troops on Walcheren was very questionable. Finally, the coast around Walcheren was (and still is) almost entirely characterised by high sand dunes or man-made sea walls. There were very few locations where a large amphibious force equipped with tanks and support vehicles could have exited the island's beaches in the absence of a physical breach in the sea defences.

Simonds’ proposal was received with considerable scepticism. With the obvious exception of the dams raid (a very different type of operation), bombing had never been used in this way before; the sea wall appeared to be a formidable target, measuring 70 metres at its base, and 20 at its apex. Another obvious objection to flooding was that it might impose handicaps on the amphibious assault force that were no less severe than those inflicted on Walcheren's German garrison.

Nevertheless, he was not dissuaded. Already famed for his exploitation of 'Kangaroo' armoured personnel carriers in Normandy, by the later months of 1944 he had another card up his sleeve - tracked amphibians like the Buffalo and the Weasel. Potentially, these would allow his forces to manoeuvre across flooded areas inaccessible to their adversaries.

A Buffalo landing from the Scheldt Estuary

A Weasel in Vlissingen, November 1944

Events subsequently played into Simonds' hands. First, on the night of 23/24 September, the RAF attacked and emptied a significant section of the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The canal was a banked up structure quite similar to parts of Walcheren's sea wall; consequently, there was now a rough precedent for the sort of operation that Simonds had in mind. Second, a few days later, General Crerar fell seriously ill and Simonds was placed in temporary command of First Canadian Army. In this new capacity, he was perfectly placed to promote his plan and managed to secure the support of both Eisenhower and Montgomery. The RAF subsequently agreed to mount an experimental attack on 3 October near Westkapelle (one of the most exposed sections of the sea wall).

Inevitably, the flooding threatened to cause severe collateral damage, extending from civilian casualties to the inundation of buildings and agricultural land, loss of livestock and deterioration of soil quality. The Dutch were allies, and their government-in-exile had been based in Britain since 1940. They were not consulted about the plan, but they were advised of its basic intent.

The response - a predictably strong protest - was passed to SHAEF but rejected. However, the Allies did agree to broadcast warnings to the inhabitants of Walcheren and to drop leaflets. The Dutch were told that the bombing of German forces in coastal areas was imminent and that flooding was likely. People were advised to leave these areas if possible, or to move to places of safety well away from German troops. Unfortunately the full significance of these warnings was not widely appreciated and, in any case, there were very few obvious refuges.

On 3 October, 259 Lancasters and Mosquitoes of Bomber Command delivered 1,262 tons of explosive on the sea wall at Westkapelle. The wall was breached, and the flooding of Walcheren began. This first attack was followed on 7 October by two more on either side of Vlissingen. A fourth raid took place on the 11th near Veere, to the north of the island. The success of the flooding lent impetus to the plans for amphibious landings. In the meantime, the German perimeter defences on Walcheren’s sea wall were repeatedly targeted by Allied air attacks.

Westkapelle, 3 October 1944

Bombs falling on the sea wall west of Vlissingen,
7 October

East of Vlissingen, 7 October; note the German anti-
aircraft artillery positions about to be inundated 

Veere under attack, 11 October 1944

*                    *                    *

Depth is critically important to the strength of a prepared defensive position; a single line of defences may be pierced with relative ease. On Walcheren, the Germans had achieved depth through the construction of an elaborate interior defensive system, part of which is shown in the photographs below. The gun emplacements here were actually designed to defend Vlissingen from an inland flanking attack if the Allies landed on Walcheren's northern coast. The nearby waterway was in fact a specially constructed anti-tank ditch.

Air reconnaissance photo of Vlissengen's interior
defences

The same defence line today

Two more gun emplacements next to the anti-tank ditch

A few fields away, the Germans positioned a coastal gun battery named W10 by the Allies - all the main German positions here were assigned ‘W’ numbers. Typically, the batteries housed two or more large guns ranging from 100 to 155mm calibre. Some, like W10, pointed north; others pointed south-west to protect the Scheldt Estuary. Positioned inland, the larger gun batteries were less vulnerable to naval gunfire than those on Walcheren's perimeter; only the fire control post would have been sited directly on the coast.

Virtually all of Walcheren’s perimeter fortifications have now gone, but the surviving interior defences give some idea of how formidable the island fortress was in 1944. There were approximately 20 large (75mm to a maximum of 220mm) batteries on the sea wall, with up to six guns each; a further ten batteries were positioned inland. Most were housed in closed casemates by late 1944, although a few were still in open emplacements.

The W10 battery

The W10 battery flooded in 1944

W12

An observation bunker on the coast that served one of
the inland gun batteries; the bunker interior has been
perfectly restored

The larger batteries made up only part of the defensive system. There were many more lighter gun positions, pillboxes and strongpoints, supported by networks of trenches. Minefields, barbed wire and beach obstacles were liberally employed. Vlissingen was almost a fortress in its own right. Elsewhere there were two basic lines of defence – the coastal defences on the sea wall and a second line in the hinterland. The second line effectively blocked all the exits from the west coast - from Westkapelle, Zouteland, Domburg, Dishoek, and Vlissingen itself. The whole system was planned with immense thought, care and expertise, and many defensive positions were designed and sited to be mutually supporting.

Before September 1944, the garrison on Walcheren numbered around 4,000, largely elements of the 70th Division. They were a mixture of low-quality garrison troops and more experienced troops who had picked up stomach wounds and complaints in earlier campaigns, and therefore had special dietary requirements (hence their nick-name of the ‘white-bread’ division). However, during September and October, their numbers were swelled by elements withdrawn from Belgium, Breskens and South Beveland, so that by mid-October an estimated 9,000 Germans were on Walcheren. Yet many (although by no means all) were exhausted, demoralised and unwilling to offer more than token resistance. The larger coastal batteries were manned by German naval marines.

The German high command had assigned top priority to the defence of the channel ports and the Scheldt Estuary after the Allied breakout from Normandy and the fall of Antwerp. It was clear that logistics were the Allies’ Achilles heel and would determine the pace of their advance towards Germany. Hitler himself issued an explicit directive ordering that ‘fortress Walcheren’ had to be held at all costs. ‘Fortress’ status indicated that German military personnel on the island would be subject to particularly severe disciplinary measures.

By October 1944, the Germans were expecting the Allies to attack Walcheren, but they do not appear to have anticipated the destruction of the sea wall and the subsequent flooding. In some ways this is surprising, as they had often themselves used flooding to enhance defences around areas such as Normandy, Dieppe, Breskens and South Beveland. The first flooding operation (3 October) was executed by a force of 250 Lancasters, accompanied by nine Mosquitos used for target marking. The raid was timed to occur at high tide, when the wall would be under greatest pressure from the sea.

The Lancasters were to arrive in nine waves. The first eight would carry a mix of 1,000lb and 4,000lb bombs, including delayed-action bombs to prevent the Germans from repairing the sea wall. For accuracy, they were to attack from an altitude of between 7,000 and 9,000ft. They would approach Walcheren from the north-west, release their weapons, and then turn immediately away from the island to limit their exposure to German anti-aircraft fire. The ninth wave would consist entirely of 617 Squadron aircraft, carrying Tallboys and, of necessity, bombing from higher altitude. The Special Instructions contained in the Operation Order read: ‘By this means it is hoped to achieve a concentration of craters sufficient, in conjunction with the scouring action of the spring high water, to breach the sea wall.’ ‘Hoped’ is the key word here: no one had any idea whether the plan would actually work.

Surprisingly, Bomber Command’s task proved less difficult than expected. The attack began at 1300 and the wall was breached at about 1400 by the fifth wave of Lancasters. By the time 617 Squadron reached Walcheren, the sea water was pouring into the island interior, so they returned to base with their Tallboys. Yet although Bomber Command had quite easily punctured the wall, it soon became clear that the flooding process would be very protracted unless further attacks were launched - hence the follow-up raids at Vlissingen and Veere. The later missions all involved fewer aircraft than the Westkapelle operation, and no more 4,000lb bombs or Tallboys were employed. Throughout, the Luftwaffe was completely absent; the only significant problems were caused by cloud in the target areas, which forced aircraft to descend to lower altitudes where the threat from AAA was greater (the ‘hard deck’ was 4,000ft). But there were very few losses.

The flood water eventually covered three quarters of Walcheren’s surface area. Only the perimeter, Middleburg, parts of Vlissingen and the extreme east of the island were not inundated.

The flooding achieved precisely those effects that Simonds had anticipated. Most obviously, it completely destroyed the German second-line defences. The inland batteries and pillboxes were rendered useless and the vast majority never fired a shot in anger. Trenches were obliterated; weapons and ammunition were damaged or lost completely. Hence, across much of the island, the German defences were confined to a single perimeter line; there was no longer any scope for defending in depth.

Of particular note, flooding eliminated any threat from the inland batteries covering the Westkapelle area - the target for Operation Infatuate 2. Consequently, on the morning of 1 November, the only German batteries defending Westkapelle were located in isolated positions along the coast. They nevertheless engaged the landing force very effectively, causing heavy losses to the Royal Navy's Support Squadron, damaging a number of landing craft, and placing the entire venture in jeopardy for a time. Had the inland batteries been active too, Infatuate 2 would probably have failed.

Additionally, by neutralising the W10 and W14 batteries, and several others, the flooding operation substantially reduced the volume of fire that the Germans could direct towards the mouth of the Scheldt - the location of Infatuate 1. Flooding provided a far more effective means of suppressing the German defences than direct targeting from the air or naval bombardment.

The W14 battery at Westkapelle before
and after the raid of 3 October 1944

One of the W14 casemates today

Secondly, the flooding caused the German garrison to disintegrate. Large numbers of troops were moved away from the western coast (where the Allies were planning to land), to dry ground on the east of the island. Centralised command and control became impossible and the senior German commanders found themselves cut off in Middelburg, with their troops dispersed and isolated around the island. Movement, re-supply and reinforcement could only be effected with enormous difficulty, if at all. One of the three main batteries covering Westkapelle, W13, ran out of ammunition during the Allied landings because flooding had rendered re-supply impossible.

The W13 battery, south of Westkapelle

A superb oblique shot of W13's four casemates

Thirdly, German sources suggest that there was a severe decline in their morale - another important Allied objective. This is easy to understand. The German forces on Walcheren were already cut off from the mainland, exposed to constant air attacks, and threatened with invasion. Now they were flooded out and cut off from their commanding officers and such supplies as had been accumulated on the island for its defence. Half-hearted efforts to build an emergency sea wall to stem the flooding proved fruitless, for the Germans lacked sufficient manpower, materials and technical expertise. 

Fourth, the breach in the sea wall at Westkapelle was effectively incorporated in the Allied landing plan. On 1 November, a significant proportion of the amphibious force went straight through the gap and then fanned out behind the German defences. No such manoeuvre would have been possible while the sea wall remained intact.

The landing beaches at Westkapelle

Buffaloes advancing through the Westkapelle gap

In summary, Bomber Command’s action in breaching Walcheren’s sea wall played a crucial part in the ultimate success of Operation Infatuate 1 and 2. The flooding significantly reduced the capability of the German defences, caused the disintegration of the island garrison, and weakened the defenders’ morale; the Westkapelle gap also provided the Allied landing force with a vital route off the beach. It was an inspired concept on the part of Lieutenant General Simonds’ in terms of thinking ‘outside the box’, thinking about the effects of military actions (and not just the attrition of the enemy), and identifying - as well as exploiting - key German vulnerabilities.

Collateral damage across the island was immense. Although the vast majority of civilians survived, 160 died at Westkapelle out of a population of 2,300. Located adjacent to the sea wall destroyed by Bomber Command on 3 October, the town was particularly vulnerable. Elsewhere, there was widespread and severe damage to residential property and the local economy. Soil was contaminated by salt water, and thousands of cattle were drowned. And although work to rebuild the sea wall began in the spring of 1945, the last gap was not finally closed until February 1946.

However, in the longer term, the flooding would paradoxically have beneficial economic effects, for it provided an opportunity in the post-war years for the island’s agricultural system to be completely overhauled. The historic and heavily subdivided field layout, with its multiplicity of minor waterways, was replaced by a far more modern system based on larger fields and more modern drainage provisions. This allowed improved farming techniques to be introduced, and agricultural productivity rose significantly as a result. By the mid-1950s, agricultural output on Walcheren vastly exceeded the levels recorded before the Second World War.

Beyond this, the collateral effects of the flooding must be considered in context. Walcheren was of enormous strategic importance to the Allied war effort in north-west Europe; moreover, the island’s defences had the capacity to inflict very heavy casualties on Allied landing forces. Hence, although the cost in terms of collateral damage was high, the flooding of Walcheren unquestionably saved the lives of many Allied troops. Allied casualties during the landings numbered 818 killed, wounded and missing, while the total for the capture of the island, including the landing phase, did not exceed 1,500.

Furthermore, a more protracted conventional battle for Walcheren - involving higher Allied casualties - might also have had calamitous consequences for the island's population and economy. It is worth remembering that barely a single building in Vlissingen was left intact by the fighting in November 1944, but much of the damage was inflicted by Allied artillery fire from across the Scheldt Estuary, or by the street-to-street, house-to-house clearance that was required to evict the Germans.